Linden v. Cnh Am. Llc D/B/A Case Constr. Equip.
| Decision Date | 26 January 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:09–cv–00019–JEG.,3:09–cv–00019–JEG. |
| Citation | 753 F.Supp.2d 860 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa |
| Parties | Thomas Lowell LINDEN, Jr., Plaintiff,v.CNH AMERICA LLC d/b/a Case Construction Equipment, and Indiana Mills & Manufacturing, Inc., a/k/a IMMI, Defendants. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
John M. Bickel, Shuttleworth & Ingersoll, Gregory M. Lederer, Lederer Weston Craig PLC, Cedar Rapids, IA, John Paul J. Gatto, Daniel A. Haws, Murnane Brandt, St. Paul, MN, Matthew R. King, Randall R. Riggs, Frost Brown Todd LLC, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants.Douglas C. Dumont, Michael J. Warshauer, Warshauer Poe Thornton PC, Atlanta, GA, Thomas L. Staack, Dutton Braun Staack Hellman Iversen, Chad Andrew Swanson, Dutton Braun Staack & Hellman PLC, Waterloo, IA, for Plaintiff.Jason C. Palmer, Bradshaw Fowler Proctor & Fairgrave, Des Moines, IA, for Movant.Patrick V. Waldron, Patterson Law Firm LLP, Des Moines, IA, for Claimant.
This matter comes before the Court on motion by Defendant CNH America LLC (Case) for summary judgment.1 Plaintiff Thomas Lowell Linden, Jr. (Linden) resists the motion. A hearing was held on December 11, 2009. The matter is fully submitted and ready for disposition.
I. SUMMARY OF MATERIAL FACTS 2
Indiana Mills & Manufacturing, Inc. (IMMI) is an Indiana corporation with its principal place of business in Westfield, Indiana. IMMI designed and manufactured the seat belt that was installed on the dozer Linden drove that gave rise to the present lawsuit. Case installed the seat belt on the dozer at its Burlington, Iowa, plant. In January 1997, Case sold and delivered the dozer to an Atlanta, Georgia, company; and, in 1998, Baker Woods Construction, a Georgia company, bought the dozer. Linden, then a resident of Georgia, was driving the dozer near Douglasville, Georgia, on March 12, 2007, when it overturned and Linden was injured. Linden sued IMMI and Case in the Northern District of Georgia on May 29, 2007, but voluntarily dismissed that complaint in March 2008. Linden then moved to Iowa.
On January 30, 2009, Linden commenced this diversity jurisdiction lawsuit on a theory of strict product liability alleging Case's dozer with IMMI's seat belt installed was defective in its design, manufacture, warnings, and instructions as well as alleging that Case was negligent. In the present motion, Case argues that under Iowa choice-of-law analysis, the statute of repose in either Indiana, Ind.Code Ann. § 34–20–3–1(a)–(b) (West 2009), or Georgia, Ga.Code Ann. § 51–1–11(b)–(c) (West 2009), should apply; Linden resists, arguing that the Iowa statute of repose, Iowa Code § 614.1(2A) (2009), should apply.
II. DISCUSSIONA. Standard for Summary Judgment
“Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Myers v. Lutsen Mtns. Corp., 587 F.3d 891, 893 (8th Cir.2009); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party.” Miner v. Local 373, 513 F.3d 854, 860 (8th Cir.2008) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). On a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id. The nonmovant “must set forth specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial” and “may not rest upon mere denials or allegations in the pleadings.” Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Wells Fargo Fin. Leasing, Inc. v. LMT Fette, Inc., 382 F.3d 852, 856 (8th Cir.2004).
B. Choice of Law
“[T]he issue of the appropriate choice of law is a question of law for the court.” Jones v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 460 F.Supp.2d 953, 959 (N.D.Iowa 2006) (citing cases). “Federal courts sitting in diversity apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum state” to determine the pertinent substantive law. Cicle v. Chase Bank USA, 583 F.3d 549, 553 (8th Cir.2009). Under Iowa law, a statute of repose is “properly characterized as substantive, rather than procedural.” Cameron v. Hardisty, 407 N.W.2d 595, 596 (Iowa 1987). However, choice-of-law analysis is only undertaken when a true conflict exists between the possible governing laws. Modern Equip. Co. v. Cont'l W. Ins. Co., 355 F.3d 1125, 1128 n. 7 (8th Cir.2004).
A true conflict exists when there is an actual difference in the relevant laws of the different states. Consul Gen. of Rep. of Indonesia v. Bill's Rentals, Inc., 330 F.3d 1041, 1045 (8th Cir.2003). The facts in this case reveal a true conflict exists. Case sold and delivered the dozer more than ten years but less than fifteen years before the accident that injured Linden occurred. Neither the Indiana nor the Georgia statute of repose allows Linden to commence an action more than ten years after the sale or delivery of the dozer.3 The Iowa statute of repose, on the other hand, allows Linden to commence an action up to fifteen years after the first purchase of the dozer.4 Thus, here a true conflict arises because Linden's action would be barred under either Indiana or Georgia law but not under Iowa law. Therefore, the Court must resolve the choice-of-law issue. See Jones, 460 F.Supp.2d at 959.
Iowa has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws “most significant relationship” methodology for choice-of-law issues. Veasley v. CRST Int'l, Inc., 553 N.W.2d 896, 897 (Iowa 1996). The most significant relationship test is outlined in the Restatement as follows:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (1971). As stated in the test, Iowa incorporates the provisions of § 6 of the Restatement as follows:
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 (1971); Veasley, 553 N.W.2d at 897–98. The Court will evaluate each factor in turn.
Case argues that this factor unequivocally favors application of Georgia's law while Linden argues that the place of injury is not determinative in a choice-of-law analysis.
The place of injury is of little importance when the state wherein the injury occurred has no other interest in the case. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 cmt. e (“[T]he place of injury will not play an important role ... when the place of injury can be said to be fortuitous or ... bears little relation to the occurrence and the parties with respect to the particular issues.”); Cameron, 407 N.W.2d at 597 (). Furthermore, “Iowa has abandoned the lex loci delicti rule in which the law of the place of injury governs every issue in a tort action.” Veasley, 553 N.W.2d at 897.
Case argues that while this factor alone does not carry much weight, it becomes significant because Linden was a resident of Georgia at the time of the accident. The Court will consider Linden's residency in a separate factor. Linden argues that the place of injury is not determinative, but the Court must consider all of the factors. Because this is a product liability action, following the Restatement's directive to evaluate the contacts according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue, the place of injury is much less important than the place where the conduct that caused the injury occurred. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 cmt. e (1971). The Court does not give the place of injury decisive weight in recognition that Iowa has abandoned the lex loci delicti rule for choice-of-law analysis. Veasley, 553 N.W.2d at 897. With a stronger focus on where the challenged conduct occurred in a product liability action,5 the Court has a diminished concern about Linden's possibly strategic relocation from George to Iowa and thus accepts the current state of the record that no party is currently a resident of Georgia.6
Case argues that IMMI designed, manufactured, and marketed the allegedly defective seat belt in...
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