Liles v. Damon Corporation
| Decision Date | 27 December 2006 |
| Docket Number | 03-3086; A129113. |
| Citation | 210 Or. App. 303,150 P.3d 432 |
| Parties | Dale L. LILES and Karen Marie Liles, Respondents, v. DAMON CORPORATION, an Indiana corporation, Appellant. |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
William A. Drew, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the opening brief was Elliott, Ostrander & Preston, P.C. With him on the reply brief were John D. Ostrander and Elliott, Ostrander & Preston, P.C.
Gary E. Norman, Albany, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondents.
Before LINDER, Presiding Judge, and BREWER, Chief Judge, and BARRON, Judge pro tempore.*
BARRON, J. pro tempore.
Defendant manufacturer appeals a judgment granting plaintiffs recovery under Oregon's Lemon Law, ORS 646.315 to 646.375, after a trial to the court. At trial, defendant moved for what was the equivalent of a motion for judgment of dismissal, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. See Lieberfreund v. Gregory, 206 Or.App. 484, 490 n. 5, 136 P.3d 1207 (2006). The trial court denied the motion. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court correctly determined that plaintiffs gave defendant an opportunity to correct the defects in their motor home, as required by ORS 646.325, before filing their complaint. We reverse.
The facts are straightforward and undisputed. On December 30, 2002, plaintiffs purchased a new motor home manufactured by defendant, which is located in Indiana. From the time that plaintiffs took possession of the motor home, water continuously leaked into it. Plaintiffs took the motor home to the dealer for repair of the leaks on several occasions, but the dealer failed to successfully fix the leaks. Plaintiffs also had several phone conversations with representatives of defendant, including the president of defendant, but again the leaks were not corrected. On December 23, 2003, plaintiffs' attorney mailed a letter to defendant notifying it of the leaks and the failed attempts to correct the leaks. In the letter, plaintiffs asked defendant to replace the vehicle in accordance with ORS 646.335.1 The letter did not reach defendant until December 29, 2003, and plaintiffs filed their complaint the next day.2 The trial court entered a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, rejecting defendant's contention that it did not have an opportunity to correct the defect before plaintiffs filed the action.
On appeal, defendant renews its argument that, because plaintiffs filed their complaint only one day after defendant received plaintiffs' letter concerning the leaks, plaintiffs did not provide an opportunity for defendant to correct the leaking problem, as required by the plain language of ORS 646.325. In response, plaintiffs make three contentions: (1) the language of the statute does not require that the opportunity to correct a defect must come after the consumer gives written notice to the manufacturer; (2) under Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., 270 Or. 694, 530 P.2d 53 (1974), we should decide that the notice requirement of ORS 646.325(3) is superfluous and a nullity because it conflicts with the clear intent of the legislature to protect the consumer who buys a "lemon"; and (3) under Brown v. Portland School Dist. # 1, 291 Or. 77, 628 P.2d 1183 (1981), plaintiffs substantially complied with the notice requirements by taking the vehicle to an authorized dealer for repairs several times and by having several phone conversations with defendant's representatives before the December 23, 2003, letter was sent.
Whether defendant had an opportunity, within the meaning of ORS 646.325(3), to correct the leaking problem presents us with an issue of statutory construction. Under the familiar framework set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993), we first look to the text and context of a statute, because the statute's wording "is the best evidence of the legislature's intent." Id. at 610, 859 P.2d 1143. If the legislature's intent is not clear from the text and context inquiry, we then look to the legislative history of the statute. Id. at 611-12, 859 P.2d 1143. We consider the legislative history along with the text and context to determine whether all of those together make the legislative intent clear. Id. at 612, 859 P.2d 1143. If the legislature's intent then becomes clear, our inquiry is at an end. Id.
ORS 646.325 provides that three requirements must be met to warrant a remedy of replacement under ORS 646.335:
The requirement under subsection (3) that the manufacturer receive "direct written notification" and have an "opportunity to correct" is the requirement at issue here. In particular, we must determine whether an "opportunity to correct" must come after the "direct written notification" is received.
