Lindley v. Lindley

• Decision Date: 07 October 1964
• Docket Number: No. A-9844,A-9844
• Citation: 384 S.W.2d 676
• Parties: Rufus LINDLEY et al., Petitioners, v. J. G. LINDLEY et al., Respondents.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 676

384 S.W.2d 676

Rufus LINDLEY et al., Petitioners, v. J. G. LINDLEY et al., Respondents.

No. A-9844.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Oct. 7, 1964.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 11, 1964.

Joe N. Chapman, Sulphur Springs, Bird Old, Jr., Raymond R. Johnson, Sulphur Springs, for petitioners.

J. G. Lindley, Dallas, Howard S. Smith, Sulphur Springs, Woodrow H. Edwards, Mt. Vernon, for respondents.

WALKER, Justice.

This will contest was tried before a jury on appeal to the district court. In response to the single special issue submitted, the jury found that the testatrix had testamentary capacity. Judgment was rendered on the verdict admitting the will to probate, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. 370 S.W.2d 740.

The will in question is a holographic instrument executed by the testatrix, Mrs. Sallie A. Lindley, on August 10, 1959. She died on June 2, 1960, at the age of 94, and was a widow at the time of her death. Three children had been born to her: Rufus Lindley, Mary Harper, and Tommy Lindley. Tommy died in the State Hospital at Terrell on July 23, 1959. He was survived by his wife, Dixie, and by three children: J. G. Lindley, Evelyn Redmond, and Juanita Irons. Rufus Lindley is married but has no children. Mary Harper is a widow and has three children: Oleta Smith, D. C. Hyder and Prentiss L. Hyder.

In the instrument offered for probate, the testatrix directed that her two surviving children, Rufus Lindley and Mary Harper, and one of her grandchildren, Prentiss L. Hyder, be paid $1.00 each. The residue of her estate was devised and dequeathed to the remaining five grandchildren in equal shares. J. G. Lindley and Juanita Irons, who were appointed executors without bond, filed the will for probate, and their application was contested by Rufus and Mary. The contestants alleged inter alia that their mother lacked testamentary capacity and that her execution of the will was procured by undue influence on the part of J. G. Lindley, Evelyn Redmond and Juanita Irons.

The charge to the jury included a definition of 'testamentary capacity' which is quoted in the margin. ¹ Contestants requested the submission of an insane delusion instruction, also set out in a footnote, ² and their first point of error asserts that the court erred in refusing to submit the same.

A person who is entirely capable of attending to his business affairs may nevertheless have his mind so warped and deranged by some false and unfounded belief that he is incapable of formulating a rational plan of testamentary disposition. Examples of such false beliefs are cases where the 'testator believed, in spite of the fact that all the evidence was to the contrary, that his son had been to the planet Mars and had conspired against the United States and should therefore be disinherited; or that his wife was plotting to kill him; or that his daughter had murdered his father; or that he was hated by his brothers and sisters who were bent on persecuting him.' Page on Wills, Bowe-Parker Revision, § 12.29. When the testator's false belief amounts, in law, to an insane delusion and the terms of his will are influenced thereby, testamentary capacity is lacking even though he might know the nature and extent of his property, the effect of his will, and the natural objects of his bounty, and be able to handle complex business matters. A jury of laymen might well conclude that such a person did have testamentary capacity, however, if their only guide were the ordinary definition of that term. An additional instruction on insane delusions is required, therefore, where the issue is fairly raised by the evidence. See Prather v. McClelland, 76 Tex. 574, 13 S.W. 543; Rodgers v. Fleming, Com.App., 3 S.W.2d 77 (holding approved).

The courts have developed their own concept of what constitutes an insane delusion. It has been defined in Texas as 'the belief of a state of supposed facts that do not exist, and which no rational person would believe.' See Knight v. Edwards, 153 Tex. 170, 264 S.W.2d 692. Other courts have attempted to state the definition in terms of the proof necessary to establish an insane delusion in the case under consideration, but none of these definitions is so complete and accurate that it can be applied indiscriminately in every situation that may arise. According to one writer 'all that can safely be said is that an insane delusion is a misconception of fact, or an abnormal mental attitude, due to some organic defect in the brain or some functional disorder of the mind. That it is so due may be inferred from its purport, if too fantastic to be the product of a normal mind; or from its fixed and persistent nature, if conceived without foundation in reason; or from its progressive immoderateness if originally induced by some rational cause; or from its origin in a previous state of irrationality. Formulas of proof cannot be followed literally. Each case must rest on its own circumstances, the question of law for the trial court being whether the contestant has introduced substantial evidence, not only of a mental error affecting the terms of the will, but that the persistence of this mental error was caused by defective cerebration.' See Annotation, 175 A.L.R. 882, 889.

