Lincoln Lumber Co. v. Tiemann
| Decision Date | 28 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. A-18-920.,A-18-920. |
| Parties | LINCOLN LUMBER COMPANY, A NEBRASKA CORPORATION, APPELLEE, v. JAMES TIEMANN, RUTH TIEMANN, AND ALYCIA TIEMANN BRADY, APPELLANTS. |
| Court | Nebraska Court of Appeals |
(Memorandum Web Opinion)
Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: KEVIN R. MCMANAMAN, Judge. Affirmed.
Scott A. Lautenbaugh, of Law Offices of Scott Lautenbaugh, for appellants.
Jonathan M. Brown, of Walentine O'Toole, L.L.P., for appellee.
Lincoln Lumber Company (Lincoln Lumber) brought an action against James Tiemann and Ruth Tiemann, husband and wife, and Alycia Tiemann Brady, the Tiemanns' daughter (collectively appellants), under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 36-701 et. seq. (Reissue 2016). We note that the UFTA has been repealed and replaced by the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act, 2019 Neb. Laws, L.B. 70, but it was in effect at the time this case originated and, therefore, it is applicable to our analysis.
Lincoln Lumber alleged that the Tiemanns fraudulently transferred money to Alycia rather than paying the judgment they owed to Lincoln Lumber. The district court for Lancaster County granted partial summary judgment in favor of Lincoln Lumber and entered judgment against Alycia for $25,000. After a trial on the remaining issues, the court found in favor of Lincoln Lumber and entered judgment against appellants, jointly and severally, for $27,500. Based on the reasons that follow, we affirm.
On September 8, 2011, Lincoln Lumber obtained a judgment in the amount of $125,000 against the Tiemanns in the district court. On August 30, 2013, Lincoln Lumber obtained a "charging order" in the referenced action against all transferable interests of Ruth in the Spence Family Limited Partnership. The charging order constituted a lien on Ruth's transferable interests in the limited partnership.
On April 10, 2014, Ruth received $61,230.24 from the Spence Family Limited Partnership pursuant to her interest in the limited partnership. She also received $36,316.95 on April 23, and $75,233.18 on May 5, for a total of $172,770.37.
Ruth gave Alycia $25,000 on April 10, 2014; $12,500 on April 24, 2014; and $15,000 on May 9, 2014, for a total of $52,500. At the time Alycia received these amounts she knew that the Tiemanns were insolvent.
On July 7, 2014, Lincoln Lumber entered into a stipulation for payments of the judgment, wherein the Tiemanns agreed to pay Lincoln Lumber $65,000 on the date of the agreement and agreed to pay the remaining $67,430.68 by April 7, 2015. The Tiemanns paid the $65,000 on July 7, 2014, but failed to pay the remaining balance by April 7, 2015. No further payments were made after July 7, 2014.
On September 20, 2016, Lincoln Lumber filed the present action against appellants under the UFTA based on the three transfers the Tiemanns made to Alycia. The complaint alleged that the Tiemanns made the transfers to Alycia with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud their creditors; the Tiemanns were insolvent at the time of each transfer; at the time of each transfer, Alycia did not give reasonably equivalent value for the voluntary transfer of monies from the Tiemanns; and the transfers were voidable pursuant to the UFTA.
Lincoln Lumber and appellants each filed a motion for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court denied appellants' motion for summary judgment and partially granted Lincoln Lumber's summary judgment motion. The trial court found that the terms of the stipulation for payments did not preclude Lincoln Lumber from filing and pursuing its claim under the UFTA after April 7, 2015, as appellants had argued, and that it was undisputed that the first $25,000 of the $52,500 that was transferred to Alycia was transferred for antecedent debts and therefore, was a fraudulent transfer. The court entered judgment against Alycia for $25,000. The court also concluded that there remained a material question of fact as to whether some or all of the remaining $27,500 was fraudulently transferred.
