Lightning v. Roadway Exp., Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 August 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-8413,94-8413
• Citation: 60 F.3d 1551
• Parties: 150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2010, 130 Lab.Cas. P 57,955, 10 IER Cases 1592 Jesse J. LIGHTNING, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC., Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1551

60 F.3d 1551

150 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2010, 130 Lab.Cas. P 57,955,

10 IER Cases 1592

Jesse J. LIGHTNING, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 94-8413.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Aug. 16, 1995.

Deborah A. Sudbury, Douglas M. Towns, Atlanta, GA, for appellant.

Richard A. Coleman, Atlanta, GA, Ernestine V. Reeves Scott, Decatur, GA, for appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before HATCHETT and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, and GIBSON ^*, Senior Circuit Judge.

HATCHETT, Circuit Judge:

The principal issue we discuss in this appeal is whether the appellee's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a Georgia state law claim, is preempted under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. We affirm the district court's ruling that the claim is not preempted.

I. FACTS

The district court made the findings of fact stated herein after conducting a bench trial on appellee Jesse Lightning's claims against his former employer, appellant Roadway Express, Inc. (Roadway).

Lightning worked as a janitor for Roadway, a trucking company, in its Atlanta terminal from February 1988 until his discharge in August 1990. Although Lightning initially served as an on-call employee, he eventually received regular employee status. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local Union No. 728 (the Union) represents regular, non-management employees at Roadway's Atlanta terminal. The collective-bargaining agreement between Roadway and the Union allows for progressive discipline, but it also grants employees the right to grieve any discipline imposed upon them.

Lightning liked his job and earnestly tried to please his superiors. He worked slowly, however, and his job performance was marginal. In attempting to document Lightning's poor work performance, Roadway supervisors photographed him from time to time. Roadway management counseled or disciplined Lightning several times for violating the collective-bargaining agreement and company rules. These violations included wasting time, failing to follow instructions, and failing to wear steel-toed shoes. Due to these work-rule violations, Roadway discharged Lightning several times following the progressive discipline process. Until August 1990, Roadway reinstated Lightning after each discharge.

Roadway supervisors subjected Lightning to verbal abuse on numerous occasions. For example, Roadway supervisors Mitchell Lilly and Darrell Poole stood over Lightning while he cleaned under a truck, and, in the presence of other employees, one of the supervisors stated, "Look at that piece of shit down there." On another occasion, supervisor Buddy Looney called Lightning into his office and stated, "We pay you really good for the shit you do, which is nothing. We hate you. You don't belong here." Another supervisor told Lightning, "I don't know why you stay here; none of the managers like you." Poole told Lightning that the company needed to "get rid of his ass." He also called Lightning a "sorry son of a bitch" and told Lighting he did not know why Roadway had hired him. Lilly and another supervisor told Lightning to quit. Lightning also received phone calls at home telling him to resign.

Lightning endured two incidents where Roadway supervisors acted even more egregiously. One confrontation commenced when supervisor Ike Franz told Lightning with regard to his sweeping: "We pay you to do this?" Lightning responded that he could perform Franz and Poole's jobs better than those two men. A few minutes later, Poole arrived with other supervisors and, with his face six inches away from Lightning's, spoke to Lighting in a loud, insulting manner. Poole spat on Lightning. He also stated, "Who do you think you are?" and "You ain't no better than a janitor."

On another occasion, Lightning told management employees that Mark Keahon was the only supervisor who treated him with decency. The following day, Keahon called Lightning into an office and criticized him about work he had performed. As the conversation progressed, Lightning requested the presence of a union steward. Keahon responded, "Fuck the union steward. Get your sorry ass out of here." Lightning returned with a union steward and, during the heated conversation that ensued, Keahon tried to hit Lightning.

Toward the end of his employment, Lightning suffered from a psychotic episode which included manifestations of paranoid delusions. This episode occurred on an evening when managers had "chewed out" Lightning on three separate occasions. Lightning was hospitalized and received treatment at the Georgia Mental Health Institute (GMHI) and another mental health facility. The causes for this episode were work-related, though other stressors contributed to Lightning's condition. According to Lightning's mother, he had not suffered previously from any mental problems or disorders. Although Roadway officials had knowledge that Lightning had been admitted to GMHI, they took no action to learn about his condition or to investigate its cause. While Lightning was hospitalized, Roadway sent him a registered letter documenting a prior verbal counseling regarding his failure to wear steel-toed shoes.

After Roadway had discharged Lightning in August 1990, supervisor Fred Dominick left a message on Lightning's telephone answering machine stating, in essence, "Hey, we understand you want your job back here at Roadway." A great deal of laughter from others accompanied Dominick's voice on the message.

A former Roadway supervisor, Timothy Marshall, stated that Looney said he was going to get Lightning if it was the last thing he did. Marshall also stated that when Roadway management had difficulty getting rid of an unwanted employee, they undertook a strategy to have that employee "written up" as much as possible. Managers sought to provoke and demean the employee, and otherwise try to persuade the employee to quit. These efforts were known as "mad-dogging." Ronnie Henson, a Roadway employee for over twenty-five years and an experienced union steward, characterized management's treatment of Lightning as "severe" and stated that he had never seen a worker similarly treated.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In February 1991, Lightning brought this lawsuit against Roadway in state court in Georgia alleging breach of contract stemming from violations of the collective-bargaining agreement, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and assault. Roadway removed the action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

In August 1991, Roadway moved for summary judgment, arguing that: (1) federal labor law preempted Lightning's breach of contract claim; (2) federal labor law preempted Lightning's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim; (3) Roadway's alleged conduct did not constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress as a matter of law; and (4) the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy for Lightning's assault claim. In March 1992, the district court granted in part and denied in part Roadway's motion. The district court found that federal labor law preempted Lightning's contract claim, but otherwise denied Roadway's motion.

After conducting a non-jury trial on Lightning's remaining claims in August 1993, the district court entered judgment for Lightning. The court awarded $33,720 in damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress ($25,000 for pain and suffering and $8,720 in medical expenses), nominal damages for assault, and $100,000 in punitive damages. This appeal followed.

III. CONTENTIONS

Roadway contends that the resolution of Lightning's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim depends upon interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement, and thus section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185, preempts that claim. Roadway also argues that Lightning has failed to allege conduct sufficient to support an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim under Georgia law. The company also asserts that the district court clearly erred in finding that Keahon assaulted Lightning. Additionally, Roadway contends that the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for Lightning's injury. Finally, Roadway argues that the district court's award of punitive damages was excessive as a matter of law.

Lightning responds to Roadway's contentions as follows. First, the resolution of his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim does not require an interpretation of the labor contract, and thus section 301 of the LMRA does not preempt that claim. Second, Roadway's actions were extreme and outrageous and therefore sufficient to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Georgia law. Third, substantial evidence existed for the district court to find that Keahon assaulted Lightning. Fourth, Lightning's emotional distress does not constitute a compensable "injury" under the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act. Finally, the district court's award of punitive damages was reasonable.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Section 301 Preemption and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim

Whether section 301 of the LMRA preempts a state-law claim constitutes a question of law subject to de novo review. See Galvez v. Kuhn, 933 F.2d 773, 776 (9th Cir.1991).

Section 301(a) of the LMRA provides:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.

29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a). Section 301 not only grants federal courts jurisdiction over employment disputes involving collective-bargaining agreements, but...