Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E & P Onshore LLC
| Decision Date | 14 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 04–14–00903–CV,04–14–00903–CV |
| Citation | 480 S.W.3d 628 |
| Parties | Lightning Oil Co., Appellant v. Anadarko E & P Onshore LLC fka Anadarko E & P Company, LP, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Bruce K. Spindler, Stephen Ahl, Robinson C. Ramsey, John W. Petry, Langley & Banack, Inc., San Antonio, TX, for Appellant.
David Allen Palmer, Timothy David Howell, Shayne D. Moses, Moses, Palmer & Howell, LLP, Fort Worth, TX, Donato D. Ramos, Jr., Law Offices of Donato D. Ramos, LLP, Laredo, TX, for Appellee.
Sitting: Marialyn Barnard, Justice,Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice, Jason Pulliam, Justice
On August 19, 2015, this court issued an opinion and judgment in this appeal. Acting sua sponte, we withdraw our opinion and judgment of August 19, 2015, and substitute this opinion and judgment to clarify portions of the opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 19.1.
This is a subsurface trespass case between lessees of two adjacent mineral estates. Lightning Oil Company sued Anadarko E & P Onshore LLC to prevent Anadarko from siting a well on the land overlying Lightning's mineral estate and from drilling through Lightning's mineral estate to reach Anadarko's adjacent mineral estate. Because the surface estate owner controls "the matrix of the underlying earth," and the summary judgment evidence conclusively proves the surface estate owner gave Anadarko permission to site and drill, we affirm the trial court's order.
This appeal involves adjacent surface estates in Dimmit County and the severed mineral estates beneath them.
The Cutlass Lease is a severed mineral estate under a portion of the Briscoe Ranch. When a previous owner of the fee simple to what is now the Briscoe Ranch conveyed the fee by warranty deed, the grantor severed the mineral estate by reserving "all mines of, and all oil, gas and all minerals, on and under the said land." The reservation did not expressly include any right to, or control of, any subterranean structures—the earth—underlying the surface estate.
In 2009, the Cutlass Lease owners executed a lease with Lightning. In 2013, the parties executed an amended lease that includes the following provisions:
Anadarko leased a mineral estate under the Chaparral Wildlife Management Area (CWMA), which is adjacent to the surface estate overlying the Cutlass Lease. Anadarko's lease allows it to explore, and produce oil and gas from, the CWMA. In a separate Surface Use and Subsurface Easement Agreement, Anadarko got permission from Briscoe Ranch to place drilling rigs on the surface estate overlying the Cutlass Lease and to drill through the earth under the Briscoe Ranch to form wells that open and bottom in the CWMA.
Lightning sued Anadarko to prevent Anadarko from siting wells on the Briscoe Ranch and from drilling through the earth within the boundaries of the Cutlass Lease. As the leaseholder of the mineral estate, Lightning asserts it has the right to exclude others from drilling. It contends it has the exclusive right to determine who can drill through the earth and the oil and gas within the boundaries circumscribing the Cutlass Lease. Lightning insists that Briscoe Ranch's permission is not enough, and Lightning should not have to trust Anadarko to not take any seismic surveys as Anadarko drills through subterranean structures that harbor Lightning's oil and gas.
Anadarko acknowledges it has begun siting wells on the Briscoe Ranch overlying the Cutlass Lease. Anadarko also acknowledges it plans to drill wells 8,000 feet vertically before deviating the wellbores to reach its leasehold under the CWMA. Anadarko argues that Briscoe Ranch, as the surface estate owner, controls the subterranean structures, and Anadarko needs only Briscoe Ranch's permission. Anadarko argues that, as a matter of law, it cannot commit a trespass by drilling through the subterranean structures in which Lightning's oil and gas hydrocarbon molecules may lie. According to Anadarko, because it has the surface estate owner's permission to site and drill, Lightning's claim for tortious interference must fail as a matter of law.
When Lightning learned Anadarko was preparing to drill on land above the Cutlass Lease, Lightning sought an injunction to prevent Anadarko from drilling through the Cutlass Lease area to reach Anadarko's adjacent mineral estate.
After some discovery, Anadarko moved for summary judgment on traditional and no evidence grounds. In its traditional motion against Lightning's claims of trespass and tortious interference with contract, Anadarko asserted it established its defense of justification as a matter of law. In its no evidence motion, Anadarko asserted there was no evidence of at least one essential element of each of Lightning's claims.
Lightning moved for traditional summary judgment on (1) its request for a permanent injunction against Anadarko drilling through the Cutlass Lease and (2) its request for the court to declare that Briscoe Ranch could not "grant Anadarko a right to trespass through Lightning's property." Lightning did not expressly move for traditional summary judgment on its tortious interference with contract claim. In its no evidence motion, Lightning moved for summary judgment on Anadarko's affirmative defense of justification.
In its November 24, 2014 order, the trial court denied Lightning's motion, and without stating the grounds for its decision, it granted Anadarko's motion. It then severed the remaining issues to make its order final and appealable. Lightning appeals the trial court's order.
To prevail on a traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant must show "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the [movant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c) ; accord Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex.1985). In our review of the trial court's order, we examine "the evidence presented in the motion and response in the light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not." Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex.2009) ; see City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex.2005). "We indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's favor." Rhône–Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex.1999) ; accord Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 756 (Tex.2007) (per curiam).
A defendant moving for traditional summary judgment must conclusively disprove at least one essential element of each of the plaintiff's claims. Elliott–Williams Co. v. Diaz, 9 S.W.3d 801, 803 (Tex.1999) ; Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dall as , Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 476–77 (Tex.1995). "When both sides move for summary judgment and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, the reviewing court should review both sides' summary judgment evidence[,] ... determine all questions presented[,] ... [and] render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered." FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 872 (Tex.2000) (citations omitted); accord Mann Frankfort, 289 S.W.3d at 848.
We review a no evidence summary judgment using a legal sufficiency standard. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750–51 (Tex.2003). "We review the evidence presented by the motion and response in the light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not." Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex.2006) (citing City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827 ).
If a trial court grants a motion for summary judgment that includes both traditional and no evidence grounds, we evaluate the no evidence grounds first. Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex.2013) ; Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex.2004). If the nonmovant fails to meet its no evidence burden for any claim, we need not address the corresponding traditional motion ground. See Ford Motor Co., 135 S.W.3d at 60 ; Vause v. Liberty Ins. Corp., 456 S.W.3d 222, 226 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 2014, no pet.).
We first address Lightning's trespass claim.
A trespass is " ‘an unauthorized entry upon the land of another,’ " Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C. v. FPL Farming Ltd., 457 S.W.3d 414, 424 (Tex.2015), such as an " ‘entry upon another's land ... by causing or permitting a thing to cross the boundary of the premises.’ " Gregg v. Delhi–Taylor Oil Corp., 162 Tex. 26, 344 S.W.2d 411, 416 (1961) (quoting Glade v. Dietert, 156 Tex. 382, 295 S.W.2d 642, 645 (1956) ). The plaintiff alleging trespass must show it owned or otherwise had a legal right to exclude others from the property. See Envtl. Processing Sys., 457 S.W.3d at 424 ; Cain v. Fontana, 423 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Tex.Civ.App.–San Antonio 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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