Linbeck v. State
| Decision Date | 28 October 1890 |
| Citation | 1 Wash. 336,25 P. 452 |
| Parties | LINBECK v. STATE. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Error to superior court, Chehalis county.
Austin E. Griffiths, for plaintiff in error.
George J. Moody, Pros. Atty., for the State.
This action was commenced in the superior court of Chehalis county, by the filing of an information therein in substance as follows: "George J. Moody, prosecuting attorney of the state of Washington for the district comprising the counties of Wahkiakum, Chehalis, and Pacific, in said state on oath accuse John Linbeck by this information of the crime of burglary committed as follows, to-wit: The said John Linbeck, on the 28th day of February, A. D. one thousand eight hundred and ninety, and within one year next preceding the date hereof, in the county of Chehalis, aforesaid, in the state of Washington, did then and there, in the night-time of said day, unlawfully break and unlawfully enter the dwelling-house of one James Arland, there situated, with the intent then and there to commit a misdemeanor therein contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state of Washington." Defendant pleaded thereto not guilty. Trial was had, a verdict of guilty rendered, and judgment and sentence imposed; whereupon defendant has brought the case to this court for review.
The first ground of reversal relied upon is that the information does not state facts constituting a public offense; the contention in this regard being that it is not only necessary to charge that the entering was with an intent to commit a misdemeanor, but that the particular misdemeanor which he intended to commit must be set out. This contention is borne out by numerous authorities which the diligence of counsel has gathered for the information of this court; and we believe it to be the law in most of the states, and that it would clearly be the law here were it not for section 828 of our Code. Said section is as follows: And by virtue of its provisions the prosecution is no longer compelled to prove with what intent the defendant enters, but, on the contrary, the unlawful entering having been proved, the intent to commit a crime or misdemeanor is presumed; and, this being so, we are unable to see how the accuracy required before such section was enacted can now aid the defendant. The burden of showing the intent with which he entered is by said section cast upon him, and he can show such an intent to have been an innocent one as well without the details as to his specific intent as with it. Aided by the section above quoted, the information was sufficient.
The defendant was not sworn as a witness in his own behalf, and the court failed to instruct the jury, as required by statute, that from such fact no inference of guilt should be drawn. We think this was error. The statute in question makes it the duty of the court to give such instruction irrespective of the action of the defendant in relation thereto; and while we do not now hold that the right to have this instruction given may not be waived by some express act of the defendant to that...
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State v. Johnson
...the rule on the former statute providing for a mandatory presumption of criminal intent from unlawful entry. See Linbeck v. State, 1 Wash. 336, 337-38, 25 P. 452 (1890). In light of the 1975 revision of that statute (see Laws of 1975, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 260, § 9A.52.040) and the recent devel......
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State v. Jury
...was present. No oral communication was made to the jury, as in State v. Wroth, 15 Wash. 621, 47 P. 106 (1896), or Linbeck v. State, 1 Wash. 336, 25 P. 452 (1890). As applied to the particular circumstances of this case, CrR 6.15(f)(1) does not violate the due process considerations raised i......
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State v. Carnagy
... ... Ct ... App. 465 (13 S.W. 750); Metz v. State, 46 Neb. 547 ... (65 N.W. 190); Ruloff v. People, supra. It seems ... that in Vermont and Washington the jury must be directed not ... to take into consideration the defendant's omission to ... testify. State v. Cameron, 40 Vt. 555; Linbeck ... v. State, 1 Wash. 336 (25 P. 452.) In the absence of a ... request such an instruction is not required in this state ... State v. Stevens, 67 Iowa 557, 25 N.W. 777. In that ... case it was said: "Had such instruction been requested, ... it, doubtless, would have been given." A similar ... ...
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State v. Pavelich
... ... Under that last proviso this court, from [153 Wash. 386] the ... earliest time, held that it was the mandatory duty of a trial ... court in the trial of a criminal prosecution to instruct the ... jury in accordance with that proviso. Linbeck v ... State, 1 Wash. 336, 25 P. 452; reaffirmed in State ... v. Myers, 8 Wash. 177, 35 P. 580, 756 ... When, ... however, the mandatory duty of the court contained in the ... last proviso of section 2148, supra, was abolished by the ... rule of this ... ...
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Balancing Interests Under Washington's Statute Governing the Admissibility of Extraneous Sex-offense Evidence
...74. Id. 75. Id. 76. Wash. Rem. and Bal. Code § 2148 (1915). 77. Pavelich, 153 Wash. at 385-86, 279 P. at 1104 (citing Linbeck v. State, 1 Wash. 336, 25 P. 452 (1890), reaff'd. State v. Meyers, 8 Wash. 177, 35 P. 580 78. Pavelich, 153 Wash. at 386, 279 P. at 1104-05. The court rule at issue ......