Lilly v. U.S.
| Decision Date | 07 July 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-8528,85-8528 |
| Citation | 792 F.2d 1541 |
| Parties | James LILLY, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Thomas J. Waldrop, Federal Public Defender, Atlanta, Ga., for petitioner-appellant.
William L. McKinnon, Asst. U.S. Atty., Atlanta, Ga., respondent-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
Before VANCE and JOHNSON, Circuit Judges, and BOWEN *, District Judge.
In this case defendant James Lilly, Jr. appeals the district court's denial of Lilly's motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255 to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine. Lilly claims that the district court failed to comply with Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(2) and that he was therefore misled concerning whether he would have the right to withdraw his guilty plea. After reviewing the record, we affirm the district court's order denying collateral relief.
A 1982 indictment charged Lilly with conspiring to possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846. Lilly entered into a plea agreement in which the government agreed to recommend to the district court a maximum sentence of eighteen months in prison in exchange for Lilly's cooperation in this and other pending cases. 1 Lilly, represented by counsel, then appeared before a magistrate. The magistrate screened the proposed plea of guilty using the "forty questions form," question 34 of which reads as follows:
Do you understand that if the court refuses to accept such an agreement, you would have the right to withdraw your plea of guilty and plead not guilty?
Lilly answered "yes" to this question. The magistrate approved the proposed plea and referred the case to the district court for arraignment and sentencing.
Before the district court, Lilly entered his plea of guilty. The following excerpted dialogue occurred between the district court and Lilly:
THE COURT: The maximum punishment is 15 years in prison or $25,000.00 fine or both.
Do you understand that?
Do you understand that?
....
THE COURT: [The plea bargain] is simply a recommendation to the court. It's not binding on the court, and I could give you 15 years in prison or $25,000.00 fine or both.
Do you understand that?
MR. LILLY: Yes, your honor.
....
....
The court sentenced Lilly to the custody of the Attorney General for a period of ten years.
Lilly filed a Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence, and the district court denied the motion. He later filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255 to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence. A magistrate, after an evidentiary hearing, recommended that the section 2255 motion be denied. 2 The district court adopted the magistrate's recommendation and denied the motion. 3
We now turn to a consideration of Lilly's contention that the district court's failure to comply with Rule 11 misled him as to his ability to withdraw his guilty plea and thereby prejudiced him. Lilly notes that the district court did not comply with Rule 11(e)(2), which states in pertinent part:
If the agreement is of the type specified in subdivision (e)(1)(B), the court shall advise the defendant that if the court does not accept the recommendation or request the defendant nevertheless has no right to withdraw his plea.
Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(2). Lilly claims that this omission, coupled with question 34 of the "forty questions form" administered by the magistrate at Lilly's plea screening, misled him and thus deprived him of knowledge of the direct consequences of his guilty plea, a core concern of Rule 11.
Our analysis of Lilly's argument begins with our recognition of the posture of this case--a collateral attack on Lilly's sentence based on a Rule 11 violation. The Supreme Court in United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 99 S.Ct. 2085, 60 L.Ed.2d 634 (1979), stated that collateral relief is not available to a defendant who can show only a failure to comply with the formal requirements of Rule 11. In Timmreck the defendant sought collateral relief under section 2255 based on the district court's violation of Rule 11 by failing to inform him of the mandatory special parole term required by the applicable statute. The Supreme Court concluded that this formal violation of Rule 11 did not result in a complete miscarriage of justice or a proceeding inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure. Id. at 784, 99 S.Ct. at 2087. In denying collateral relief to the defendant, the Court noted that the defendant's claim could have been raised on direct appeal but was not, and the Court found no basis for allowing Timmreck's collateral attack to do service for an appeal. Id. The Court stated that "the concern with finality served by the limitation on collateral attack has special force with respect to convictions based on guilty pleas." Id. (footnote omitted).
This court in an en banc decision prior to Timmreck came to a similar conclusion. In Keel v. United States, 585 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc), we affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief to the defendant in a case in which the district court had not literally complied with Rule 11. The court had misinformed the defendant as to the maximum sentence he could receive. We held:
[W]hen a collateral attack is made on a guilty plea for failure of the district court to literally comply with new Rule 11, the defendant must show prejudice in order to qualify for Sec. 2255 relief. In the absence of a fundamental defect which inherently results in the miscarriage of justice, or an omission inconsistent with the demands of fair procedure, relief cannot be given in a collateral attack on a guilty plea conviction based on failure of Rule 11 compliance when the plea was taken.
Id. at 113. In Keel we based our holding on the reasoning of the same case relied on by the Supreme Court in Timmreck, Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962). 4 In rejecting the defendant's claim we noted that he had failed to show that he was prejudiced by the technical error or that the error rendered the proceeding so fundamentally defective as to result in a miscarriage of justice. 5 Keel, 585 F.2d at 114.
We conclude that the district court's failure to comply with Rule 11 in Lilly's case was a formal violation that did not result in a miscarriage of justice or a proceeding inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure. 6 We hold, therefore, that collateral relief under section 2255 is not available to Lilly. In reaching this conclusion we note that Lilly has not shown that he was prejudiced by the district court's failure to comply with Rule 11(e)(2). As quoted earlier, the district court on several occasions informed Lilly that the plea agreement's recommendation was not binding on the court and that there was a substantial likelihood that he would receive a sentence larger than that recommended. Lilly stated that he understood this and that his guilty plea was freely and voluntarily given. Lilly's attorney testified at the section 2255 evidentiary hearing that he warned Lilly that the trial judge likely would give a tougher sentence than that recommended in the plea agreement, but Lilly insisted that they go ahead with the guilty plea hoping that the judge would follow the recommendation. Lilly made no attempt to withdraw his guilty plea. He did not make a direct appeal, and he waited over a year and a half to make this collateral attack on his guilty plea.
We also find Lilly's argument that he was misled by question 34 of the "forty questions form" administered by the magistrate at his plea screening unpersuasive. Question 34 indicates that if the court refuses to accept the plea agreement, the defendant may withdraw the plea of guilty. The district court, however, may accept the plea agreement and yet permissibly not follow the plea agreement's recommendation. Question 34 does not state that if the court refuses to follow the recommendation of the plea agreement the defendant may withdraw the plea of guilty. In this case the district court simply refused to follow the plea agreement's recommendation, as it indicated to Lilly on several occasions prior to accepting his guilty plea that it would. The fifth circuit has enunciated three core concerns of Rule 11: "(1) a guilty plea must be free from coercion; (2) the accused must understand the nature of the charges against him; and (3) the accused must know the direct consequences of his guilty plea." United States v. Corbett, 742 F.2d 173, 178 (5th Cir.1984). We are convinced that these...
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