Lincoln County Stone Company v. Koenig
| Decision Date | 30 June 2000 |
| Citation | 21 S.W.3d 142 |
| Parties | (Mo.App. E.D. 2000) . Lincoln County Stone Company, Inc. and Missouri Land Reclamation Commission, Appellants, v. Ray and Marydel Koenig, Respondents. Case Number: ED77492 Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District Handdown Date: 0 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Lincoln County, Hon. J. Rockne Calhoun
Counsel for Appellant: Timothy Duggan
Counsel for Respondent: David Taylor
Opinion Summary: Lincoln County Stone Company and the Missouri Land Reclamation Commission appeal a circuit court judgment reversing a Commission order which granted a land reclamation permit to Lincoln County Stone. The basis for the Circuit Court's order was a permit hearing conducted upon request of neighbors, the Koenigs and Eisenbaths.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Division Three holds: When considering whether a person's health, safety or livelihood is affected by noncompliance with any applicable laws or regulations, the Commission must look to acts of noncompliance of associated persons and corporations. In addition, the Commission may look to a company's past acts of noncompliance to the extent they suggest a reasonable likelihood of future acts of noncompliance in determining whether a person's health, safety or livelihood is affected.
Opinion Vote: REVERSED AND REMANDED. Teitelman, P.J. and Mooney J., concur.
Opinion modified by Court's own motion on July 25, 2000. This substitution does not constitute a new opinion.
Lincoln County Stone Company ("Lincoln County Stone") and the Missouri Land Reclamation Commission ("Commission") appeal a judgment of the Lincoln County Circuit Court ("Circuit Court") reversing an order of the Commission which granted a land reclamation permit to Lincoln County Stone. The basis for the Circuit Court's order was a permit hearing conducted upon request of neighbors Ray and Meridel Koenig ("the Koenigs") and David and Pam Eisenbath.1 On appeal, Lincoln County Stone and the Commission argue the Commission did not err in granting the permit application of Lincoln County Stone as the evidence demonstrated Lincoln County Stone was in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations. We reverse and remand.
Lincoln County Stone is a corporation in the business of mining limestone. It was incorporated on March 13, 1998 and is wholly owned by the J.H. Berra Holding Company ("Holding Company"). In addition to owning Lincoln County Stone, the Holding Company also owns J.H. Berra Construction Company ("Construction Company") and Bellefontaine Quarries ("Bellefontaine"). Bellefontaine operates limestone quarries, and the Construction Company constructs sewer systems, develops land, constructs highways, and clears construction sites. John Berra, Jr. is the president of the Holding Company, the Construction Company, Bellefontaine, and Lincoln County Stone. Joseph Nicpon ("Nicpon") is the vice-president of Bellefontaine and Lincoln County Stone; his duties include obtaining the proper permits for Lincoln County Stone.
On March 21, 1998, Lincoln County Stone submitted to the Commission an application to operate a limestone quarry on land in Lincoln County. The proposed quarry would be located adjacent to property owned by the Koenigs and the Eisenbaths. The Koenigs operate a 750-tree orchard which is pollinated by a hive of bees and rent out a house located on their property. On April 13, 1998, pursuant to section 444.773.3 RSMo (Supp. 1999), the Koenigs and the Eisenbaths requested a hearing to challenge the issuance of the permit. Mohsen Dkhili, a Land Reclamation Specialist with the Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") whose duties include making recommendations to the Commission on requests for hearings, later recommended the Commission deny the Koenig's and Eisenbath's request for a hearing. The Commission, however, granted their request for a hearing.
Later in April, after beginning construction on a scale house and construction of the haul road, Nicpon spoke with Thomas Seigel, an engineer with the Missouri Department of Natural Resources ("DNR"), who recommended Lincoln County Stone apply for a land disturbance permit. Believing Lincoln County Stone's initial construction would not involve land disturbance of greater than five acres, the minimal amount of disturbed land to necessitate a permit, Nicpon did not file an application for a land disturbance permit until April 29, 1998. On April 30, 1998, Lincoln County Stone was issued a Notice of Violation for failure to obtain a storm water permit for land disturbance prior to beginning construction. Lincoln County Stone discontinued operations at the site. In response to Nicpon's application, the DNR issued a land disturbance permit to Lincoln County Stone around May 5, 1998.
Pursuant to section 444.789.3 RSMo (Supp. 1999), the Commission appointed attorney Tom Jones to serve as hearing officer. Following a hearing, the officer presented his proposed findings to the Commission in which he recommended against issuing the permit. The Commission chose to reject the proposed findings and instead issued an order granting Lincoln County Stone a permit to operate their limestone quarry. The Koenigs and Eisenbaths appealed the Commission's decision to the Circuit Court. The Circuit Court entered a summary judgment order reversing the order of the Commission and rescinding Lincoln County Stone's permit. Lincoln County Stone and the Commission appeal from the Circuit Court's order.
