Liljestrand v. Dell Enters., Inc.
| Decision Date | 25 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. A-20-695.,A-20-695. |
| Parties | ADAM LILJESTRAND, APPELLEE, v. DELL ENTERPRISES, INC., DOING BUSINESS AS THE DUNDEE DELL, AND LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE, APPELLANTS. |
| Court | Nebraska Court of Appeals |
(Memorandum Web Opinion)
Appeal from the Workers' Compensation Court: J. MICHAEL FITZGERALD, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert Kinney-Walker, of Law Offices of James W. Nubel, for appellants.
Ronald E. Frank and Danielle E. Forsgren, of Sodoro, Mooney, and Lenaghan, for appellee.
The appellants, Dell Enterprises, Inc., and Liberty Mutual Insurance (collectively Dell), appeal from an order of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court, wherein the court determined that the appellee, Adam Liljestrand, suffered a compensable injury while employed with Dell and awarded attorney fees. Dell also appeals from separate orders from the compensation court wherein the court denied their motion to recuse and continued two hearings. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the decisions of the compensation court.
The facts underlying Liljestrand's injury and previous litigation involving these parties are set forth more fully in the Nebraska Supreme Court's opinion in Liljestrand v. Dell Enters., 287 Neb. 242, 842 N.W.2d 575 (2014). We reiterate the facts only as relevant to the current appeal.
Liljestrand initially injured his back in September 2001 while employed for Dell as a bartender. Following Liljestrand's injury in 2001, Dell stipulated his injury was work-related and that Liljestrand was entitled to future medical care as was reasonable and necessary to treat his injury. In addition, a vocational rehabilitation specialist concluded that Liljestrand sustained a 60- to 65-percent loss of earning power and recommended that Liljestrand attend college for retraining as a financial advisor. Liljestrand was awarded vocational rehabilitation, which ended in 2004. He secured a job providing financial advice but because of his back pain and the effect of the narcotic pain medications he had to take, he could not perform the work that he secured, due to being groggy and sleepy. He was last employed in 2008.
In 2010, Liljestrand was reexamined and a physician diagnosed Liljestrand with "failed back syndrome" and determined that his condition had deteriorated. The physician believed that Liljestrand was totally disabled. In November 2010, Liljestrand's vocational rehabilitation specialist prepared an updated loss of earning capacity report. Liljestrand sought relief in the compensation court. At the 2011 hearing, the sole issue was the nature and extent of Liljestrand's permanent disability. Prior to this hearing, Liljestrand served Dell with requests for admission. As relevant to this appeal, Dell admitted that on September 5, 2001, Liljestrand injured his back in the scope and course of his employment with Dell. The compensation court initially found that Liljestrand lost all earning power and was entitled to weekly compensation at the rate of $508 per week. After a series of appeals, the matter was remanded back to the compensation court for a new trial in 2014.
Liljestrand subsequently filed an amended petition on June 3, 2014, wherein he alleged that on September 5, 2001, he suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment with Dell. Liljestrand requested that the rights and liabilities of the parties be determined by the compensation court and that he be awarded benefits, including, but not limited to an award of permanent total disability, reimbursement for any and all dental and medical expenses, and an award of future reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses which he may be entitled to. In their answer to the amended petition, Dell admitted that Liljestrand injured himself in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with Dell, but denied that he suffered consequential dental injuries.
On September 21, 2016, the parties submitted an application for approval of final lump sum settlement and compromise (the Application). The Application stated that there was "a reasonable controversy with regard to the nature and extent of [Liljestrand's] disability," but that the parties intended to "settle, finalize, and put to rest their dispute with regard only to the nature and extent of [Liljestrand's] disability as a result of the aforementioned accident and injuries." To that end Dell agreed to pay and Liljestrand agreed to accept a lump sum payment of $310,000. The Application for settlement also stated that it was the intention "only to compensate [Liljestrand] for a disputed amount of disability entitlement he may be entitled to, and is not intended to settlethe medical portion of [Liljestrand's] claim, which shall remain open." The Application closes with the following:
[Liljestrand] fully understands that once approved by the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court and the amount of consideration has been paid, his claim as set forth above shall be deemed as though dismissed with prejudice with regard to any further claim for indemnity benefits, however, it is the understanding and intent of the parties that [Liljestrand's] claim shall remain open with regard to any and all future reasonable and necessary medical expenses.
