Lincoln v. Harvey

• Decision Date: 14 December 1945
• Docket Number: No. 13666.,13666.
• Citation: 191 S.W.2d 764
• Parties: LINCOLN et al. v. HARVEY et al.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

191 S.W.2d 764

LINCOLN et al. v. HARVEY et al.

No. 13666.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Dallas.

December 14, 1945.

Rehearing Denied January 18, 1946.

Appeal from District Court, Dallas County; Sarah T. Hughes, Judge.

Suit for declaratory judgment by Paul J. Harvey and others against J. V. Lincoln and others. From the judgment, the defendants appeal.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

W. M. Pierson and Saner, Saner, Jack & Sallinger, all of Dallas, for appellants.

Clifford S. Dillard, of Dallas, for appellees.

BOND, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a declaratory judgment entered by a district court of Dallas County in favor of each of the appellees (eight in number) against the eight appellants respectively, in reference to separable lease contracts entered into by the appellees with the appellants, J. V. Lincoln and wife Lela Lincoln, in which each claims a valid subsisting lease on residential property, located in the City of Dallas, for the "duration of the war at a rental of $50.00 per month." Each contract was oral, made at a different time and place, and in no way contingent upon the others. Subsequently the Lincolns sold one rental unit to each of the other appellants; and, in consequence, the purchasers, with legal notice of the respective tenants' occupancy and right of possession, are proceeded against in this suit.

The eight separable causes of action are joined on the alleged ground of "common questions of law and fact", affecting the rights and relief of the several tenants; that is, whether the rental contracts terminate only when a formal declaration by the sovereign authority of the United States shall have been pronounced; or whether the war terminated when the general contest by force ceased between the United States and Germany, Italy and Japan and the armed forces of the sovereign powers were ordered withdrawn from the theaters of conflict, thereby evidencing victory to which this nation prosecuted its right by force. Appellees also sought an injunction to restrain multiplicity of suits in forcible entry and detainer, on the alleged ground that a fair and impartial trial could not be had in a justice court, or the county court on appeal, because of bias and prejudice of the courts and juries in such matters; and that the value of all the several leases combined is above the jurisdiction of both the justice court and the county court.

The appellants in due course challenged the jurisdiction of the district court to enter a declaratory judgment in absence of pleadings showing that the subject matter in controversy was within the jurisdiction of the district court; and, further, that the district court was without jurisdiction to grant an injunction to restrain threatened actions of forcible entry and detainer on the grounds thus alleged. In limine, the trial court overruled appellants' exception to the jurisdiction; and, on trial, July 10, 1945, the court refused to grant the writ of injunction but entered the declaratory judgment, finding (pertinent here) that "the law and facts are with the plaintiffs in the case * * *, that each plaintiff hereto entered into a contract with Lela Lincoln or her duly authorized agent, husband, J. V. Lincoln, to rent the property occupied by each respective plaintiff for the duration of the war at a rental of $50.00 per month." The action of the court in refusing the injunction is not before us.

On this appeal, appellants urge that the primary and determinative issue involved, as found by the trial court, is whether appellees have right of possession of the rental property occupied by each of them "for the duration of the war", meaning, evidently, World War II, and, if so, the war having subsequently ended, appellees' right of possession has become moot; thus the appeal should be dismissed.

We think the conclusions hereinafter expressed render it unnecessary to determine whether the war has in fact terminated because of cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of the armed forces of the sovereign powers from the theaters of conflict and the supreme efforts of the allied nations in winning the peace; or whether the war will terminate only when the sovereign authorities shall have formally declared the war ended—at which time the lease contracts will then terminate; suffice to say that the term "the duration of the war" in contracts must be construed as the term is ordinarily used for the purposes intended in accomplishing the object of the contracting ...