Liljedahl v. Glassgow
| Decision Date | 19 January 1921 |
| Docket Number | No. 33474.,33474. |
| Citation | 190 Iowa 827,180 N.W. 870 |
| Parties | LILJEDAHL v. GLASSGOW ET AL. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Page County; Thomas Arthur, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment upon a verdict of the jury returned by direction of the court. Reversed.Ferguson, Barnes & Ferguson, of Shenandoah, for appellant.
Wilson & Keenan, of Shenandoah, and William M. Jackson, of Bedford, for appellees.
On May 20, 1915, one L. D. Bailey, who was the owner of a tract of land located in the state of Colorado, executed promissory notes in the aggregate amount of $6,000, with interest coupons attached, and to secure payment thereof at the same time executed a mortgage upon the Colorado land. The notes are dated and made payable to H. I. Foskett, of Shenandoah, at the Shenandoah National Bank in said city, and were shortly thereafter assigned to plaintiff, who loaned the money to Bailey thereon. Two days later the said Bailey executed a deed before a notary public in Shenandoah describing the Colorado land, but without the insertion of the name of any one as grantee. The consideration recited in said deed, which contained the following clause: “This deed is made subject to one loan of $6,000 and one of $600, which the grantee assumes and agrees to pay as part of the purchase price above mentioned”--is $1 and other valuable consideration.
Plaintiff alleged in his petition that during the summer of 1917 the said Bailey conveyed the Colorado land to Frank Glassgow by delivering the deed in question to him, and that the said Glassgow in turn conveyed the same to A. M. Hiatt, and that said Hiatt later conveyed to the defendant Joe Hilger, all of said conveyances being accomplished by the delivery and acceptance of said deed without the insertion of the name of the purchaser as grantee; that each of said purchasers became and were, in fact, grantees under said deed, with full right and authority to insert therein his own name as such; that each conveyance was for a full consideration, and that by reason thereof the said defendants became liable for the payment of the mortgage indetedness to the plaintiff; that default was made in the payment of the interest coupons, and that by the terms of said instrument, the whole indebtedness thereby became due; and plaintiff demands judgment for $6,000, interest, and costs. After suit was commenced, Frank Glassgow died, and the defendant Nellie Glassgow, administratrix of his estate, was substituted. Each defendant filed a separate answer containing a general denial, followed by the admission that the said Bailey owned the land and executed the notes and mortgages described; that the deed in question was delivered by him to Glassgow, and that he in turn delivered it to Hiatt; and that, after passing through the hands of various parties, it was delivered to one C. E. Brown, who inserted his name therein as grantee and caused the same to be recorded. Each of the defendants specifically denied that he assumed or agreed to pay the mortgage indebtedness, and averred that the deed was, in fact, void, and conveyed no interest in said real estate under the laws of Colorado, except to C. E. Brown, whose name was finally inserted in the blank space as grantee. At the conclusion of all the evidence, the court upon motion of counsel for defendant directed the jury to return a verdict in their behalf, and judgment was accordingly entered against plaintiff for costs, and he appeals.
[1][2] The law is settled in this state that the equitable title passes by the delivery of a deed blank as to the name of the grantee, to a purchaser for a valid consideration (Bossingham v. Syck, 118 Iowa, 192, 91 N. W. 1047;Logan v. Miller, 106 Iowa, 511, 76 N. W. 1005), and that by accepting a deed containing a clause by which the grantee assumes and agrees to pay incumbrances, such purchaser becomes liable for the payment thereof, the same as he would if his name was written in the instrument (Beeson v. Green, 103 Iowa, 406, 72 N. W. 555; Bossingham v. Syck, supra; Marble Savings Bank v. Mesarvey, 101 Iowa, 285, 70 N. W. 198;Bennett Sav. Bank v. Smith, 171 Iowa, 405, 152 N. W. 717;Santee v. Keefe, 127 Iowa, 128, 102 N. W. 803;Gray v. Bricker, 182 Iowa, 816, 166 N. W. 284;Logan v. Miller, 106 Iowa, 511, 76 N. W. 1005). Under the law of Colorado however, a deed blank as to grantee is a nullity, and passes no interest whatever by delivery to a purchaser until his name is written therein. He has implied authority to insert his name therein, and by doing so he acquires title. McGrew v. Lamb, 60 Colo. 462, 154 Pac. 91;Halliwill v. Weible, 64 Colo. 295, 171 Pac. 372;Herr v. Denver Co., 13 Colo. 406, 22 Pac. 770, 6 L. R. A. 641.
[3] Counsel for appellee base their principal contention that the defendants, who received and passed the deed without designation therein of a grantee, never became such under the law of Colorado or acquired any interest in the land, and that the clause above interposed no obligation upon them to pay said incumbrance. On the other hand, counsel for appellant take the position that, while the question as to the sufficiency of the deed to convey title must be determined by the law of Colorado, the assumption of the incumbrance and the agreement to pay the same are personal covenants, executed and to be performed in the state of Iowa, and therefore the legal effect thereof must be determined by the law of this state, and not by the law of Colorado. It is a rule of universal application that instruments of conveyance, in so far as they relate primarily or directly to the title, are to be construed according to the law of the lex rei sitæ. Wharton on Conflict of Laws (8th Ed.) 591; Finnes v. Selover Bates & Co., 102 Minn. 334, 113 N. W. 883;Clement v. Willett, 105 Minn. 267, 117 N. W. 491, 117 Am. St. Rep. 1094, 127 Am. St. Rep. 562, 15 Ann. Cas. 1053. But personal covenants or agreements in instruments of conveyance will be given effect according to the law of the place where the same is executed and to be performed. Finnes v. Selover, Bates & Co., supra; ...
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