Liimatta v. Vest, No. S-9289

• Decision Date: 12 April 2002
• Docket Number: No. S-9320., No. S-9289
• Citation: 45 P.3d 310
• Parties: Into LIIMATTA, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Deborah VEST, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Alaska Supreme Court

45 P.3d 310

Into LIIMATTA, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Deborah VEST, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Nos. S-9289, S-9320.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

April 12, 2002.

Sheldon E. Winters, Lessmeier & Winters, Juneau, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Michaela Kelley Canterbury, Kelley & Kelley, Anchorage, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Before FABE, Chief Justice, MATTHEWS, EASTAUGH, BRYNER, and CARPENETI, Justices.

OPINION

EASTAUGH, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

We consider here various evidentiary rulings in a case arising out of a collision between a personal injury plaintiff's bicycle and the defendant's truck. Because it was an abuse of discretion to exclude evidence of the plaintiff's pre-accident drug-seeking behavior, and because the error was prejudicial, we reverse the judgment against the defendant and remand for a new trial.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

On July 2, 1997 a truck driven by Into Liimatta collided with a bicycle ridden by Deborah Vest. Vest suffered a broken right clavicle, trauma to her teeth and face, an avulsion fracture of her left wrist, and bruises and abrasions on the right side of her body. Vest sued Liimatta, seeking damages for past and future medical expenses, lost earnings, severe impairment, disfigurement, and noneconomic losses including pain and suffering, emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of life, fear, embarrassment, humiliation, and inconvenience. The jury returned a verdict awarding Vest damages of $97,287.26. On April 12, 1999 the superior court entered a final judgment of $119,219.91 against Liimatta. Liimatta appeals and Vest cross-appeals.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court's "decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion."¹ We find an abuse of discretion only when "left with a definite and firm conviction, after reviewing the whole record, that the trial court erred in its ruling."²

We review the superior court's setoff decision "`de novo, adopting the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.'"³ The date when "prejudgment interest begins to accrue is a question of law which we review using our independent judgment."⁴

B. It Was an Abuse of Discretion to Exclude Evidence of Vest's Pre Accident Drug Seeking Condition.

Vest's medical history contains numerous references to drug-seeking behavior.⁵ Vest moved in limine to exclude evidence of her drug-seeking behavior. The trial court ruled that evidence of Vest's post-accident drug-seeking behavior was admissible, stating:

I can see that there are all sorts of relevancy issues here.

It refutes the claim of pain and suffering. That means—what that means is she really wasn't in pain, she was just seeking drugs when she went to these doctors and got these medications. It refutes the extent of her injuries: that is, these injuries are just a minor matter compared to the— her real motive, and that was to go get these drugs. And it increases her—the medical expenses exponentially, not for legitimate treatment for actual injuries, but because she's running around getting drugs from various doctors.

....

... And I think there's sufficient relevancy here to ... outweigh the prejudice that's caused by this kind of information coming in.

But the trial court nonetheless excluded evidence of Vest's pre-accident drug-seeking behavior, reasoning that it was "redundant, repetitious, and highly prejudicial." Thus, the trial court apparently applied Alaska Evidence Rule 403, which provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."

1. The danger of unfair prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence of Vest's pre-accident drug-seeking behavior.

When reviewing the exclusion of evidence under Evidence Rule 403 as unfairly prejudicial, we first "consider the relevance of the [excluded evidence] and then determine whether its prejudicial effect so outweigh[s] its probative value that admission by the trial judge constitute[s] a `clear abuse of discretion.'"⁶

Liimatta argues that evidence of Vest's pre-accident drug-seeking behavior was highly relevant to damages, credibility, and causation. We agree.

