Lindahl v. State
| Decision Date | 02 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | WD72555 |
| Parties | DONNA J. LINDAHL, Appellant, v. STATE OF MISSOURI, ET AL., Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Johnson County, Missouri
Before Division Two: Thomas H. Newton, Presiding Judge, Cynthia L. Martin, Judge
and Gary D. Witt, Judge
Donna Lindahl ("Plaintiff") filed suit against the State of Missouri and the Missouri Army National Guard ("Defendant") for sex harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation pursuant to the Missouri Human Rights Act, section 213.0101 et seq., as it pertained to her prior employment with Defendant.2 After a jury trial based solely onPlaintiff's retaliation claim, the jury returned a verdict that awarded Plaintiff no actual damages and $500,000 in punitive damages.
Plaintiff appeals the judgment of the trial court, which granted Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the basis that "[n]o punitive damages can be awarded since there was no award of actual damages by the jury." Plaintiff also appeals the trial court's judgment that, inter alia, denied Plaintiff's motion for new trial.
The cause is reversed and remanded.
Beginning in 1999, Plaintiff was a civilian custodial worker at the Missouri National Guard Armory located on Whiteman Air Force Base in Knob Noster, Missouri. On February 18, 2004, Plaintiff notified military police on Whiteman Air Force Base of sexual harassment by Sgt. Mike Lewis, a soldier that was then stationed at the Armory but was never Plaintiff's supervisor. Plaintiff reported that over a fifteen month period, beginning in August 2002 through November 2003, Sgt. Lewis sexually harassed Plaintiff on multiple occasions at the Armory where she worked. Defendant did not dispute at trial that Sgt. Lewis engaged in reprehensible conduct.4
Specifically, the incidents began with Sgt. Lewis stopping by the Plaintiff's office and commenting on a poster depicting a muscular man wrapped in a large American flag. Sgt. Lewis repeatedly joked that he was the man in the photo, and asked Plaintiff whenshe was going to re-take this photo. Eventually, Plaintiff, an amateur photographer, consented to taking photographs of Sgt. Lewis, which led to Sgt. Lewis being photographed naked holding a small flag on a stick in front of his penis.
Over time, these incidents became even more aggressive, with Sgt. Lewis flashing his penis at Plaintiff without notice. On two occasions, Sgt. Lewis lured Plaintiff into a secluded location, blocked her avenue of escape and exposed himself so that Plaintiff could see his erect penis, and then began to masturbate.
In 2005, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against Defendant in the Circuit Court of Johnson County, which alleged claims of sex harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation pursuant to the Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), section 213.010 et seq. Prior to trial, Plaintiff made a strategic decision to proceed only on the retaliation claim against the Defendant.
The jury heard evidence that Plaintiff had reported the sexual harassment by Sgt. Lewis to Plaintiff's immediate supervisor at the time, Sgt. Carla Caldwell. However, it was disputed at trial as to when the actions of Sgt. Lewis were discovered by other individuals within the Defendant's chain of command, and why the Defendant did not take concrete action based on this information.
Plaintiff presented evidence that she was retaliated against by the Defendant in numerous ways after reporting the incidents by Sgt. Lewis to the civilian police. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that she suffered lost wages as a result of a one monthsuspension from work after her report to the civilian police,5 and that she also suffered a pay differential that she claimed Defendant imposed as retaliation in restricting her hours after she reported this conduct. Plaintiff also claimed that the Defendant changed some of her job duties as retaliation after she reported the incidents. Two examples include: (1) Plaintiff was no longer allowed to collect the materials for recycling on the Armory because that position was re-assigned to military personnel; and (2) Plaintiff was directed "to stop burnishing the drill floor, a great source of pride to plaintiff, and allow it to return to concrete."
Plaintiff testified that after she reported the incidents, her existing work environment also deteriorated because of individual conduct at the Armory that the Defendant did not prevent. One example of such conduct is that Plaintiff would find pornographic magazines in the male bunk room following drill weekends.
Plaintiff also presented evidence that her new direct supervisor, Sgt. Beck, did not personally like the Plaintiff. Sgt. Beck was assigned as her supervisor after her report of the incidents.6 Plaintiff presented evidence that Sgt. Beck secretly videotaped Plaintiff mowing a lawn while on workers' compensation leave in an attempt to have Plaintiff punished. Plaintiff was never charged with any workers' compensation fraud.