In their point relied on, Lincoln County Stone and the Commission contend the Circuit Court erred in substituting its discretion for that of the Commission when it rescinded the Commission's issuance of a permit. In particular, Lincoln County Stone argues section 444.773.3 RSMo (Supp. 1999) requires a finding of noncompliance with applicable laws and regulations to warrant denial of a land reclamation permit and the evidence demonstrated Lincoln County Stone was in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations. Consequently, Lincoln County Stone and the Commission argue the Commission's decision to grant Lincoln County Stone a permit should have been upheld.
Although this case is an appeal from the Circuit Court's judgment, we review the agency's findings and conclusions rather than the Circuit Court's judgment.2 State ex rel. Drury Displays, Inc. v. City of Olivette, 976 S.W.2d 634, 635 (Mo. App. 1998). The case at bar deals solely with issues of statutory construction. Statutory construction is a matter of law, not fact. Zitzman v. Lohman, 917 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Mo. App. 1996). An agency's interpretation generally is to be given great weight. Burlington Northern R.R. v. Director of Revenue, 785 S.W.2d 272, 273 (Mo. 1990). However, when an administrative agency's decision is based on the agency's interpretations of law, the reviewing court must exercise unrestricted, independent judgment and correct erroneous interpretations. Id.
The purpose of Missouri's Land Reclamation Act ("the Act") is to strike a balance between the surface mining of minerals and the reclamation of land subjected to surface disturbance by that mining. Section 444.762 RSMo (Supp. 1999). As such, the duties of the Commission include examining and passing on all applications and plans submitted by potential mine operators for the method of operation of the proposed mines and for the reclamation and conservation of the area of land affected by the operations. Section 444.767(3) RSMo (Supp. 1999). Any operator desiring to engage in surface mining shall make a written application to the director for a permit. Section 444.772.1 RSMo (Supp. 1999). The director shall promptly investigate the application and make a recommendation to the commission as to whether the permit should be issued or denied.
Section 444.773.1 RSMo (Supp. 1999). If the director's recommendation is for issuance of the permit, the director shall issue the permit without a hearing except that upon petition from any person whose health, safety, or livelihood is affected by noncompliance with any applicable laws or regulations, a hearing may be held. Section 444.773.3 RSMo (Supp. 1999). The hearing officer shall make recommendations to the Commission, but the Commission shall make the final decision. Section 444.789 RSMo (Supp. 1999).
The dispute between the Commission and the Circuit Court centered around the phrase "is affected by noncompliance" in section 444.773.3. The Commission adopted a narrow construction of the wording; it stated the statute required an "active, current, [and] ongoing noncompliance" and explained to consider past and/or future acts of noncompliance would be to ignore the clear language of the statute. The Circuit Court, however, held "[t]he Commission was remiss in not examining sister companies or any other person connected to Lincoln [County Stone]" for acts of noncompliance. The Circuit Court noted the anomaly of not considering past violations of subsidiary companies, noting "[c]ertainly Lincoln [County Stone] would have no noncompliance history having just been born."
Both the Commission and the Circuit Court conceded section 444.773.3 is designed as a standing requirement to permit the Koenigs to request a hearing. However, both the Commission and the Circuit Court also utilized the statute as a substantive standard to evaluate issuance of a permit. Whether section 444.773.3 is merely procedural or both a procedural and substantive standard is not a question before this court on appeal. We leave the question of section 444.773.3's function for another day and evaluate the language in light of the Commission's decision, namely that the effect of noncompliance upon the "health, safety or livelihood" of a hearing petitioner constitutes a substantive consideration in the issuance of a land reclamation permit.
This case presents an...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Campbell v. Cnty. Comm'n of Franklin Cnty.
...or absurd results." Mo. ex rel. Bouchard v. Grady, 86 S.W.3d 121, 123 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002) (quoting Lincoln Cnty. Stone Co. v. Koenig, 21 S.W.3d 142, 146 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000)). Moreover, the intent of Rule 64.870.2 is to provide a litigant with a unique opportunity for review at the trial c......
-
Florida Rsa # 8, LLC v. City of Chesterfield, Mo.
...legislative act must be construed together and, if reasonably possible, all provisions must be harmonized." Lincoln County Stone Co. v. Koenig, 21 S.W.3d 142, 146 (Mo.Ct.App. 2000) (citing State v. Sledd, 949 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Mo.Ct.App.1997)). See also Cousin's Advertising, Inc. v. Bd. of Z......
-
Branson v. State
...it will be presumed the legislature did not insert idle verbiage or superfluous language in a statute." Lincoln County Stone Co., Inc. v. Koenig, 21 S.W.3d 142, 146 (Mo.App. E.D.2000). That being the case, I believe it is important to acknowledge that the legislature here used the words "se......
-
State ex rel. Hawley v. City of St. Louis
...intent, we look also to the problem the legislature sought to address with the statute's enactment. Lincoln Cty. Stone Co., Inc. v. Koenig, 21 S.W.3d 142, 146 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000). We must construe the statute in light of the purposes the legislature intended to accomplish and the evils it ......