Evidence of Vest's pre-accident drug-seeking behavior was highly relevant to Vest's claim for the loss of enjoyment of life. In Ocasio v. Amtrak, the plaintiff sued Amtrak for injuries sustained when a train struck him while he was walking on elevated railroad tracks.⁷ In addition to seeking damages for past and future medical expenses, the plaintiff sought to recover for the loss of enjoyment of life.⁸ The defendant offered evidence at trial that the plaintiff had a ten-year history of drug abuse problems involving cocaine, heroin, and alcohol which had continued until the accident.⁹ The trial court excluded the evidence, stating that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value with respect to the plaintiff's claim for loss of enjoyment of life.¹⁰ On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, reversed, holding that "a jury assigned the responsibility of determining the value of a loss of enjoyment of life should have had the opportunity to consider evidence that [a plaintiff's] mental and physical functions, customary activities and capacity to enjoy the pleasures of life were already restricted by a long-term addiction to drugs."¹¹ Similarly, evidence of Vest's pre-accident drug-seeking behavior was highly relevant to her claim for the loss of enjoyment of life.

This evidence was also highly relevant to causation, because it would have helped the jury distinguish between medical expenses attributable to Liimatta's negligence and medical expenses attributable to Vest's drug-seeking behavior. For example, Liimatta correctly notes that

Vest claimed fees for the second, third and fourth opinions she sought for a shoulder surgery referral, despite the fact that all four opinions recommended against surgery. In assessing whether these repeated consultations were caused by the accident or caused by her drug-seeking condition, the jury would have to consider the true extent of her drug-seeking condition as it existed then, and not just the relatively minimal evidence in the short time between the date of the accident and these visits. The same applies to any of her post-accident medical care requests; the extent of Vest's drug-seeking condition was probative to the cause of each pain complaint and request for medication.

Evidence of Vest's pre-accident drug-seeking behavior was also relevant to her credibility. Vest testified at trial that she had not had a problem with addiction to pain medication before the accident. Thus, evidence of Vest's pre-accident drug-seeking behavior would have directly impeached her testimony. Vest's credibility was particularly relevant, because a critical trial issue was the legitimacy of Vest's post-accident subjective pain complaints; her credibility when testifying might have shed light on the credibility of her subjective complaints. Evidence of pre-accident drug-seeking behavior was also relevant to the credibility of Vest's expert witness. It would have tended to impeach Vest's expert, Dr. Bliss, who testified that Vest's subjective pain complaints were legitimate.

Liimatta also argues that the excluded evidence was relevant because, he asserts, Vest made an aggravation claim that encompassed drug-seeking behavior. Thus, according to Liimatta, Vest argued to the jury that it could award damages to Vest if it found that Liimatta's negligence had aggravated Vest's drug-seeking behavior. While we agree that such an aggravation claim would make evidence of Vest's pre-accident drug-seeking behavior relevant, it is not clear to what extent Vest made such a claim in this case. While Vest's brief does not deny that she made such a claim, our review of the record does not convince us that Vest squarely made this argument to the jury. We therefore do not rely on this argument as a basis for reversing. But an argument by Vest on remand that Liimatta's negligence aggravated her drug-seeking behavior would be an additional reason to admit the evidence.

Liimatta next argues that the danger of unfair prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of this evidence. We agree. In Hiller v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., we stated that undue prejudice "connotes not merely evidence that is harmful to the other party, but evidence that will result in a decision being reached by the trier of facts on an improper basis."¹² Evidence of prior drug use and addiction certainly presents a danger of unfair prejudice.¹³ "[T]here are strong attitudes against drug use. The introduction of evidence of drug use could cause the jury to consider ... [that] the person who uses drugs is a bad person and could prejudice his or her case."¹⁴ Despite undoubted resulting prejudice, however, the probative value of proffered evidence may compel its admission.¹⁵ For example, in CNA Insurance Co. v. Scheffey, the Court of Appeals of Texas held that "[i]t is difficult to imagine that a trial court would not abuse its discretion if, upon balancing pursuant to Rule 403, it determined that the probative value of evidence... which bears on the crux of the case, was outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice."¹⁶ As we noted above, evidence of Vest's pre-accident drug-seeking behavior was highly relevant to the central issues. It was therefore an abuse of discretion to exclude the evidence, despite its unsavory implications, as unfairly prejudicial.

2. Evidence of Vest's pre-accident drug-seeking behavior was not cumulative.

The superior court excluded this evidence partly because it was cumulative. Liimatta argues that it was an abuse of discretion to exclude the evidence for this reason. We agree.

In ...