Lighthouse Baptist Church, Inc. v. Chemung Cnty.
| Decision Date | 14 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 6:20-CV-7000 EAW |
| Parties | LIGHTHOUSE BAPTIST CHURCH, INC., RICHARD HACK, MATT MAYER, and PAUL GLISSON, Plaintiffs, v. CHEMUNG COUNTY, CHEMUNG COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT, PETE BUZZETTI, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Chemung County's Public Health Director, CHRISTOPHER MOSS, Individually and in his Official Capacity as County Executive, and MARI DELANEY, Individually and in her Official Capacity as Chairman for the Chemung County Health Department, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of New York |
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD United States District Court Chief Judge
Plaintiffs Lighthouse Baptist Church, Inc. (“LBC”), Richard Hack, Matt Mayer, and Paul Glisson (collectively “Plaintiffs”) claim that Defendants Chemung County, Chemung County Health Department, Pete Buzzetti Christopher Moss, and Mari Delaney (collectively “Defendants”) violated their First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by limiting LBC's ability to conduct religious services during the COVID-19 pandemic. (Dkt. 1). On December 4, 2020, the Court entered a stipulated preliminary injunction (the “Stipulated Preliminary Injunction”) at the request of the parties. (Dkt. 9).
Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees. (Dkt. 11). Because Plaintiffs' motion is untimely and they have failed to properly file a motion seeking an extension for excusable neglect (instead, simply raising in their reply memorandum of law the argument that the Court may extend the deadline), the Court denies Plaintiffs' motion, although it does so without prejudice. Plaintiffs may file a subsequent fee application contemporaneously with a motion to extend the deadline within 45 days of the date of this Decision and Order. In the meantime, because further litigation will only increase the amount of fees that Plaintiffs seek, the Court directs the parties to select a mediator through the Court's Alternative Dispute Resolution Program and conduct a mediation of this dispute within 30 days of the date of this Decision and Order. These deadlines may be extended upon mutual consent of the parties through a letter submission to the Court, if necessary.
Plaintiffs commenced the instant action on November 20, 2020, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declaratory relief and preliminary and final injunctions for alleged violations of rights guaranteed under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Dkt. 1). The alleged violations stem from Defendants' attempts to ascertain and manage a suspected COVID-19 outbreak at LBC. (See Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 14-89). Particularly Plaintiffs challenge a notice of closure that the Chemung County Health Department posted on LBC's door on September 8, 2020, prohibiting LBC from holding services. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 21-24; Dkt. 2-2 at 9). In addition to their complaint, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin Defendants from enforcing this closure order. (Dkt. 2).
On November 24, 2020, the Court ordered an expedited briefing schedule regarding Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and set oral argument for December 10, 2020. (Dkt. 5). In light of Plaintiffs' failure to comply with Local Rule 65(a)(4), the Court denied Plaintiffs' request for an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 3). Because Plaintiffs' filings failed to comply with several rules and procedures, the Court admonished Plaintiffs that further failures to comply may result in denial of the requested relief. (Id.).
On December 4, 2020, at the request of the parties, the Court entered the Stipulated Preliminary Injunction granting Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and enjoining Defendants from imposing any restrictions on Plaintiffs other than those contained in the “Interim Guidance for Religious & Funeral Services During the Covid-19 Public Health Emergency” promulgated by the New York State Department of Health, and requiring the withdrawal of the letter dated September 24, 2020, from Chemung County Attorney M. Hyder Hussain. (Dkt. 9).
On February 19, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. (Dkt. 11). Plaintiffs seek reimbursement of $32, 013.50 in attorneys' fees and $863.75 in costs and disbursements, for a total award of $32, 877.25, claiming that they are “prevailing parties” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Defendants filed their opposition papers on March 12, 2021 (Dkt. 13; Dkt. 14; Dkt. 15), and Plaintiffs filed their reply on March 19, 2021 (Dkt. 16).
