Limtiaco v. Camacho
| Decision Date | 27 March 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 06–116.,06–116. |
| Citation | 127 S.Ct. 1413,75 BNA USLW 4145,549 U.S. 483,167 L.Ed.2d 212 |
| Parties | Alicia G. LIMTIACO, Attorney General of Guam, Petitioner, v. Felix P. CAMACHO, Governor of Guam. |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
The Guam Legislature authorized the Governor to issue bonds to fund the Territory's continuing obligations, but Guam's attorney general refused to sign the necessary contracts, concluding that issuance would violate the debt-limitation provision of Guam's Organic Act, which limits the Territory's public indebtedness to 10 percent of the “aggregate tax valuation of the property in Guam,” 48 U.S.C. § 1423a. The Governor sought a declaration from the Guam Supreme Court that issuance would not violate the provision, calculating the debt limitation based on the appraised value of property in Guam. Agreeing, the Supreme Court rejected the attorney general's argument to base the limitation on assessed value. The Ninth Circuit granted the attorney general's certiorari petition, but while the appeal was pending, Congress removed the Circuit's jurisdiction over appeals from Guam. Relying on its holding in Santos v. Guam, that Congress had stripped it of jurisdiction over pending appeals, the court dismissed the appeal. The attorney general then filed a petition for certiorari in this Court, even though it was more than 90 days after the Guam Supreme Court's judgment.
Held:
1. The Guam Supreme Court's judgment did not become final, for purposes of this Court's review, until the Ninth Circuit issued its order dismissing the appeal. Certiorari petitions must be filed “within 90 days after the entry of,” 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c), a lower court's “genuinely final judgment,” Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 98, 124 S.Ct. 2276, 159 L.Ed.2d 172. In some cases, the actions of a party or a lower court suspend the finality of a judgment by “rais[ing] the question whether the court will modify the judgment and alter the parties' rights.” Ibid. By granting the petition for certiorari, the Ninth Circuit raised that possibility and thus suspended the finality of the Guam Supreme Court's judgment. Until the Circuit issued its order dismissing the case, the appeal remained pending, and the finality of the judgment remained suspended. Contrary to the Governor's arguments, the judgment was not made final either when Congress enacted the jurisdiction-depriving statute or when the Ninth Circuit decided Santos. This holding is limited to the unique procedural circumstances here. Pp. 1417 – 1418. 2. Guam's debt limitation must be calculated according to the assessed valuation of property in the Territory. The term “tax valuation” most naturally means the value to which the tax rate is applied. It therefore means “assessed valuation”—a term consistently defined as a valuation of property for tax purposes. Appraised value is simply market value, which may or may not relate to taxation. The Guam Supreme Court's contrary interpretation—that “tax” limits the kinds of property qualifying for inclusion in the debt-limitation calculation—impermissibly rearranges the statutory language. “Tax” modifies “valuation,” not “property.” Thus, “tax valuation” refers to the type of valuation to be conducted, not the object that is valued. The court also erred in reasoning that, because the Virgin Islands' debt-limitation provision explicitly refers to “assessed value,” Congress must have intended to base Guam's limitation on some other value. Congress' rejection of “assessed” says no more than its rejection of “actual” or “appraised,” terms it could have used had it meant actual, market, or appraised value. This Court's interpretation comports with most States' practice of fixing the debt limitations of municipalities to assessed valuation. States use clear language when departing from this approach, but Congress has not done so here. The Governor's additional arguments—that this interpretation would result in no debt limitation at all because Guam may arbitrarily set its assessment rate above 100 percent of market value, and that this Court owes deference to the Guam Supreme Court's interpretation of the Organic Act—are not persuasive. Pp. 1418 – 1420.
Reversed and remanded.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Part II, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III, and IV, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and BREYER, JJ., joined. SOUTER, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which STEVENS, GINSBURG, and ALITO, JJ., joined, post, p. 1420.
Seth P. Waxman, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.
Beth S. Brinkmann, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Seth P. Waxman, Randolph D. Moss, Jonathan G. Cedarbaum, Kelly Thompson Cochran, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner.
