Lindsay v. Dunleavy

• Decision Date: 20 December 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-1532.,00-1532.
• Citation: 177 F.Supp.2d 398
• Parties: Robert LINDSAY, Plaintiff, v. Walter P. DUNLEAVY, Warden of Philadelphia County Prison Known as CFCF; Philadelphia County; and Doctor Eric Amoh, Employed by the CFCF, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

177 F.Supp.2d 398

Robert LINDSAY, Plaintiff, v. Walter P. DUNLEAVY, Warden of Philadelphia County Prison Known as CFCF; Philadelphia County; and Doctor Eric Amoh, Employed by the CFCF, Defendants.

No. 00-1532.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

December 20, 2001.

Robert Lindsay, P.P. DX-5524, SCI— Houtzdale, Houtzdale, PA, pro Se.

Charles T. Roessing, Lynne A. Coughlin, White and Williams, Paoli, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOYNER, District Judge.

Presently before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment of Defendants, Warden Walter P. Dunleavy ("Warden Dunleavy"), Philadelphia County (the "County") and Eric Amoh P.A.¹ ("Amoh"). Plaintiff, Robert Lindsay ("Lindsay" or "Plaintiff"), filed his initial complaint in this action on March 24, 2000. However, in the initial complaint, Plaintiff did not specifically name Defendants Warden Dunleavy and Amoh, so he filed an amended complaint on February 5, 2001 to name them.² Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges the following claims: a § 1983 claim against Amoh for failing to provide adequate medical treatment; a § 1983 claim against Warden Dunleavy and the County for failing to adequately train, supervise and/or discipline Amoh; and state law claims against all of the Defendants for "official oppression," reckless endangerment of another person, simple assault, aggravated assault, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

All Defendants seek to dismiss each of the claims against them. For the following reasons, the § 1983 claims against Amoh, Warden Dunleavy, and the County are dismissed. Further, the Court will not exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims. Rather, the Court will dismiss those claims without prejudice to allow Plaintiff the opportunity to re-file those claims in state court if he so chooses.

BACKGROUND

The facts, taken from Plaintiff's complaints and taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, are as follows. Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Philadelphia County Prison ("CFCF") on February 18, 1999. While at CFCF, Plaintiff was assigned a job serving food to the other inmates and cleaning up after them.

On April 13, 1999, while Plaintiff was working, he was punched in the jaw by another inmate. Plaintiff alleges that soon after the incident he was taken to the medical facility at CFCF for treatment due to the pain he was experiencing in his jaw. Plaintiff was treated by Amoh who examined Plaintiff's mouth. Amoh allegedly gave Plaintiff cotton to bite on to stop the bleeding and gave him some pain medication. Amoh allegedly told Plaintiff his jaw was "alright" and that it would take time to heal.

On April 14, 1999, Plaintiff alleges that he went to see Amoh again because he was still experiencing bleeding and pain in his jaw. Plaintiff alleges that Amoh again examined him and increased the pain medication.

On April 15, 1999, Plaintiff alleges that he again went to see Amoh and explained to Amoh that he was in extreme pain and that his jaw was swollen and his face was numb. Plaintiff requested that Amoh order an x-ray because Plaintiff thought his jaw was broken. Plaintiff alleges that Amoh did not order x-rays, but rather told Plaintiff that the jaw would take time to heal.

On April 16, 1999, Plaintiff alleges that he went to see Amoh again with the same complaints as on the 15th. Plaintiff alleges that Amoh again told Plaintiff that his jaw would take time to heal.

On April 18, 1999, Plaintiff alleges that he again saw Amoh with the same complaints. Plaintiff alleges that Amoh told him that if his jaw was broken he would not be able to talk.

On April 20, 1999, Plaintiff was transferred to the State Correctional Institution at Graterford ("Graterford"). Upon arrival at Graterford, Plaintiff told the medical department what had happened to his jaw and that he was in extreme pain.

On April 21, 1999, the medical department at Graterford x-rayed Plaintiff's jaw and found that his jaw was broken. On April 27, 1999, Plaintiff alleges that he was transferred to an outside hospital where his jaw was wired shut.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

When deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, a court must view all facts, and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); see also Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir.1990). Dismissal is appropriate only "if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984). Further, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court will construe his complaint liberally and hold it to a less stringent standard than a pleading drafted by an attorney. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).

II. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed because he has not alleged that he exhausted all administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA").³ Plaintiff responds that he has exhausted his administrative remedies, but he does not have access to the prison's files which would demonstrate exhaustion.

The PLRA requires a prisoner to exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing a suit regarding prison conditions. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a); see also Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, (3d Cir.2000) (holding that exhaustion of available remedies is condition precedent to filing a law suit). Specifically, section 1997e(a) provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions ... by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted."

In the instant case, Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not exhaust the administrative remedies available at CFCF. Defendants attach the affidavit of Warden Dunleavy, the Warden of CFCF, to attest that Plaintiff did not exhaust the remedies available to him at CFCF. However, by the time Plaintiff learned that his jaw was broken, Plaintiff had already been transferred to Graterford. Defendants do not provide the Court with any information concerning what sort of administrative remedies were available at either institution, but particularly what sort of administrative remedies are available at Graterford for an inmate complaining of conduct that occurred at a different facility.

Because there remain questions of fact regarding 1) whether Plaintiff exhausted the available administrative remedies and 2) whether there were any administrative remedies available to exhaust, the Court will deny the Motion to Dismiss on this basis. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) (must exhaust "available" administrative remedies).

III. § 1983 Claims Against Eric Amoh, P.A.

In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court determined that "deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the `unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.'" 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). In Farmer v. Brennan the Court clarified the state of mind required to show deliberate indifference by holding that a

prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment ... unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and he must also draw the inference.

511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1979, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).

A prisoner's claims of negligent diagnosis or treatment, do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06, 107, 97 S.Ct. 285 (finding that "in the medical context, ... a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment"); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) ("allegations of `inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care' or of `negligent ... diagnosis' fail to establish the requisite culpable state of mind") (internal citations omitted); Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 458 n. 7 (3d Cir.1997) (recognizing "well-established law in this and virtually every circuit that actions characterizable as medical malpractice do not rise to the level of `deliberate indifference'").

Further, a doctor's decision not to order specific forms of diagnostic treatment, an x-ray for example, constitutes medical judgment, which is not actionable. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107, 97 S.Ct. 285. The Third Circuit has stated that "`[w]here a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgment and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.'" United States ex rel. Walker v. Fayette County, Pennsylvania, 599 F.2d 573, 575 n. 2 (3d Cir.1979) (quoting Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n. 5 (6th Cir.1976)). Moreover, a disagreement between the doctor and the plaintiff as to the medical diagnosis and treatment does not constitute deliberate indifference. Douglas v. Hill, CIV.A. No. 95-6497, 1996 WL 716278, *7 (E.D.Pa. Dec.6, 1996) (citing Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 473 (3d Cir.1987)).

In the instant case, Plaintiff alleges that Amoh's failure to diagnose his broken jaw and failure to order an x-ray, from which he could have diagnosed the fracture and which Plaintiff requested, constitutes deliberate indifference.

In response, Amoh does not argue that Plaintiff's medical needs were not "serious." Instead, Amoh argues that Plai...