According to the Application, if there was a dispute "between future reasonable and necessary medical expenses, [Liljestrand] may present said dispute before the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court for a determination as to those reasonable and necessary medical expenses and treatment claimed."
The compensation court entered an order "Approving Application for Approval of Final Lump Sum Settlement and Compromise" (Order Approving Application) on October 24, 2016, finding that the Application was made in conformity with Nebraska's workers' compensation laws. Then, the Order Approving Application stated the following:
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Application for Approval of Final Lump Sum Settlement (leaving medical open) is hereby approved. That upon payment of the sum of $310,000.00 to [Liljestrand], as set forth in said Application, [Dell], its successors, insurers and assigns shall be discharged from all further liability, as to indemnity only, on account of the accident and [Liljestrand's] alleged injuries of September 5, 2001, with the exception of medical expenses. [Dell] will continue to be liable for [Liljestrand's] reasonable hospital, medical and miscellaneous expenses related to the September 5, 2001, incident until such time the Court has approved a further Application regarding an approved Medicare set-aside account as to future medical.
Almost 3 years later, on August 30, 2019, Liljestrand filed a motion to enforce settlement and notice of hearing. Liljestrand alleged that he sought continuing and ongoing medical treatment that was previously approved by Dell. Liljestrand alleged that when he sought repayment from Dell for medical bills he had incurred, pursuant to the terms of the Application, Dell notified him that it would no longer authorize any benefits or payments to him. Liljestrand alleged that the denial and representation of the refusal to pay any further medical benefits would be in violation of the Order Approving Application. In his prayer for relief, Liljestrand "prays for an Order of this Court specifically directing and requiring [Dell] to continue to be liable and responsible for [Liljestrand]'s reasonable hospital, medical, and miscellaneous expenses" related to the September 5, 2001, injury.
Dell filed a "Response to Motion to Enforce" on September 19, 2019, wherein it stated that it disputed the compensability of the underlying claim, thereby making Liljestrand's motion inappropriate. On the same day, Dell also filed a motion to amend asking that it be permitted to amend the answer it had filed to the amended petition in 2014 because Dell stated that they had erroneously admitted that Liljestrand injured himself in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with Dell. On September 27, 2019, Dell filed a motion to determinecompensability of the 2001 injury and also filed a motion to withdraw their responses to Liljestrand's request for admissions from March 2010. The compensation court set these motions for a hearing on October 28, 2019.
At the October 28, 2019, hearing, the parties submitted arguments and the compensation court received evidence. Dell conceded that it had previously admitted that Liljestrand's injury was compensable during the 2014 proceedings. However, Dell argued that the Application and the Order Approving Application was not a determination of compensability. As such, Dell asked the compensation court to determine compensability. While Dell conceded that the language in the order approving application was not favorable to their position, they argued that the language stating that they were liable for future medical expenses was basically meaningless. Dell argued that the injury was not compensable; therefore, the future medical expenses should amount to nothing. Dell further argued that in reading the Application in its entirety, there was not an attempt to stipulate to compensability. Liljestrand contended that a lump-sum settlement agreement such as the one the parties entered into, does not need to address compensability because it is a contract between the parties that has to be approved by the compensation court and, under that contract, Dell agreed to be responsible for reasonable and necessary medical expenses arising from the 2001 injury.
The parties also argued about the specific medical bills Liljestrand sought to have paid. Liljestrand submitted into evidence exhibit 35, which was a collection of receipts from prescription medication he...
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