Limpus v. New York Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 05 December 1949
• Docket Number: No. 21255,21255
• Citation: 241 Mo.App. 27,226 S.W.2d 97
• Parties: LIMPUS v. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 97

226 S.W.2d 97

241 Mo.App. 27

LIMPUS v. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO.

No. 21255.

Kansas City Court of Appeals, Missouri.

Dec. 5, 1949.

Lathrop, Crane, Sawyer, Woodson & Righter, Kansas City, Richard S. Righter, Kansas City, Horace F. Blackwell, Jr., Kansas City, Ferdinand H. Pease, New York City, of counsel, for appellant.

Cross & Cross, Lathrop, R. H. Musser, Plattsburg, Harry A. Hall, Kansas City, Maurice P. Murphy, Washington, D. C., for respondent.

SPERRY, Commissioner.

Carrie E. Limpus, widow of Oran Limpus, deceased, sued on a life policy issued by New York Life Insurance Company, defendant to the said Oran Limpus. Trial to a jury resulted in judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $4270, which includes the full face of the policy and interest thereon. Defendant appeals.

Defendant challenges the jurisdiction of the trial court. The following facts are pertinent to that issue.

Insured died November 24, 1929, and the petition was filed February 17, 1930. Defendant filed demurrer, a motion to stay proceedings, and for security for costs. The cause was continued, by agreement of the parties and order of the court, through 1931, 1932, 1933. At the September Term, 1935, the following appears on the judge's docket: 'Pass to unprinted docket.' September, 1936, the following appears on the judge's docket: 'Pass off docket.'

It was stipulated in open court that the case was thereafter continued from time to time, by agreement, until trial date; and defendant offered to prove by the testimony of one of its attorneys, that it had repeatedly asked that the cause be tried.

April 28, 1939, defendant filed a deposition, taken in the state of Iowa, on the merits of the case.

September 27, 1944, plaintiff moved to reinstate the case on the docket, alleging that said cause was pending, that plaintiff desired that it be heard and determined, and that counsel for defendant, naming them, had been served with notice of the filing of said motion. In connection therewith the following appears on the judge's docket: 'Ordered reinstated on trial docket.'

February 19, 1945, defendant filed the depositions of three witnesses, taken in the state of New York, on the merits.

April 1, 1946, by agreement of the parties, the cause was set for trial on April 22, 1946. April 12, 1946, plaintiff filed a deposition taken on her behalf, on the merits.

June 10, 1946, defendant filed depositions of three witnesses, taken in St. Joseph, on the merits.

January 7, 1947, the case was set 'specially' for trial on March 25.

April 8, 1947, defendant's motion to dismiss, and its demurrer, were overruled, and defendant filed answer.

Trial was begun on October 5, 1948.

The trial court has inherent power to dismiss a cause for failure to prosecute with diligence. Guhman v. Grothe, 346 Mo. 427, 142 S.W.2d 1; but the order made in this case, if it was an order of dismissal, is silent as to the grounds therefor. True, the record fails to show any action taken, as to continuances or otherwise, during 1934, 1935 and a part of 1936. However, it was automatically continued. Alexander v. Haffner, 323 Mo. 1197, 20 S.W.2d 896, loc.cit. 898. If the order was one of dismissal the trial court was without power to reinstate the cause in 1944, or to make any order touching it. State ex rel. Conant v. Trimble, 311 Mo. 128, loc. cit. 144, S.W. 916.

But the vital question is whether the court dismissed the cause. At the time the order was made defendant's demurrer, and certain motions, wee pending and undisposed of. Although the petition stated a cause of action, to the merits of which defendant had not yet pleaded, various pending motions prevented actual trial on the merits, or the rendering of a default judgment against defendant. The judge at that time, maintained more than one 'docket.'

If the court had used the term 'dismissed' its meaning would have been clear. Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d Ed.1943; Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed. (1933) page 590. The cause would not have been, thereafter, pending. We do not hold that a cause may not be dismissed except by use of the word 'dismissed' but, if other words are used, their meaning and intended effect may be open to judicial interpretation. However, if the words used indicate a clear intention to dismiss the action, such effect will be given to them.

The following facts may be considered in determining the meaning of the order. The practice of the court in maintaining at least two dockets; the action of the court in continuing the case, by agreement of the parties, from and after 1936; the taking of depositions on the merits by defendant, in 1939; the reinstatement of the case to the 'trial docket,' on motion of plaintiff, unopposed by defendant, in 1944; the taking of various depositions by both parties, on the merits after reinstatement of the case; the claimed persistent insistence by defendant for a trial; the action of the court in specifically setting the case for trial on a number of occasions, by agreement of the parties; the failure of defendant to raise this question prior to the filing of its answer some elevent years after the entry of the order which, it now contends, removed the cause from the court's jurisdiction.

We are unable to say that the words used clearly indicate a dismissal, or that the court intended the order to have that effect. If the judge who made the order, and the parties, had not treated the cause as pending, following its entry, we might be inclined to rule that the cause was dismissed; but they were familiar with practice obtaining in that court, they did not interpret it as an order of dismissal, nor did the court; and we are inclined to adopt their construction. We hold that the cause was not dismissed.

The policy was issued in 1918, and insured was accidentally killed November 24, 1929. The policy was in the principal sum of $1000, and provided for double indemnity in case of accidental death. It also provided for waiver of premiums and payment of disability benefits if insured should become totally and permanently disabled, while the policy was in effect and no premium was past due, after due proof thereof. No notice of disability was given until after the policy had been lapsed and placed on an extended paid-up basis. The extended term had expired before insured's death occurred.

If plaintiff can recover at all it must be on the theory upon which the cause was tried and submitted: That insured became, and remained, totally and permanently disabled by reason of insanity, prior to February 13, 1927; and that his failure to give notice thereof was excused by reason of the nature of his disability.

Defendant presents three propositions for our review, to wit: (a) that there was no substantial evidence of insured's insanity; (b) that insanity of insured constitutes no valid excuse for failure to furnish notice and proof of disability prior to the date the policy was lapsed for failure to pay premiums; and, (c) that plaintiff is not entitled to recover interest for a period of 19 years, because of her failure to prosecute diligently.

Insured was employed as a traveling salesman, from about 1904, until 1921. During the summer of 1921 he suffered a stock and was confined to his bed for several months and, during the remainder of his life, he dragged his left foot and leg, and suffered from an impairment of the use of his left arm, the left side of his face and mouth was twisted and drawn, and he was unable to talk clearly.

On the issue of insanity, plaintiff and her two daughters, testified to the following effect: that insured, prior to suffering a stroke in 1921, was uniformly cheerful and kindly to his family, worked steadily and earned a good living for them, brought money to the home, never cursed or used vile language, never threatened or abused either his wife or daughters, had many friends of whom he was fond, and treated guests who visited in the home with courtesy and friendliness; that after he was able to be out of bed, following the stroke, he was greatly disabled physically; that he could not drive his car; mumbled when he talked; that he eventually went back to work for his old employer, for a few months, but worked in the office instead of as a salesman; that he was unable to do that work and quit; that he then tried to sell goods which he bought on his own, but was unable to do so; that he, thereafter, searched for employment but never worked; that he would get lost in St. Joseph, where they lived, would take the wrong street car, would get off at the wrong corner; that his condition grew progressively worse; that he became abusive and threatening toward members of the...