Plaintiff further testified that she suffered emotional damages as the result of Defendant's alleged illegal retaliation. For example, Plaintiff testified that she had "trouble sleeping and eating."7
At the conclusion of trial, Plaintiff asked the jury to return a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. In addition to the evidence of lost income of $12,549.59, Plaintiff's trial counsel also suggested that the jury award $250,000.00 in actual damages for Plaintiff's "pain and suffering." Finally, Plaintiff argued that the jury should award punitive damages to Plaintiff "to send the message that this kind of conduct in an organization can't be tolerated."
The jury returned a verdict finding no actual damages, but assessing $500,000 in punitive damages in favor of Plaintiff. The trial court entered a written judgment consistent with the jury's verdict.
Defendant subsequently filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the trial court granted on the basis that the punitive damage award could not stand as a matter of law, without a finding of actual damages. Plaintiff also filed, inter alia, a motion for new trial, and the trial court denied Plaintiff's post-trial motions.
Plaintiff now appeals, bringing four Points.
Further facts will be outlined as relevant in the analysis section below.
In Point One, Plaintiff argues that the "trial court erred in granting the Defendants' judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Plaintiff made a submissible case onretaliation and punitive damages under the [MHRA] . . . and the language of the [MHRA] does not require an award of actual damages to support punitive damages."
"We review a trial court's grant of a motion for JNOV de novo." Koppe v. Campbell, 318 S.W.3d 233, 239 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010). "We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, and give the prevailing party all reasonable inferences from the verdict while disregarding the unfavorable evidence." Id. (). "A presumption exists favoring the reversal of a JNOV." Kinetic Energy Dev. Corp. v. Trigen Energy Corp., 22 S.W.3d 691, 697 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999).
In granting the JNOV, the trial court found that "[n]o punitive damages can be awarded since there was no award of actual damages by the jury." It is undisputed on appeal that "Missouri follows the general rule that no punitive damages can be awarded absent an award of actual or nominal damages." Williams v. Williams, 99 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003) (citations omitted). "Nominal damages are significant because such a judgement(sic) determines the right to receive costs, as well as an award of punitive damages." Clark v. Beverly Enterprises-Missouri, Inc., 872 S.W.2d 522, 527 (Mo. App. W.D. 1994). We thus reject Plaintiff's argument that the MHRA permits an award of punitive damages without an award of actual damages. The common law must apply to the MHRA "'unless a statute clearly abrogates the common law either expressly or by necessary implication.'" Wiley v. Homfeld, 307 S.W.3d 145, 149 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009) (quoting Mika v. Cent. Bank of Kansas City, 112 S.W.3d 82, 90 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003)). "[T]he Legislature is presumed to have acted with full awareness and completeknowledge of the present state of the law, including judicial and legislative precedent." Rozelle v. Rozelle, 320 S.W.3d 225, 229 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010) (quotation omitted). Indeed, in concluding that punitive damages could be assessed against a city under the MHRA, the Missouri Supreme Court just recently relied on the fact that the legislature did not clarify a different interpretation than established by common law in that context. See Howard v. City of Kansas City, 332 S.W.3d 772, 788 (Mo. banc 2011) ("Because the Missouri General Assembly has not amended or clarified the MHRA in the face of our court of appeals decisions authorizing punitive damages against political subdivisions and because the Missouri General Assembly included the phrase 'the state, or any political or civil subdivision' in the definition of 'employer' in § 213.010, it is clear the legislature intended to treat the state and its subdivisions in the same manner as it treats other employers.").
Though we do not conclude that the MHRA permits an award of punitive damages without an award of actual damages as argued by Plaintiff, our inquiry into the inconsistent verdict entered by the jury in this case is not complete. Plaintiff points out in her brief the inequity of the JNOV in light of the bench conference immediately following the jury's return of its verdict.
"By awarding [plaintiff] punitive damages but not actual damages, the jury returned an inconsistent verdict," and "the rule in Missouri is that a claim that a verdict is inconsistent to the point of being self-destructive must be presented to the trial court before...
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