Liles v. Damon Corp.
Decision Date | 11 December 2008 |
Docket Number | CC 033086.,SC S054734.,CA A129113. |
Citation | 345 Or. 420,198 P.3d 926 |
Parties | Dale L. LILES and Karen Marie Liles, husband and wife, Petitioners on Review, v. DAMON CORPORATION, an Indiana Corporation, Respondent on Review. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Gary E. Norman, Albany, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioners on review.
William A. Drew, of Elliott, Ostrander and Preston PC, Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondent on review.
Brian S. Campf, of Brian S. Campf, PC, Portland, filed the brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.
Before DE MUNIZ, Chief Justice, and GILLETTE, DURHAM, BALMER, KISTLER, and WALTERS, Justices.**
Plaintiffs brought this action under ORS 646A.400 to ORS 646A.418, commonly known as Oregon's Lemon Law,1 seeking replacement of a motor home that they had purchased. The issue on review concerns the proper interpretation of ORS 646A.402, which we quote below in full. Under that statute, a statutory remedy is "available to a consumer" if, among other things, the manufacturer of a motor vehicle has received "direct written notification" from the consumer and "has had an opportunity to correct the alleged defect." ORS 646A.402(3).
After a trial, the trial court found that plaintiffs had satisfied the statutory requirements and granted relief. Specifically, the court rejected defendant's contention that ORS 646A.402(3) obligated plaintiffs to afford defendant the opportunity to correct the alleged defect after sending written notification to defendant and before filing their action. In its judgment, the court made the following finding of fact:
"The Court finds that the manufacturer did receive adequate written notification of these defects from the Plaintiffs and that the manufacturer also had ample opportunity to correct the defects."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals concluded that the conditions in the statute applied in sequence: that is, the delivery of the consumer's "direct written notification" of the defect must occur before the manufacturer has any "opportunity to correct" the defect under the statute. Moreover, the court determined that each statutory condition "must be met before seeking a remedy under the Lemon Law[,]" meaning that plaintiffs had to satisfy each condition before filing their action. Liles v. Damon Corp., 210 Or.App. 303, 314, 150 P.3d 432 (2006). According to the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs had satisfied the written notice requirement but, after doing so, had not provided defendant an opportunity to correct the alleged defect before filing their action. This court granted review to determine whether the Court of Appeals had correctly construed the requirements in Oregon's Lemon Law.
The vehicle dealer performed most of the unsuccessful attempts to repair the leaks. However, the trial court found that, on one occasion, defendant directed plaintiffs to submit the vehicle for repair at a different repair shop. That attempted repair occurred on December 9, 2003, but it, too, was unsuccessful. According to the trial court, that attempted repair "was specifically authorized by the manufacturer as their attempt to cure the defect[ ]" and "was an opportunity to correct the defect before the lawsuit was filed even though written notice wasn't given."
On December 23, 2003, an attorney representing plaintiffs sent a letter to defendant under Oregon's Lemon Law. The letter described the water leak problems and plaintiffs' unsuccessful efforts to resolve them through multiple repair efforts and through several discussions with defendant's representatives, including its president and "the field person for Damon in charge of repairs." The letter requested the replacement remedy under the Lemon Law, ORS 646A.404(1)(a), which we quote below. The letter also stated:
Defendant received the letter described above on December 29, 2003. Plaintiffs filed their action the next day, December 30, 2003. In January 2004, plaintiffs informed defendant that it could have access to the vehicle, but defendant took no further action to assess or repair the rainwater leaks. The case was tried to the court sitting without a jury on February 24, 2005, and the court entered judgment for plaintiffs on June 7, 2005. As noted, the Court of Appeals reversed, and we allowed plaintiffs' petition for review.
This case requires the interpretation of several statutory provisions in Oregon's Lemon Law. We begin with the text and context of the statutes and endeavor to give meaning to all parts of those statutes.
ORS 646A.402 provides:
ORS 646A.404(1) describes the remedy that is available to a consumer:
ORS 646A.406 creates a presumption, potentially usable during litigation, about whether the vehicle manufacturer or dealer has undertaken a "reasonable number of attempts" to conform the vehicle to applicable manufacturer's express warranties. That statute provides, in part:
ORS 646A.412(1) describes additional remedies available to a consumer in a successful action under the statute "against a manufacturer * * *." ORS 646A.414(1) confirms that the statute does not create an action against a vehicle dealer.
Several features of the statutory text are noteworthy. The statutory remedy is "available to a consumer" under ORS 646.402 only if the consumer communicates certain information to others. First, under ORS 646A.402(2), the consumer must "report[ ]" the defects to "the manufacturer, its agent or its authorized dealer, for the purpose of repair or correction" within the timeframe that the subsection describes. The statute does not require that communication to be in writing. Second, the consumer or someone acting on the consumer's behalf must give the manufacturer "direct written notification." The statute does not describe the information that the consumer's written notice must contain beyond confirming that a consumer's request for an informal dispute settlement procedure under ORS 646A.408 constitutes notification. There is no dispute here that plaintiffs satisfied...
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...several provisions or particulars such construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all"); Liles v. Damon Corp., 345 Or. 420, 424, 198 P.3d 926 (2008) (noting obligation of the courts "to give meaning to all parts of those statutes" in issue). Such a harmonizing constr......
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