Where, as here, an action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, ” subject to certain exceptions not relevant here. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). “[P]laintiffs may be considered ‘prevailing parties' for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). “However, while prevailing parties are eligible for fees under § 1988, they are not invariably entitled to them[, ]” and “it is not the technical fact of prevailing party status, but the ‘degree of success obtained' that determines a party's entitlement to a fee award and, relatedly, the reasonableness of the amount of that award.” Husain v. Springer, 579 Fed.Appx. 3, 4 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992)).
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' motion is untimely pursuant to Rule 54(d)(2)(B)(i), which requires that a motion for attorneys' fees “be filed no later than 14 days after the entry of judgment[.]” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2)(B)(i). The Court entered the Stipulated Preliminary Injunction on December 4, 2020, and Plaintiffs filed their motion on February 19, 2021. Plaintiffs argue that Rule 54 does not define “entry of judgment” and the Court “should consult the rule's history, such as its advisory notes, to interpret its meaning.” (Dkt. 16 at 2). They further argue that the advisory committee's notes suggest that “judgment” refers only to a final judgment on the merits. (Id. at 2-3).
There is relatively little case law regarding whether a preliminary injunction constitutes a “judgment” that triggers Rule 54's 14-day filing deadline, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has not addressed the issue. However, on July 16, 2021- after the parties had completed briefing on the instant motion-the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit entered a decision holding that “[b]ecause preliminary injunctions are orders from which an appeal lies, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), a plain reading of Rule 54 shows that the entry of a preliminary injunction triggers the fourteen-day deadline to move for attorney's fees, unless a statute or a court order provides otherwise.” Spirit Lake Tribe v. Jaeger, 5 F.4th 849, 853 (8th Cir. 2021).
The Court finds the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in Spirit Lake persuasive. As the Eighth Circuit noted, Rule 54 defines judgment “to include ‘any order from which an appeal lies.'” Id. at 853 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(a)). An order granting a preliminary injunction is one from which an immediate appeal lies. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291(a)(1). It is true that the advisory committee note to Rule 54 “states that the rule establishes a deadline for motions for attorneys' fees-14 days after final judgment unless the court or a statute specifies some other time.” Spirit Lake, 5 F.4th at 853 (quotation omitted and emphasis added). Although only cited by Plaintiffs indirectly for other purposes (Dkt. 16 at 4), the Second Circuit referenced this advisory committee note in Weyant v. Okst, wherein while considering whether motions pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50(b), 59(a), and 59(e) suspended the 14-day filing limitation, the court stated “that a Rule 54(d)(2)(B) motion is timely if filed no later than 14 days after the resolution of such a Rule 50(b), 52(b), or 59 motion” because “[t]o the extent pertinent here, the Judicial Code permits appeals only from ‘final' decisions of the district court, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994), and it is only a ‘final judgment' that triggers the 14-day filing period[.]” 198 F.3d 311, 315 (2d Cir. 1999).
Nonetheless, the Court does not view Weyant as inconsistent with the Eighth Circuit's holding in Spirit Lake. In Weyant, there was no dispute that the decision at issue was appealable only if it was final, and the Second Circuit had no cause to consider whether the advisory committee note was consistent with Rule 54's express definition of “judgment.” “An Advisory Committee Note, while helpful, cannot replace the plain language of a rule or statute.” In re Habeas Corpus Cases, 216 F.R.D. 52, 53-54 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Design Strategy, Inc. v. Davis, 469 F.3d 284, 298 (2d Cir. 2006) (). Although the advisory committee note “muddied the waters by describing the relevant triggering event as the entry of ‘final judgment,' despite the rule's use of the term ‘judgment, '” Spirit Lake, 5 F.4th at 855, it does not change the fact that an order granting a preliminary injunction falls within Rule 54's definition of a “judgment” and thus triggers the 14-day filing deadline for an attorneys' fee request. Accordingly, because it was filed over two months after the Stipulated Preliminary Injunction's entry, Plaintiffs' motion is untimely.
The Court may “for good cause” extend the time for a party to act “on motion made after the time has...
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