Lindsay v. The Clayton District Court
| Decision Date | 16 October 1888 |
| Citation | 39 N.W. 817,75 Iowa 509 |
| Parties | LINDSAY v. THE CLAYTON DISTRICT COURT. (Two Cases) |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Decided October, 1888
Certiorari to Clayton District Court.
THIS is an original proceeding in this court, the object of which is to review the action of the district court, refusing to punish one Hagensick for contempt in disobeying an injunction.
REVERSED.
A Chapin, for plaintiff.
Noble & Updegraff, for defendant.
The plaintiff commenced an action against J. L. Hagensick, and in May, 1887, a perpetual injunction was granted, restraining said Hagensick from manufacturing or selling intoxicating liquors, and ordering the abatement of the nuisance which the court found existed. Upon the day subsequent to the rendition of the decree the defendant in said action appealed to this court, and filed a supersedeas bond, as provided by law. Afterwards, at a subsequent term of court, the plaintiff filed a motion for a rule requiring the defendant to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt, on the ground that he had manufactured intoxicating liquor since the granting of the injunction, in disobedience thereof. At the hearing of the motion it was conceded that the defendant Hagensick had, since the taking of the appeal and filing of the supersedeas bond, "conducted the business of manufacturing beer in the premises described in the decree;" and that the "only act of the defendant claimed to be a contempt was the manufacturing of such liquor" since the rendition of the judgment perpetually enjoining him from so doing; and the court held that the "supersedeas bond prevents the punishment for contempt."
I. It is insisted that there is no authority for reviewing on certiorari the action of the district court in refusing to punish an alleged contempt against the authority of the court. That such action could not be reviewed, in the absence of a statute, will be conceded; and in First Congregational Church v. City of Muscatine 2 Iowa 69, it is said: "These authorities are conclusive that, in the absence of a statute, each court of record is the sole and final judge in the matter of contempt." There was in force when this decision was made, and is now, the following statute: "No appeal lies from an order to punish for contempt, but the proceedings may, in a proper case, be taken to a higher court, for revision, by certiorari." Code, sec. 3499. It is said this statute has no application when the court refuses to punish the defendant. It will be conceded, for the purposes of this case, that this is true in all cases where the court determines that a contempt has not been committed. This the court did not do, but held, as a matter of law, that it could not inquire into and determine such question, because it was prevented from so doing by appeal and supersedeas. As no appeal lies, the judgment of the district court must be reviewed in a certiorari proceeding if it can be done at all. The proper construction of the statute, we think, is that the action of the court may, in a proper case, be so reviewed; that is, the proceedings may be reviewed, whether the defendant has or has not been punished, in all cases when a substantial right, either public or private, is involved, which can only be protected or enforced by the proceeding in contempt. That this is such a case we think there cannot be any reasonable doubt.
II. It is insisted that the appeal and supersedeas stay the judgment, and prohibit the court from making any inquiry as to whether a contempt has or has not been committed; and in...
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