Lindsey v. Jackson
| Decision Date | 17 December 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:13-CV-1797 JAR,4:13-CV-1797 JAR |
| Parties | JACKIE LINDSEY, Plaintiff, v. HERBERT JACKSON, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Partially Dismiss Plaintiff's Fourth Amended Complaint (ECF No. 5) and Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Fourth Amended Complaint (ECF No. 10).1 These motions are fully briefed and ready for disposition.
Plaintiff Jackie Lindsey ("Plaintiff") alleges that Harlan Jackson ("Jackson") was hired as a police officer, jailer, and/or auxiliary employee for the Uplands Park police department. . On or around March 24, 2007, Plaintiff states that Jackson pulled over Plaintiff and, having determined that she had outstanding traffic tickets, transported her to and detained her at the Uplands Park jail. (Pet., ¶¶23-27). Plaintiff alleges that Jackson sexually assaulted her at the jail. (Pet., ¶28). On August 28, 2008, Jackson pled guilty to one count of sexual contact with a prisoner, a class D felony, arising out of his March 24, 2007 sexual assault of Plaintiff. (Pet., ¶29).
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a Petition in State Court. On August 15, 2013, Defendants were served with the Fourth Amended Petition, which alleged claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for the first time. (ECF No. 1, ¶1; ECF No. 4). On September 13, 2013, Defendants removed this action to federal court based upon federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§1331, 1441 and 1446.
In the instant Petition, Plaintiff alleges claims for negligence (Counts I, II, and III) and under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (Counts IV, V, and VI). In the motions to dismiss, Defendants claim that Counts I, II, and III of Plaintiff's Petition are barred by the doctrines of sovereign immunity, official immunity and the public duty doctrine and that Counts IV, V, and VI of Plaintiff's Petition are barred by the statute of limitations.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must view the allegations in the Complaint liberally in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Eckert v. Titan Tire Corp., 514 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2008), citing Luney v. SGS Auto Servs., 432 F.3d 866, 867 (8th Cir. 2005). Additionally, the Court "must accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Coons v. Mineta, 410 F.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), abrogating the "no set of facts" standard for Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) found in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Huang v. Gateway Hotel Holdings, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1140 (E.D. Mo. 2007).
In Count I Plaintiff alleges a negligence claim against Police Chief for the Village of Uplands Park, Herbert Jackson (hereinafter "Chief Jackson"). In Count II Plaintiff alleges a negligence claim against the Village of Uplands Park. In Count III, Plaintiff alleges a claim against Kenneth Williams, Carmen McClendon, Charles Gamble, Henry Iwenofu, and Shirley Martin (collectively, "the Board of Trustees") for negligence. Defendants assert that these claims are barred by official immunity, the public duty doctrine, and sovereign immunity.
Defendants contend that Counts I and III of Plaintiff's Petition against the Board of Trustees and Chief Jackson are barred by official immunity. Official immunity is a "judicially-created doctrine protects public employees from liability for alleged acts of negligence committed during the course of their official duties for the performance of discretionary acts." Southers v. City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Mo. 2008), citing Davis v. Lambert-St. Louis Int'l Airport, 193 S.W.3d 760, 763 (Mo. banc 2006). "The official immunity doctrine, however, does not provide public employees immunity for torts committed when acting in a ministerial capacity." Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 610, citing Kanagawa v. State, 685 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Mo. banc 1985), overruled on other grounds by Alexander v. State, 756 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. banc 1988). "Whether an act is discretionary or ministerial depends on the 'degree of reason and judgment required' to perform the act. Davis, 193 S.W.3d at 763, quoting Kanagawa, 685 S.W. 2d at 836. "An act is discretionary when it requires 'the exercise of reason in the adaption ofmeans to an end, and discretion in determining how or whether an act should be done or a course pursued.'" Davis, 193 S.W.3d at 763, quoting Rustici v. Weidemeyer, 673 S.W.2d 762, 769 (Mo. banc 1984). "Conversely, a ministerial function is 'of a clerical nature which a public officer is required to perform upon a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning the propriety of the act to be performed.'" Id. "To discern whether an act is ministerial or discretionary, the court looks to three factors: (1) the nature of the duties; (2) how much policymaking or professional expertise and judgment the act involves; and (3) the consequences of withholding immunity." Davis, 193 S.W.3d at 763, citing Kanagawa, 685 S.W.2d at 836. "[A] discretionary act, however, will not be protected by official immunity if the conduct is willfully wrong or done with malice or corruption." Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 610-11, citing Schooler v. Arrington, 106 Mo. Ct. App. 607 (1904).
