Lillions v. Gibbs
| Decision Date | 27 October 1955 |
| Docket Number | No. 33266,33266 |
| Citation | 289 P.2d 203,47 Wn.2d 629 |
| Parties | Olga C. LILLIONS, Appellant, v. James A. GIBBS, Dean C. McLean, and William A. Sears, constituting the Board of County Commissioners for King County, Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Christ D. Lillions, L. C. Brodbeck, Seattle, for appellant.
Charles O. Carroll, K. G. Smiles, Seattle, for respondents
Olga C. Lillions owns eight acres of unimproved land on Mercer Island, comprising the southwest quadrant of the intersection of southeast 40th street and 84th avenue southeast.
In 1950, the board of county commissioners adopted a comprehensive zoning plan for this area, in which the eight acres were classified as an S-1 (suburban) district. The northeast quadrant of this intersection was classified as a B-1 (business) district.
May 8, 1953, Mrs. Lillions petitioned the King county planning commission to reclassify as a B-1 and B-P (business parking) district two acres of her property adjacent to the intersection. The planning commission recommended to the board of county commissioners that the petition be granted. At the next regular meeting of the board, the recommendation of the commission was considered for adoption or rejection. Petitioner was represented by counsel. Several persons appeared in opposition to the reclassification. All persons appearing were given an opportunity to be heard. Thereafter, by resolution, the board unanimously denied the petition.
Mrs. Lillions commenced this action against the board of county commissioners, seeking a writ of mandate to compel the board to accept the recommendation of the planning commission.
The court denied the writ, and dismissed the action with prejudice. The plaintiff appealed.
Appellant assigns as error the court's failure to hold that respondents' action was arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, and predicated upon a false premise.
The contention that the board's action was predicated upon a false premise is based upon appellant's allegation that, at the time county commissioner McLean made the motion to reject the recommendation of the commission, his stated reason was that the proposed amendment was not in conformity with the comprehensive zoning plan previously adopted.
The members of the board were called as adverse witnesses, and none of them supported appellant's allegation. Commissioner McLean gave several other reasons why he moved to reject the petition. Commissioner Gibbs specifically stated that, although the conflict with the plan was a paramount reason, it was not the sole reason for his vote to reject.
The map in the comprehensive plan did not indicate that the planning commission intended appellant's property to be business property. Proposed business property was indicated on the map in red. Mr. Walkup, a member of the planning commission at the time the comprehensive zoning plan was adopted, was called was a witness for the appellant and testified as follows:
* * *
The contention of appellant with reference to false premise is without merit for two reasons. The evidence established (1) that the board did not rely solely upon the premise that the proposed change was in conflict with the comprehensive plan, and (2) that the plan itself did not show that the Lillions property was intended to be business property.
Was the action of the board arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory? When a board of county commissioners acts pursuant to a statute relating to zoning, it is a legislative body exercising legislative powers. See State ex rel. Lyon v. Board of County Commissioners of Pierce County, 1948, 31 Wash.2d 366, 196 P.2d 997. In the absence of fraud, this court will not inquire into the motives which actuated the local legislative body to enact, or fail to enact, an ordinance or resolution. See Cornelius v. City of Seattle, 1923, 123 Wash. 550, 559, 213 P. 17; Clise v. City of Seattle, 1929, 153 Wash. 661, 666, 280 P. 80; Goebel v. Elliott, 1934, 178 Wash. 444 447, 35 P.2d 44. The motives of the board in rejecting the commission's recommendation are not pertinent.
It is well established that courts will not review, except for clear abuse, the discretion vested in public officers. Metzger v. Quick, Wash.1955, 282 P.2d 812, and cases cited. If the action of the board, in and of itself, was not arbitrary and capricious, it follows that this court will not interfere.
Chapter 44, Laws of 1953, p. 115, RCW 35.63, cf. Rem.Rev.Stat.Sup. §§ 9322-1 through 9322-12, authorized the establishment of a planning commission, and the adoption of a comprehensive zoning plan. The act gives to the planning commission only the power to make recommendations to the board of county commissioners. The adoption or rejection of its recommendations lies solely within the sound discretion of the board. The proper exercise of discretion may include further inquiry. The board did not abuse its discretion by hearing the objectors, as well as the proponents.
Mandamus will not lie to compel the performance of acts or duties which call for the exercise of discretion on the part of public officers. Stoor v. City of Seattle, 1954, 44 Wash.2d 405, 410, 267 P.2d 902, and cases cited. Where courts do interfere, it is upon the theory that the action is so arbitrary and capricious as to evidence a total failure to exercise discretion, and therefore the act of the officer is invalid. Stoor v. City of Seattle, supra.
Arbitrary and capricious action of administrative bodies means...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Miller v. City of Tacoma
...has been defined as willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and regard for facts or circumstances. Lillions v. Gibbs, 47 Wash.2d 629, 633, 289 P.2d 203 (1955). A finding of fact made without evidence in the record to support it, and an order based upon such finding, is arbitra......
-
Milwaukie Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen
...an erroneous conclusion had been reached. In re Buffelen Lumber & Mfg. Co., 1948, 32 Wash.2d 205, 201 P.2d 194, 196; Lillions v. Gibbs, 1955, 47 Wash.2d 629, 289 P.2d 203; State Board of Tax Com'rs v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 1951, 121 Ind.App. 302, 96 N.E.2d The presumption favorab......
-
Deaconess Hospital v. Washington State Highway Commission
...v. City of Tacoma, 61 Wash.2d 374, 378 P.2d 464 (1963); Smith v. Hollenbeck, 48 Wash.2d 461, 294 P.2d 921 (1956); and Lillions v. Gibbs, 47 Wash.2d 629, 289 P.2d 203 (1955). A review of the record shows that the Highway Commission surveyed and studied several routes for the Spokane freeway,......
-
Petstel, Inc. v. King County
...bodies as to the wisdom of legislation. See Lenci v. City of Seattle, 63 Wash.2d 664, 675, 388 P.2d 926 (1964); Lillions v. Gibbs, 47 Wash.2d 629, 289 P.2d 203 (1955). The precise limits of this judicial review, however, are often inadequately defined. There are four tests which a rate regu......