Lindsay v. Ass'n of Professional Flight Attendants

• Decision Date: 21 September 2009
• Docket Number: Docket No. 08-4130-cv (con).,Docket No. 08-4122-cv (L).,Docket No. 08-4128-cv (con).
• Citation: 581 F.3d 47
• Parties: Jill LINDSAY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Carol Johnson, Constance Lamattina, Daniel Santiago, Deborah Whittington, Dottie Long, Janet Gold, Judith Alexander, Karen Rivoira, Laurence E. Salomon, III, Patricia Kennedy, Patty Gentry, Rebecca Smith, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, a business entity of unknown type, AMR Corporation, a Delaware corporation, also known as American Airlines, American Airlines, Inc., also known as American Eagle, and John Ward, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

581 F.3d 47

Jill LINDSAY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Carol Johnson, Constance Lamattina, Daniel Santiago, Deborah Whittington, Dottie Long, Janet Gold, Judith Alexander, Karen Rivoira, Laurence E. Salomon, III, Patricia Kennedy, Patty Gentry, Rebecca Smith, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ASSOCIATION OF PROFESSIONAL FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, a business entity of unknown type, AMR Corporation, a Delaware corporation, also known as American Airlines, American Airlines, Inc., also known as American Eagle, and John Ward, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 08-4122-cv (L).

Docket No. 08-4128-cv (con).

Docket No. 08-4130-cv (con).

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued: July 6, 2009.

Decided: September 21, 2009.

Emily M. Bass, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Steven M. Nachman, New York, NY; Michael S. Haber, New York, NY; Martin Garbus, Davis & Gilbert, New York, NY, on the brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Stephen B. Moldof (Michael L. Winston, Travis M. Mastroddi, on the brief), Cohen, Weiss and Simon LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants-Appellees Association of Professional Flight Attendants and John Ward.

Thomas E. Reinert, Jr. (Jonathan C. Fritts, on the brief), Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Washington, D.C., for Defendants-Appellees American Airlines, Inc. and AMR Corporation.

Before: RAGGI, HALL, Circuit Judges, and BIANCO, District Judge.^*

REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs Jill Lindsay, Carol Johnson, Constance LaMattina, Daniel Santiago, Deborah Whittington, Dottie Long, Janet Gold, Judith Alexander, Karen Rivoira, Laurence E. Salomon III, Patricia Kennedy, Patty Gentry, and Rebecca Smith, proceeding individually, and in Ms. Lindsay's case, also on behalf of a putative class of flight attendants, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Nina Gershon, Judge), challenging the validity of a Restructuring Participation Agreement reached between their former employer, defendants American Airlines and its parent AMR Corporation (collectively, "American Airlines"), and their union, defendant Association of Professional Flight Attendants, and its former president defendant John Ward (collectively, "APFA" or the "union"). Plaintiffs now appeal an award of summary judgment entered on July 22, 2008, in favor of American Airlines on plaintiffs' claims under the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.; in favor of American Airlines and APFA on plaintiffs' state law claims; and in favor of APFA on plaintiffs' claim of a breach of the duty of fair representation. We conclude that plaintiffs' challenge fails because (1) the statutory sections relied on by plaintiffs to support their RLA claim, 45 U.S.C. § 152, First and Seventh, do not provide for a private cause of action; (2) the RLA preempts plaintiffs' state law claims; and (3) plaintiffs failed to adduce sufficient evidence of a material fact on their fair representation claim to defeat summary judgment.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court in favor of defendants.

I. Background

The district court's thorough opinion fairly chronicles the complex events giving rise to defendants' Restructuring Participation Agreement, which plaintiffs challenge in this action. See Marcoux v. Am. Airlines, Inc., ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2008 WL 2828599 (E.D.N.Y.2008). We assume familiarity with that opinion, and we do not ourselves repeat the facts except as necessary to discuss plaintiffs' appeal of the award of summary judgment.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

We review an award of summary judgment de novo, "construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor." SCR Joint Venture L.P. v. Warshawsky, 559 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir.2009). Summary judgment may be granted only "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "An issue of fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." SCR Joint Venture L.P. v. Warshawsky, 559 F.3d at 137.