We previously construed ORS 646.325(3) in Pavel v. Winnebago Industries, Inc., 127 Or App. 16, 870 P.2d 856 (1994), a case that also involved the purchase of a motor home. In Pavel, the plaintiffs' motor home was in repair shops for more than 100 days after delivery, but the plaintiffs never gave the defendant any advance written notice under ORS 646.325(3) that a particular defect had to be corrected. The defendant contended that giving a written notice was a condition precedent to filing an action in court. More specifically, the defendant argued that ORS 646.325(3) was unambiguous and that the plaintiffs did not provide the proper "prior written notification and opportunity to correct." Pavel, 127 Or.App. at 19, 870 P.2d 856. The plaintiffs, making an argument similar to plaintiffs' argument in this case, asserted that an interpretation of the statute requiring "an opportunity to correct" and "prior written notice" when the alleged nonconformity is based on a series of repairs totaling 30 or more business days is clearly contrary to the remedial purpose of the statute.
We disagreed with the plaintiffs' assertion. Although we did not cite PGE, we determined that ORS 646.325(3) was unambiguous under those facts and that the unambiguous language "can be literally applied consistently with the other provisions of the statutory scheme." Pavel, 127 Or.App. at 20, 870 P.2d 856. We rejected the plaintiffs' assumption that the objective of the statute is solely to provide consumers with replacement vehicles or refunds. Id. To the contrary, we noted that ORS 646.325(3) also "contemplates an opportunity for the manufacturer to remedy problems with a vehicle." Id.
In Pavel we did not decide whether the written notice to the manufacturer had to come before the "opportunity to correct the alleged defect." That is the inquiry we must now make by first examining the text of ORS 646.325(3), as required by PGE, 317 Or. at 610, 859 P.2d 1143. Although we determined in Pavel that the language of ORS 646.325(3) was unambiguous for purposes of the issue presented in that case, the legislature's intent as to the chronological requirements in the statute is less clear. See Harlow v. Allstate Ins. Co., 177 Or.App. 122, 130, 33 P.3d 363 (2001) (). ORS 646.325(3) states that "[t]he manufacturer [must] receive[ ] direct written notification from or on behalf of the consumer and ha[ve] had an opportunity to correct the alleged defect." A plain reading of the text does not clearly indicate that the legislature intended that an opportunity to correct come after the written notification because the conjunction "and" only suggests that both requirements must be met before a consumer pursues the extraordinary remedies of the Lemon Law.3
As part of our textual analysis, we also look to the context of the statutory language at issue. In looking at the context, we can consider earlier versions of the statute. SAIF v. Walker, 330 Or. 102, 108-09, 996 P.2d 979 (2000). The first version of ORS 646.325 was enacted in 1983. Or. Laws 1983, ch. 469, § 2. It consisted of subsections (1) and (2) only. After complying with those subsections, a consumer could pursue the remedy allowed under the Lemon Law. Subsection (3) was enacted in 1987 and added a third requirement that must be met before a consumer could pursue a remedy under the Lemon Law. Or. Laws 1987, ch. 476, § 6. As noted, subsection (2) requires that the buyer report the nonconformity to the manufacturer, its agent, or its authorized dealer for the purpose of repair within one year or 12,000 miles of delivery, whichever occurs earlier. Subsection (3) is directed solely at the manufacturer and requires written notification and an opportunity to cure. We must construe the provisions to "give effect to all." ORS 174.010. It appears that the provisions provide for a natural progression. First, the vehicle does not conform to the warranty; second, the consumer reports—not necessarily in writing—the defect to the manufacturer or dealer; and third, the consumer gives a written notification, with the manufacturer then having a final opportunity to cure the defect.
Our contextual inquiry may also include examining related statutes. PGE, 317 Or. at 611, 859 P.2d 1143. Under ORS 646.361, which was enacted at the same time as ORS 646.325(3...
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Liles v. Damon Corp.
...remedy under the Lemon Law[,]" meaning that plaintiffs had to satisfy each condition before filing their action. Liles v. Damon Corp., 210 Or.App. 303, 314, 150 P.3d 432 (2006). According to the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs had satisfied the written notice requirement but, after doing so, h......
- Liles v. Damon Corp., S54734.