Arthur B. Clark, Rodney J. Jacob, Daniel M. Benjamin, Calvo & Clark, LLP, Tamuning, Guam, Kathleen V. Fisher, Arne D. Wagner, Matthew Borden, Calvo & Clark, LLP, San Francisco, CA, Beth S. Brinkmann, Seth M. Galanter, Brian R. Matsui, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Washington, DC, Seth M. Hufstedler, Shirley M. Hufstedler, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Respondent.
The Legislature of Guam authorized Guam's Governor to issue bonds to fund the Territory's continuing obligations. Concluding that the bonds would violate the debt-limitation provision of the Organic Act of Guam, § 11, 64 Stat. 387, as amended, 48 U.S.C. § 1423a, the attorney general 1 of Guam refused to sign contracts necessary to issue the bonds. In response, the Governor sought a declaration from the Guam Supreme Court that issuance of the bonds would not violate the Organic Act's debt limitation. The Guam Supreme Court held that § 1423a limits Guam's allowed indebtedness to 10 percent of the appraised valuation, not the assessed valuation, of taxable property in Guam. We granted certiorari to decide whether Guam's debt limitation must be calculated according to the assessed or the appraised valuation of property in Guam. We hold that it must be calculated based on the assessed valuation.
In 2003, Guam lacked sufficient revenues to pay its obligations. To supplement revenues, the Guam Legislature authorized the Governor to issue bonds worth approximately $400 million. See Guam Pub.L. 27–019. The Governor signed the new legislation and prepared to issue the bonds. However, under Guam law, Guam's attorney general must review and approve all government contracts prior to their execution. Guam Code Ann., Tit. 5, § 22601 (1996). The attorney general concluded that issuance of the bonds would raise the Territory's debt above the level authorized by Guam's Organic Act. See 48 U.S.C. § 1423a (). He therefore refused to approve the bond contracts.
In response, the Governor sought a declaration from the Guam Supreme Court that issuance of the authorized bonds would not cause Guam's debt to exceed the debt limitation. That determination turned, in part, on the meaning of the phrase “aggregate tax valuation” in Guam's Organic Act. The attorney general calculated the debt limitation as 10 percent of the assessed valuation of property in Guam. But the Governor calculated the debt limitation as 10 percent of the appraised valuation. Because Guam assesses property at 35 percent of its appraised value, Guam Code Ann., Tit. 11, § 24102(f), the attorney general's interpretation resulted in a much lower debt limit. The Guam Supreme Court agreed with the Governor and held that 48 U.S.C. § 1423a sets the debt limitation at 10 percent of the appraised valuation of property in Guam.
The attorney general filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See § 1424–2 (). The Court of Appeals granted the petition in October 2003. While the appeal was pending, Congress amended § 1424–2 and removed the language that vested jurisdiction in the Ninth Circuit over appeals from Guam. See § 2, 118 Stat. 2208, 48 U.S.C. § 1424–2 (2000 ed., Supp.IV). In Santos v. Guam, 436 F.3d 1051 (Jan. 3, 2006), the Court of Appeals addressed the effect of the amendment on its jurisdiction. The court held that Congress had stripped its jurisdiction not only prospectively, but also for pending appeals. Id., at 1054. Citing Santos, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the attorney general's appeal in this case on March 6, 2006. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a.
The attorney general then filed a petition for certiorari in this Court. By statute, certiorari petitions must be filed “within ninety days after the entry of ... judgment” in a lower court. 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c). The attorney general filed his petition more than 90 days after the judgment from which he appeals—that of the Guam Supreme Court—was entered. Accordingly, when we granted certiorari in this case, 548 U.S. 942, 127 S.Ct. 36, 165 L.Ed.2d 1014 (2006), we directed the parties to address both the question presented by petitioner and whether the filing of a petition for certiorari or the pendency of a writ of certiorari before the Court of Appeals suspended the finality of the Guam Supreme Court's judgment for purposes of the 90–day period set out in § 2101(c).
Only “a genuinely final judgment” will trigger § 2101(c)'s 90–day period for filing a petition for certiorari in this Court. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 98, 124 S.Ct. 2276, 159 L.Ed.2d 172 (2004). In most cases, the 90–day period begins to run immediately upon entry of a lower court's judgment. In some cases, though, the actions of a party or a lower court suspend the finality of a judgment and thereby reset the 90–day “clock.” Ibid. For instance, the timely filing of a petition for rehearing with the lower court or a lower court's appropriate...
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