B. Plaintiffs' Railway Labor Act Claims

Plaintiffs contend that American Airlines violated those provisions of the RLA codified at 45 U.S.C. § 152, First and Seventh by supplanting an existing collective bargaining agreement with the Restructuring Participation Agreement. Section 152, First states as follows:

It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers, agents, and employees to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether arising out of the application of such agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute between the carrier and the employees thereof.

45 U.S.C. § 152, First.

Section 152, Seventh states as follows:

No carrier, its officers, or agents shall change the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of its employees, as a class, as embodied in agreements except in the manner prescribed in such agreements or in section 156 of this title.

Id. § 152, Seventh.

No party has pointed us to any case law addressing whether these sections provide for a private right of action by individual employees, nor have we identified any. In considering this question of first impression we begin by reviewing the general enforcement structure of the RLA.

1. Arbitral Resolution of Major and Minor Disputes Under the RLA

"The Railway Labor Act was passed in 1926 to encourage collective bargaining by railroads and their employees in order to prevent, if possible, wasteful strikes and interruptions of interstate commerce." Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 148, 90 S.Ct. 294, 24 L.Ed.2d 325 (1969); see also 45 U.S.C. § 181 (amending RLA to apply to interstate air carriers). Toward this end, the RLA provides an arbitral mechanism for "the prompt and orderly settlement" of two classes of disputes between unions and employers. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 129 L.Ed.2d 203 (1994) (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 151a). The first class, referred to as "major" disputes, relates to "the formation of collective [bargaining] agreements or efforts to secure them." Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 302, 109 S.Ct. 2477, 105 L.Ed.2d 250 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). The second class, known as "minor" disputes, see id. at 303, 109 S.Ct. 2477, "grow[s] out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions," 45 U.S.C. § 151a(5). In other words, "major disputes seek to create contractual rights, minor disputes to enforce them." Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. at 253, 114 S.Ct. 2239.

2. Private Enforcement of the RLA

Beyond the arbitral scheme for resolving disputes between employers and unions, the RLA also provides for federal criminal enforcement. See 45 U.S.C. § 152, Tenth ("It shall be the duty of any United States attorney to whom any duly designated representative of a carrier's employees may apply to institute in the proper court and to prosecute under the direction of the Attorney General of the United States, all necessary proceedings for the enforcement of the provisions of this section."). Although the RLA does not explicitly provide a private civil cause of action, the Supreme Court has found such an action by a union implicit in the statutory scheme.

In Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, the Supreme Court recognized a private right of action by a union alleging that the defendant company was "interfering with, influencing, or coercing the clerical employees of the railroad company in the matter of their organization and designation of representatives" in violation of § 152, Third. 281 U.S. 548, 555, 50 S.Ct. 427, 74 L.Ed. 1034 (1930). The Court concluded that "Congress, in the legislation of 1926, while elaborating a plan for amicable adjustments and voluntary arbitration of disputes between common carriers and their employees, thought it necessary to impose, and did impose, certain definite obligations enforceable by judicial proceedings." Id. at 567, 50 S.Ct. 427. In fact, private civil proceedings constitute the bulk of cases arising under the RLA. See United States v. Winston, 558 F.2d 105, 108 & n. 3 (2d Cir.1977) (noting "[t]he paucity of criminal proceedings under § 152, when contrasted with the active pursuit of civil relief thereunder").

Although much of the case law involving private causes of action under § 152 concerns claims brought by or against a certified union, our sister circuits have recognized an implied private right of action for individual employees against their employer under certain RLA provisions, notably § 152, Third and Fourth. See, e.g., Bensel v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 387 F.3d 298, 318 (3d Cir.2004) (collecting cases); Fennessy v. Sw. Airlines, 91 F.3d 1359, 1362-64 (9th Cir.1996); Stepanischen v. Merchs. Despatch Transp. Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 927 (1st Cir.1983). The Third Circuit explained that "[i]mplying a private cause of action for individual employees under 45 U.S.C. § 152, Third & Fourth is appropriate given that those sections prohibit carriers from discriminating against employees in connection with union organizing activities."¹ Bensel v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 387 F.3d at 318 (emphasis in original). By contrast, the Third Circuit declined to find an implied private cause of action for individual employees in § 152, Second and Ninth because, although the statute "may indicate...