Lindsay v. City of Garfield Heights

• Decision Date: 09 July 2020
• Docket Number: Nos. 108967,109015,s. 108967
• Citation: 154 N.E.3d 1226,2020 Ohio 3672
• Parties: Nell LINDSAY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. City of GARFIELD HEIGHTS, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

154 N.E.3d 1226

2020 Ohio 3672

Nell LINDSAY, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.City of GARFIELD HEIGHTS, et al., Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 108967

109015

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga County.

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 9, 2020

Dworken & Bernstein Co., L.P.A., and Patrick J. Perotti, Nicole T. Fiorelli, and James S. Timmerberg, Painesville, for appellee.

O'Toole, McLaughlin, Dooley & Pecora Co., L.P.A., and John D. Latchney, Medina, and Timothy J. Riley, Garfield Heights Director of Law, for appellant City of Garfield Heights.

Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., and Quintin F. Lindsmith, Columbus, for appellant Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc.

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

MARY J. BOYLE, P.J.:

{¶ 1} In this consolidated appeal, defendants-appellants, city of Garfield Heights ("Garfield Heights") and Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc. ("Redflex") (collectively "defendants"), separately appeal from the trial court's judgment granting the renewed motion for class certification of the plaintiff-appellee and class representative, Nell Lindsay, and defining the class as follows:

All persons issued a notice of liability pursuant to Garfield Heights Ordinance No. 63-2009, excluding persons to which any of the following apply: (1) their notice was issued as a warning; (2) their notice resulted in a finding of no liability pursuant to subsection (E) of the ordinance; or (3) their notice was otherwise dismissed.

{¶ 2} Garfield Heights raises one assignment of error for our review:

The trial court erred/abused its discretion, in granting plaintiff's renewed motion for class certification.

{¶ 3} Redflex raises five assignments of error for our review:

1. The trial court erred as a matter of law in granting Plaintiff's renewed motion for class certification where the court failed to conduct a "rigorous analysis" that resolved all relevant factual disputes and found by a preponderance of the evidence the requirements of Civ.R. 23, but only incanted the words "rigorous analysis" in two sentences which, separate from the class definition, comprised the court's entire ruling.

2. The trial court erred as a matter of law in granting Plaintiff's renewed motion for class certification without holding an evidentiary hearing to resolve factual disputes between Plaintiff's testimony and other witnesses concerning her core complaint allegations at the center of the claims asserted.

3. The trial court erred in finding that Plaintiff had standing, and that waiver and res judicata defenses applicable to Plaintiff are not threshold questions that would predominate the litigation if Plaintiff remained a class representative so that she meets the typicality requirement of Civ.R. 23.

4. The trial court erred in finding that Lindsay had proven all prerequisites required by Civ.R. 23.

5. The trial court erred in finding that Plaintiff is an adequate class representative.

{¶ 4} After review, we find merit in part to Redflex's third assignment of error. Specifically, we agree with Redflex that Lindsay lacks standing to bring the constitutional claims set forth in the first four counts of her complaint because she did not challenge her notice of liability. We find, however, that Lindsay has standing to bring the claims set forth in Counts 5 and 6 of her complaint. Therefore, Redflex's third assignment of error is sustained in part and overruled in part. With respect to Redflex's remaining assignments of error and Garfield Heights' sole assignment of error, we find no merit to their arguments and overrule them.

{¶ 5} We further affirm the trial court's judgment granting Lindsay's renewed motion for class certification and setting forth the class definition with Lindsay as the class representative with respect to Counts 5 and 6 of Lindsay's class action complaint. We therefore remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Procedural History and Factual Background

{¶ 6} In November 2009, Garfield Heights passed Ordinance No. 63-2009, which amended the city's codified ordinances by enacting Garfield Heights Codified Ordinances ("G.H.C.O.") 313.11. To "reduce the frequency of vehicle operators speeding and running red lights," G.H.C.O. 313.11 provided for the "use of automated cameras to impose civil penalties upon red light and speeding violators" within the city. The ordinance stated that the automated cameras would "work in conjunction with a traffic control signal, to produce recorded images of motor vehicles entering an intersection against a red signal indication and/or measuring the speed of a vehicle traveling in excess of the posted speed limit." G.H.C.O. 313.11(b)(3). The ordinance explicitly provided that:

This Section applies whenever traffic is controlled by traffic control signals exhibiting different colored lights, or colored lighted arrows, successively one at a time or in combination.

