Lightfoot v. People

• Decision Date: 28 April 1868
• Citation: 16 Mich. 507
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: James Lightfoot v. The People

16 Mich. 507

James Lightfoot v. The People

Supreme Court of Michigan

April 28, 1868

April 21, 1868; April 22, 1868, Heard [Syllabus Material]

Error to the recorder's court of Detroit.

The defendant was convicted upon an information for the crime of burglary.

The case was removed to this court by writ of error with bill of exceptions.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Judgment affirmed.

Wm. L Stoughton, Attorney-General, for the people:

1. A witness stated that the defendant admitted, at the time of the commission of the offense, that he was the person who broke in the same premises in the previous May. This was a part of the res gestoe, and, therefore, admissible: 1 Greenl. Ev., 108.

Evidence may be admissible for one purpose though not for another: 5 Serg. and Rawle, 117; 10 Id. 14; 1 Phil. on Ev., 739.

The burglary in May was not under consideration, but the identity of the defendant and his knowledge of the premises and his antecedent preparations, were proper subjects of inquiry: Whart. Am. Cr. L., § 828; 3 Seld. 445; 2 Cush. 590.

The fact that the breaking in May was a distinct felony, does not necessarily render the evidence incompetent: Bish. Cr. Proceed, § 493, and note 2; 16 N.Y. 344; 4 Gratt. 534; 21 Pick. 515.

It is not necessary that the evidence should bear directly upon the issue. It is admissible if it tends to prove the issue, or constitutes a link in the chain of proof: 1 Greenl. Ev., § 51, and cases there cited; 15 Mich. 397.

2. Upon the defense the counsel for the prisoner offered in evidence the minutes of the testimony taken by the clerk of the police court upon the preliminary examination, and returned to the recorder's court for the purpose of contradiction. This evidence was objected to by the counsel for the people, and the court rejected all of such depositions "excepting the testimony of two witnesses, Mary Cassidy and Hortense Cassidy, concerning the facts to which their attention was particularly called on the cross-examination."

Before the credit of a witness can be impeached by proof of inconsistent statements, whether written or verbal, a foundation must be laid by questioning him as to his former statements: 1 Greenl. Ev., § 462; 1 Walk. Ch., 48; 2 Mich. 415; 2 Phil. Ev., 958; 19 N. Y., 549; 2 Broad. and Bing., 313-314.

If such statement is in writing and in existence, it must be produced and shown to the witness: 1 Greenl. Ev., § 463; 2 Phil. Ev., 962-967; The Queen's Case, 2 B. and B., 286; 8 Wend. 395-398; 8 C. and P., 26, 726, 7 Id. 676.

And in case of depositions taken before an examining magistrate, it must be shown that they are the identical papers without alteration: 8 Wend. 599; Comp. L., § 5992; Sess. L. 1863, p. 307.

The record shows that the depositions were not shown to the witnesses, and that no proof was offered in relation to them. They were not therefore admissible for any purpose.

H. M. & W. E. Cheever, for defendant:

1. It is not competent for the prosecution to place before the jury facts even tending to prove another distinct offense, so as thereby to raise a presumption that the prisoner is guilty of the offense charged in the information: Foster, 245.

It has been held on indictments for burglary and for larceny that evidence of the commission of previous crimes was inadmissible: Birdeye's Case, 4 C. and C., 386; Vandercomb's Case, 2 Leach 708.

The only exception to this is evidence of other transactions, which, by reason of the time of their commission, seem to be a part of the offense charged, or are so connected that its admissibility can not be avoided, or where the guilty intent or knowledge of the prisoner is material to the issue.

2. The depositions of the two witnesses, Mary and Hortense Cassidy, were admissible.

By section 2 of the police court act, the police justice is given the same power in the examination of criminal cases, in this city, as is possessed by justices of the peace outside the city, and he is subject to the same laws: Laws of 1850, p. 365, § 2.

Justices of the peace, in the examination of criminal cases not cognizable by them, are governed by the following provision:

"The evidence given by the several witnesses examined shall be reduced to writing by the magistrate, or under his direction, and shall be signed by the witnesses respectively:" Comp. L., § 5992; Laws of 1863, p. 307.

