Lincoln Traction Co. v. Reason

• Decision Date: 02 July 1943
• Docket Number: 31623.
• Citation: 10 N.W.2d 344,143 Neb. 512
• Parties: LINCOLN TRACTION CO. v. REASON.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

10 N.W.2d 344

143 Neb. 512

LINCOLN TRACTION CO. v. REASON.

No. 31623.

Supreme Court of Nebraska

July 2, 1943

Syllabus by the Court.

The general rule is that if an employee suffers an accident and is injured while going to or from his work from or to his home the accident does not arise "out of and in the course of his employment" as that clause is defined in the compensation act.

Coburn Campbell, of Lincoln, for appellant.

Lee & Sheldahl, of Lincoln, for appellee.

Heard before SIMMONS, C. J., and PAINE, CARTER, YEAGER, CHAPPELL, and WENKE, JJ., and TEWELL, District Judge.

SIMMONS Chief Justice.

In this action Otis L. Reason, hereinafter called the plaintiff seeks compensation under the workmen's compensation act. Plaintiff prevailed before a judge of the compensation court. The employer, Lincoln Traction Company, hereinafter called the defendant, appealed to the district court where, after trial, compensation was denied. Plaintiff by his appeal here presents the question as to whether or not his injuries were caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff entered the employment of the defendant in 1921 as an "oil man." His agreed pay was 40 cents an hour and "transportation back and forth to work." This transportation was furnished him by the medium of a book of passes, good day or night, on any line of the defendant, and was not limited to use only to and from his home to his work. Plaintiff had a fixed place of employment and fixed hours although in emergency he might be called to service out of hours and at places other than where he normally worked.

On February 10, 1939, his usual place of employment was then, and had been for some time past, at the company property at Seventh and J streets in Lincoln. His usual hour to begin work was 7 a. m. He resided at 2517 Y street. On that morning plaintiff left his home to go to work. He walked to Twenty-seventh and Y where at 6:15 a. m. he took passage on a bus of defendant riding it to Ninth and P streets where he transferred to a South Tenth street car. He left the car at Tenth and J streets and walked west toward his place of employment at Seventh and J streets. This appears to have been the route selected by him and the customary method and route followed by plaintiff in going to work. He had walked some 300 feet when about 6:50 a. m. at the intersection of Ninth and J streets he was struck by a car and received serious and permanent injuries. He was then some 600 feet or two blocks from his place of employment at Seventh and J streets.

Except as above shown the defendant had no buses or cars operating to carry passengers to, nor did it furnish other transportation from, plaintiff's home to the place where he was employed.

In this proceeding plaintiff's rights and defendant's liabilities are fixed by statute. Our statute provides: "When employer and employe shall by agreement, express or implied, or otherwise as hereinafter provided, accept the provisions of Part II of this article, (48-109 to 48-115), compensation shall be made for personal injuries to or for the death of such employe by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, without regard to the negligence of the employer, according to the schedule hereinafter provided, in all cases except when the injury or death is caused by wilful negligence on the part of the employe; and the burden of proof of such fact shall be upon the employer." Comp.St.1929, § 48-110.

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