We agree with the Court of Civil Appeals that the jury's finding is amply supported by the evidence, but that does not solve our problem. Contestants were entitled to have an instruction on insane delusions given if there is any evidence of probative value which, with the inferences that may reasonably be drawn therefrom, will support a finding that Mrs. Lindley was laboring under such a delusion which affected the terms of her will. In determining that question, moreover, we must consider only the evidence which, when viewed in its most favorable light, tends to support such a finding, and must disregard all evidence that would lead to a contrary conclusion.

The evidence discloses that Mrs. Lindley's son, Tommy, suffered a complete mental breakdown in March, 1959. He was placed in the Hopkins County Memorial Hospital at Sulphur Springs, where it was necessary to tie him to his bed. Two days later he was transferred to Timberlawn Sanitarium in Dallas. After six weeks at Timberlawn, he was committed to the State Hospital at Terrell, and died there on July 23, 1959. Mrs. Lindley's will was written 18 days later.

Mrs. Lindley was 93 years of age and in poor health herself when Tommy became ill. The medical testimony shows that she was senile and suffering from high blood pressure and arteriosclerosis at the time. Tommy's illness and death caused severe distress and sorrow to his mother. She saw him tied to the bed in the Hopkins County Memorial Hospital, and according to one witness 'just went to pieces.' She also visited him frequently while he was at Timberlawn and in the State Hospital at Terrell, but evidently was never able to understand the nature of his illness. She told her banker, W. W. Jones, that her boy had been sent to Terrell, and that she was going to bring him home and take care of him herself. When Mr. Jones attempted to explain Tommy's condition and assured her that Terrell was the place for him, she 'paid no attention to it whatever.'

The evidence also shows that Mrs. Lindley entertained a number of false beliefs or delusions after Tommy's death. She told several witnesses, including three doctors, that she did not want to go to the Hopkins County Memorial Hospital because the hospital had killed her son. When she and some of her grandchildren returned to Sulphur Springs for Tommy's funeral, they spent the night at a local motel. The manager of the motel asked her how Rufus was getting along. She replied that 'she didn't known and didn't care because * * * he and Mary killed my son.' A short time later she told another witness that 'if it hadn't been for Rufus and Dixie, I would have my poor little child with me today,' that 'Rufus and Dixie sent Tommy to Terrell.' She stated to a neighbor that the Hopkins County Memorial Hospital had mistreated Tommy, and that both she and Tommy had been badly mistreated by Rufus and Mary, but the time of this conversation is not clear from the record. There is also evidence indicating her belief that she had talked with her deceased husband and son, and had seen Tommy when she went to his former home.

Several lay witnesses noticed a marked change in Mrs. Lindley after her son died. She failed to recognize old friends on the street and was unable to carry on a normal conversation. The witness Jones, whom Mrs. Lindley consulted frequently on business matters, testified that in his opinion she was mentally incompetent after Tommy's death. A doctor who saw her in June, July and August, 1959, also expressed the opinion that she was of unsound mind at the time of one visit when she discussed Tommy's death with him. Two doctors in Greenville who examined Mrs. Lindley on January 19, 1960, were of the opinion that she was of unsound mind at that time, and one of them testified that her condition would have been about the same on August 10, 1959. She suffered a stroke in March, 1960, and was sent to the hospital where she died about two months later.

The evidence shows Mary had lived with Mrs. Lindley and cared for her for some time prior to her death, doing the washing, cooking, house cleaning and nursing, and that Rufus also helped his mother in various ways. Mrs. Lindley had made three earlier wills, all of which were formal instruments prepared by an attorney. None of the children were left out of the first two wills, and Mary was named co-executor in at least one of them. The third will divided all property between the three children. Nothing was given to any of the grandchildren, but J. G. Lindley was appointed independent executor without bond.

Although...