In this case, the evidence of these two witnesses was "reduced to writing" by the police court clerk, acting "under the direction" of the police justice. The statute does not require the evidence to be read over to the witnesses before signing. They signed it, and it was taken in exact conformity to the statute.

The depositions were regularly taken, and produced from the legal custodian to whom it was required by law to be returned.

It is admissible to contradict or to impeach the witnesses against the prisoner without reading to them the entire deposition: 3 State Trials, 131; Hawks P. C., 62, chap. 46 § 9; 10 Gratt. (Va.), 658; 2 Smedes and Marsh., 10 Miss. 54; Thatcher's Crim. Cases, 82; 19 Wend. 569.

Campbell, J. Cooley, Ch. J. Graves, J.concurred. Christiancy, J. did not sit.

OPINION

Campbell J.:

Defendant was indicted for burglary. Upon the trial one of the witnesses, in giving a narrative of what took place at the time, stated that defendant said he was the man who had broken into the house in the previous May.

The witness was then asked whether the house was broken into in May, and was allowed under objection to answer the question and describe the breaking.

This was improperly allowed. What the witness said about defendant's statement concerning the May burglary would not have been admissible as a distinct piece of evidence. It only got into the case as part of a narrative of what took place during the burglary for which the prisoner was on trial, and was not objected to for that reason. But the further testimony was independent evidence, having no tendency to prove anything but the earlier offense, for which defendant was not on trial. There was no connection between the two crimes, and proving one had no tendency to prove the other. It is very manifest that the admission of such testimony must prejudice the jury strongly against the prisoner, while he can not be expected to have made any preparation to meet such irrelevant charges. The rule of exclusion is even more important in criminal than in civil cases, because the consequences of its violation are more serious, and the danger of conviction on irrelevant matter is more direct: 2 Russ. Cr., 772; Foster, 245; Roscoe Cr. Ev., 81; People v. Jenness, 5 Mich. 305.

The defense also offered to show by the depositions returned upon the preliminary examination that two witnesses sworn on the trial had testified differently in material respects there from what they did on the trial. The court refused to allow any part of the depositions to be read in contradiction, except such portions as the witnesses had been questioned on upon cross-examination had, and as to which they had been asked whether they had not made such statements.

The rule applied by the recorder was the same which is adopted where the witness is sought to be impeached by proof of contradictory oral statements. It is the rule in this state, as in most other places, that, where a witness is to be impeached upon contradictory verbal statements, the inquiry must first be made of the witness himself whether he has previously made such statements, with convenient certainty of time, place and circumstance: Sawyer v. Sawyer, Walker Ch., 48; Smith v. People, 2 Mich. 415. But where the statements relied upon for contradiction are not verbal, the rule is otherwise.

In the Queen's Case, 2 Brod. and Bing., 284, this subject was somewhat carefully investigated, and it was stated by the judges that it was not competent to ask a witness whether he had not made certain statements in a letter but that when he had admitted the letter, the letter itself was to be read in evidence; and the chief justice said, "one of the reasons for the rule requiring the production of written instruments is in order that the court may be possessed of the whole;" and he further remarks, that "the whole, if produced, may have an effect very different from that which might be produced by a statement of a part."

And in the same case it was held that a witness could not be cross-examined concerning such statements without first ascertaining whether they were verbal or written, and if written they must be shown by the writing alone.

It is a general rule that verbal admissions are only receivable of facts provable by parol. This is the ground upon which it has been held that a witness can not be inquired of as to whether or not he has made particular written statements Bellinger v. People, 8 Wend. 595; Newcomb v. Griswold, 24 N.Y. 298. And this rule applies with much more force to depositions than to private writings, for they stand as solemn testimony, and in many cases are receivable as original proof where the witness is not attainable. His oath on one occasion is as solemn and binding as on any other; and if his sworn declarations are inconsistent, they will, unless some good explanation is given, destroy the credit of the witness to a greater or less extent. They are not like verbal conversations which may easily be perverted by treacherous memories, but stand without danger or change or misunderstanding through lapse of time. Where a witness has once been examined before a magistrate, the law presumes that the depositions contain all of his statements. It presumes further that those statements of witnesses were the only ground on which the prisoner was regarded as worthy of being charged as...