Defendants contend that Plaintiff's claims of negligent hiring, retaining, supervising and training are barred by official immunity. (ECF No. 17, pp. 2-3, citing Southers, 263 S.W. 3d 603). First, Defendants maintain that their actions of hiring, retaining, supervising and inadequately training are discretionary and not ministerial acts. (ECF No. 6, pp. 3-4). As noted by Defendants, the Missouri Supreme Court held that a supervising officer could not be held liable for injuries sustained as a result of a subordinate officer's vehicular pursuit because "[t]heir conduct at issue involves highly discretionary supervisory and policy decisions that the doctrine is intended to shield." Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 621. Furthermore, Defendants assert that Plaintiff's Petition does not allege that Defendants acted in bad faith or with malice. (ECF No. 6, p. 4).
In response, Plaintiff contends that her claims in Counts I and III are based upon ministerial functions. (ECF No. 11, pp. 2-4, citing Pet., ¶¶13, 18, 19, 21, 27, 31). Specifically, Plaintiff contends that "[p]ermitting an individual to retain the commission of police officer, jailer and/or auxiliary personnel in violation of 590.195, R.S. Mo. is not a discretionary action that involves the exercise of professional judgment." (ECF No. 11, p. 4).
Plaintiff also contends that Defendants are not entitled to official immunity because their acts were reckless, willful and knowing. (ECF No. 11, pp. 5-6). Plaintiff asserts that her Petition alleges that Defendants' conduct was willful in ignoring the results of background and criminal checks (Pet., ¶31(d)), failing to undertake internal affairs investigations (Pet., ¶31(f)), and hiring police officers, jailers and auxiliary personnel without adequate background checks or pre-hire screenings (Pet., ¶31(k)).
Assuming all of Plaintiff's allegations as true (as the Court must), the Court finds that Plaintiff's Petition sufficiently alleges that Defendants' actions were reckless, willful and knowing such that application of official immunity would be improper. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants hired a violent criminal without the proper checks in violation of R.S. Mo. §590.0702, failed to train that person, and allowed him to exercise unchecked authority as a police officer. The Court finds that this is sufficient to demonstrate willful and wanton conduct, particularly when Plaintiff alleges the alleged assault arose out of the failure to investigate, train,and supervise this employee.3 Thus, the Court denies Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to Counts I and III because they are not barred by official immunity.
"The public duty doctrine states that a public employee is not civilly liable for the breach of a duty owed to the general public, rather than a particular individual." Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 611; Bishop v. Crawford, 1:11-CV-11-SNLJ, 2013 WL 4507797, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 23, 2013). "'[J]ust as the doctrine of official immunity will not apply to conduct that is willfully wrong or done with malice or corruption, the public duty doctrine will not apply where defendant public employees act in bad faith or with malice.'" Bishop, 2013 WL 4507797, at *5, citing Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 612.
Defendants contend that the public duty doctrine applies because Plaintiff cannot show that the Board of Trustees and Chief Jackson (ECF No. 6, p. 5).
In response, Plaintiff maintains that the public duty doctrine does not apply because Defendants' conduct was knowing and deliberate and "directly caused the sexual assault perpetrated against her while in Defendants' custody." (ECF No. 11, p. 7).
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