Lindley v. Ferguson
| Decision Date | 09 November 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 76-1345,76-1345 |
| Citation | 369 N.E.2d 482,52 Ohio St.2d 60 |
| Parties | , 6 O.O.3d 196 LINDLEY, Tax Commr., Appellee, v. FERGUSON, Auditor of State, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Where the Tax Commissioner presents the Auditor of State with vouchers for the refund of motor vehicle fuel taxes, the Auditor's statutory obligation to determine the legality of the vouchers, as set forth in R.C. 115.35, is accomplished by an examination of the voucher alone.
2. The subpoena power granted to the Bureau of Inspection and Supervision of Public Offices, in R.C. 117.03, is intended to facilitate the comprehensive biennial examination of public offices, as required by R.C. 117.09, in contradistinction to the daily examination of individual vouchers mandated by R.C. 115.35.
On January 20, 1976, an examiner from the Bureau of Inspection and Supervision of Public Offices, a division of the Auditor of State's office, issued a subpoena, requesting that appellee, Tax Commissioner Edgar L. Lindley, produce the following records and documents:
"all applications received pursuant to R. C. 5735.14 through 5735.142, filed pursuant to R. C. 5735.13, which are the subject of motor vehicle fuel tax refund claims listed on voucher Number 6042, dated January 6, 1976."
Appellee chose not to comply with the subpoena, and instead filed a complaint against appellant, Auditor of State Thomas E. Ferguson, seeking a declaratory judgment clarifying their respective rights and duties relative to the issuance of warrants for the refund of motor vehicle fuel taxes. In addition, appellee sought an order enjoining appellant from issuing subpoenas for the production of tax refund applications, and from otherwise delaying the issuance of warrants for the refund of taxes after proper certification has been made by appellee.
On April 16, 1976, the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County rendered a decision granting appellee's prayer for declaratory and injunctive relief. The court concluded that "(a)s to the Auditor's duty to examine vouchers presented to him under Section 115.35, Ohio Revised Code, it is apparent that such examination is limited to the face of the voucher alone."
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, but in so doing adopted a somewhat different construction of R.C. 115.35. The court stated that "(t)he auditor has no authority to act in an administrative appellate capacity to review the factual determinations made by the tax commissioner * * *," and that the auditor "is not empowered to embark upon an investigation using a subpoena power for that purpose." The court, however, observed that "there is no need for the auditor to issue subpoenas and make investigations since he may accomplish the purpose of protecting the public simply by refusing to make payment * * *" until he obtains sufficient information from which to determine the legality of the claim for refund.
The cause is now before this court upon an allowance of appellant's motion to certify the record.
William J. Brown, Atty. Gen., and John C. Duffy, Jr., Columbus, for appellee.
William J. Brown, Atty. Gen., and Patrick V. Kerrigan, Columbus, for appellant.
R. C. 115.07 mandates that no money be drawn from the state treasury except on a warrant certified by the Auditor of State. R. C. 115.35, which sets out the procedure to be followed by the auditor before he issues his warrant on the Treasurer of State, reads as follows:
Appellant stresses the significance of this court's decision in State, ex rel. Krabach v. Ferguson (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 168, 346 N.E.2d 681, in which paragraph one of the syllabus states:
It is appellant's position that, by virtue of the disjunctive language employed in this paragraph, he is empowered to proceed alternatively when examining a voucher presented to him by appellee.
First, appellant states that Krabach establishes his prerogative to refuse to issue a warrant until he obtains sufficient information from which to determine the legality of a claim, where ample reason exists to question the legality thereof. Second, appellant claims that his office may employ the power of subpoena, granted in R. C. 117.03, to secure this information, in the course of intermittent investigations into the records, documents and applications supporting individual tax refund claims.
It is apparent that appellant has misapplied our holding in the Krabach case. In the first paragraph of the syllabus the words "investigate or require further proof" were intended to indicate synonymous, and not alternative, procedures. The Krabach decision certainly did not invest appellant with the plenary investigatory powers he now seeks to exercise. Furthermore, it is by now a legal commonplace that the syllabus of a case is to be read and appraised in the light of the facts on which the case is predicated. 14 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d 683, Courts, Section 248.
In Krabach the auditor, because of the use of cover plates, could not determine whether gasoline and oil purchased with a state credit card were lawfully used in a state-owned vehicle, for which the card was issued, or were unlawfully used in another, privately-owned vehicle. Accordingly, he refused to draw warrants for certain charges to state vehicles with cover plates.
This court, in denying a petition for a writ of mandamus, held that the auditor has a statutory responsibility to make a finding of the legality of a claim before he draws a warrant for payment, and that, under the circumstances, the auditor acted properly in refusing to issue his warrant until further proof of the claims were presented to him. We also indicated that the sufficiency of the proof of a claim's legality and validity would depend upon the circumstances of each individual case.
The instant case concerns the auditor's function with respect to the issuance of warrants for motor vehicle fuel tax refunds. R. C. 5735.13, 5735.14, 5735.141 and 5735.142 allow taxpayers to apply to the appellee for refunds of motor vehicle fuel taxes. Each of the four sections specifically provides that the appellee Tax Commissioner shall determine the amount of the refund due, shall certify such amount to the Auditor of State, and each mandates that the Auditor of State shall draw a warrant for the certified amount. 1
The statutory appellate process further delimits appellee's role in...
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