On March 27, 2018, a bench trial was held on the remaining issue--whether Lincoln Lumber could recover $27,500 transferred to Alycia by the Tiemanns in April and May 2014. The only evidence offered by Lincoln Lumber was an exhibit containing a stipulation by the parties. The stipulation included much of the information already discussed in regard to the judgment against the Tiemanns, the money Ruth received from the Spence Family Limited Partnership, the transfers to Alycia, and the stipulation for payments. In addition, the exhibit provided that Alycia did not have a judgment against the Tiemanns; Alycia did not have a perfected lien against anyproperty owned by the Tiemanns; the Tiemanns were insolvent at the time they transferred the $52,500 to Alycia; Alycia knew that the Tiemanns were insolvent when she received the $52,500; and the Tiemanns lived in a house owned by Alycia. The mortgage payment history and utility payment history for the house the Tiemanns were occupying were attached to the stipulation.
Appellants offered three exhibits into evidence: the mortgage payment history, the utility payment history, and the stipulation for payments. Alycia's husband, Justin Brady, testified at trial as well as the Tiemanns. Justin testified that the Tiemanns had lived in a house he and Alycia owned since the fall 2011. He testified that he and Alycia had a lease agreement with the Tiemanns for $3,000 per month, which was approximately the amount of monthly mortgage and utility payments. No written lease was produced at trial. Justin testified that in April 2014, Justin and Alycia told the Tiemanns they would have to move out of the house because they had not been paying rent. Justin and Alycia planned to then sell the house. Justin testified that the Tiemanns asked if they could continue living in the house if they prepaid him and Alycia for rent. Justin testified that he and Alycia subsequently received money from the Tiemanns and it was used to make seven future mortgage payments. The mortgage payment history reflected that seven mortgage payments were made on April 10, 2014. In exchange for the money received, Justin and Alycia agreed to not sell the house and to allow the Tiemanns to continue living in the house. The Tiemanns both testified that they agreed with the testimony given by Justin.
Appellants moved for directed verdict at the end of Lincoln Lumber's case, which the court overruled. Appellants did not renew their motion at the end of all evidence. Following trial, the court found that the remaining $27,500 that the Tiemanns paid to Alycia was a fraudulent conveyance. The court determined that the transfers made to Alycia were made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud Lincoln Lumber under § 36-705(a)(1). In addition, the court found that the Tiemanns did not receive reasonably equivalent or present value in exchange for the transfer of the $27,500 under § 36-706. It found the $27,500 was transferred either for antecedent debt or for future value yet to be incurred, and was not in the ordinary course of business. Judgment was entered in favor of Lincoln Lumber and against appellants, jointly and severally, in the amount of $27,500.
Restated, appellants assign that the trial court erred in (1) granting Lincoln Lumber's motion for summary judgment in part and denying appellants' motion for summary judgment because the stipulation for payments barred the present action; (2) its interpretation of the stipulation for payments and its terms; (3) finding there was no ambiguity in the stipulation for payments; (4) failing to construe the terms of the stipulation for payments against the drafter; (5) failing to grant a directed verdict at trial; (6) finding at trial that the remaining $27,500 transferred to Alycia amounted to a fraudulent conveyance; (7) finding actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud Lincoln Lumber; and (8) finding that the Tiemanns did not receive reasonably equivalent or present value in exchange for the transfer of the $27,500.
An appellate court will affirm a lower court's grant of summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Sparks v. M&D Trucking, 301 Neb. 977, 921 N.W.2d 110 (2018). In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment was granted and gives that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence. Id.
The meaning of a contract is a question of law, in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach its conclusions independently of the determinations made by the court below. Meyer Natural Foods v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., 302 Neb. 509, 925 N.W.2d 39 (2019).
An action under the UFTA is equitable in nature, and an appeal of a district court's determination that transfers of assets were in violation of the UFTA is equitable in nature. Korth v. Luther, 304 Neb. 450, 935 N.W.2d 220 (2019). In an appeal of an equity action, an appellate court tries factual questions de novo on the record, reaching a conclusion independent of the findings of the trial court, provided, however, that where credible evidence is in conflict on a material issue of fact, the appellate court considers and may give weight to the fact that the trial judge heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather than another. Id. When reviewing questions of law, an appellate court resolves the...
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