G.H.C.O. 313.11(a)(3). The ordinance also required the intersections with the installed automated cameras to have "visible postings upon approach of the intersection indicating that the intersection is equipped with an automated traffic control signal monitoring system." G.H.C.O. 313.11(a)(4).

{¶ 7} Under the ordinance, a civil fine was imposed on the owner of any vehicle detected by one of the cameras to have been operating a motor vehicle in violation of the ordinance. For vehicles that violated the ordinance, the system generated notices of liability, which were mailed to the vehicle owners apprising them that they must pay a $100 civil penalty or oppose the alleged violation within 15 days of receiving the notice of liability. G.H.C.O. 313.11(e) and (f). The ordinance directed that "an individual desiring a hearing [was] required to post payment equal to the amount of the civil penalty before an appeal hearing [would] be scheduled." G.H.C.O. 313.11(e)(1)(c). "The failure to give notice of request for review within this time period shall constitute a waiver of the right to contest the notice of liability." Id. If the vehicle owner or responsible party chose to contest the notice of liability, Section (3)(2) of the ordinances set forth affirmative defenses that could be considered by the hearing officer. These defenses were as follows:

(A) That the driver of the vehicle passed through an intersection in order to yield the right-of-way to an emergency vehicle in accordance with Ohio Revised Code Section 4511.45, or to a funeral procession in accordance with Ohio Revised Code Section 71.14.

(B) That the motor vehicle or registration plates of the motor vehicle were stolen before the violation occurred and were not under the control or possession of the owner at the time of the violation. In order to demonstrate that the motor vehicle or the registration plates were stolen before the violation occurred and were not under the control or possession of the owner at the time of the violation, the owner must submit proof that a police report about the stolen motor vehicle or registration plates was filed prior to the violation or within 48 hours after the violation occurred.

(C) That this Section is unenforceable because at the time and place of the alleged violation, the traffic control signal was not operating properly or the traffic control signal monitoring system was not in proper position and the recorded image is not legible enough to determine the information needed.

(D) Evidence, other than that adduced pursuant to subsection (e)(2)(B) of this Ordinance, that the owner or person named in the notice of liability was not operating the vehicle at the time of the violation. To satisfy the evidentiary burden under this subsection, the owner or person named in the notice of liability shall provide to the Hearing Officer evidence showing the identity of the person who was operating the vehicle at the time of the violation, including, at a minimum, the operator's name and current address, and any other evidence that the Hearing Officer deems pertinent.

G.H.C.O. 313.11(e)(2).

{¶ 8} The Garfield Heights Police Department administered and enforced the ordinance. Garfield Heights contracted with Redflex, a third-party vendor, to install and operate the cameras and systems used to detect violations. Although the city was responsible for enforcing violations, Redflex performed administrative functions, including processing, encrypting, and storing the video and photographs of violations. Redflex then sent the relevant images to the city for review.

{¶ 9} Redflex, however, never installed the automated cameras in conjunction with any traffic signals or posted any warning signs upon approach of a camera as required by the ordinance. Instead, the cameras were installed in mobile units without any warning signs.

{¶ 10} On November 1, 2010, Lindsay received a notice of liability in the mail. The notice stated that the city's photo enforcement program captured a recorded image of her registered vehicle driving above the posted speed limit on Turney Road on October 26, 2010. The notice instructed Lindsay that if she wished to schedule a hearing and have the matter reviewed by a hearing officer, she was required to pay a bond in the amount equal to the civil penalty and an administrative fee in the amount of $50, for a total payment of $150. The ordinance provided that failure to pay the civil penalty or request a hearing "constitute[d] a waiver of the right to contest the notice of liability." G.H.C.O. 313.11(e)(1)(C). But the ordinance did not state that the city could or would collect a $50 administrative fee. Lindsay paid the $100 civil fine on February 23, 2011, but never requested a hearing to contest the notice of liability.¹

{¶ 11} On November 1, 2010, approximately one year after it was enacted, the voters of Garfield Heights repealed the ordinance. Within the one-year time frame, the city collected $975,667.73 in civil fines. According to Redflex, only 66 people requested a hearing, but only 19 of those 66 actually received a hearing. Of the 47 who requested but did not receive a...