Lindsey v. Lindsey, 2001-CA-00098-SCT.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
• Writing for the Court: Before SMITH, P.J., COBB and DIAZ, JJ.
• Citation: 818 So.2d 1191
• Parties: Elizabeth LINDSEY v. Mark LINDSEY.
• Docket Number: No. 2001-CA-00098-SCT.,2001-CA-00098-SCT.
• Decision Date: 28 February 2002

818 So.2d 1191

Elizabeth LINDSEY
v.
Mark LINDSEY

No. 2001-CA-00098-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

February 28, 2002.

Dissenting Opinion on Denial of Rehearing June 20, 2002.

Kenneth Eugene Floyd, II, Tommy Dexter Cadle, Booneville, for appellant.

Will R. Ford, New Albany, for appellee.

Before SMITH, P.J., COBB and DIAZ, JJ.

DIAZ, Justice, for the Court.

¶ 1. Mark Lindsey filed for divorce from Elizabeth Lindsey on grounds of adultery and irreconcilable differences on August

818 So.2d 1192

24, 2000, in the Chancery Court of Tippah County, Mississippi. An order was entered granting the divorce to Mark on the ground of adultery. On appeal, Elizabeth now brings the following issues before this Court

I. Whether Mississippi law authorizes a final decree of divorce by a chancery court sitting in vacation and without the consent of both parties.

II. Whether the chancellor erred in failing to give notice to Elizabeth of the hearing and rendering of the decree of divorce.

III. Whether the chancellor erred in entering a final decree of divorce when at the time Elizabeth was pregnant.

IV. Whether, in light of testimony revealing that Elizabeth and Mark resumed sexual relations, the chancellor erred in refusing to set aside the divorce decree based on the defense of condonation.

FACTS

¶ 2. The divorce was originally set for hearing on September 12, 2000; however, the hearing was continued until further order of the chancery court. On September 27, presiding Chancellor Norman L. Gillespie entered a final decree of divorce in favor of Mark on the ground of adultery. The matter was heard in vacation by the Chancery Court of Tippah County. Elizabeth failed to answer the complaint filed by Mark, and she did not appear before the chancery court when the chancellor heard Mark's complaint for divorce.

¶ 3. On October 27, 2000, Elizabeth, making her first appearance before the chancery court, filed a motion to set aside the decree of divorce. On December 4, 2000, a hearing was held on the motion to set aside the decree of divorce. The chancery court ruled in favor of Mark and refused to set aside the divorce decree. On December 12, 2000, Elizabeth filed a motion to reconsider, and on December 26, 2000, Elizabeth filed a motion to declare the final decree of divorce void. Both motions were denied.

DISCUSSION

¶ 4. The scope of review in domestic matters is limited, and this Court will not disturb the findings of a chancellor unless those findings are clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied. Norton v. Norton, 742 So.2d 126, 129 (Miss.1999).

I. WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR ERRED IN ORDERING A DECREE OF DIVORCE IN VACATION AND WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF BOTH PARTIES.

¶ 5. Elizabeth relies on the rule in Mississippi that the power of judges and chancellors to sign decrees and try causes in vacation must be derived from statute or by consent of the parties. Chaffin v. Chaffin, 437 So.2d 384, 385 (Miss.1983); Callicott v. Horn, 137 Miss. 693,137 Miss. 693, 102 So. 850, 851 (1925). A decree entered in vacation that is not in conformity with statute or not authorized by statute is void. Id. According to Elizabeth, Mississippi provides chancellors with the authority to hear and rule on divorce matters as follows:

(1) The proceedings to obtain a divorce shall not be heard or considered nor a judgment of divorce entered except in open court. A chancellor may, in his discretion, hear or consider proceedings to obtain a divorce in vacation and make and enter judgments of divorce in the same manner as he may in other cases that may be heard in vacation

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pursuant to Section 9-5-91. Any judgment made or entered contrary to the provisions of this section shall be null and void.

Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-17(1) (1994). Elizabeth argues that since Miss.Code Ann. § 9-5-91 (referenced above in § 93-5-17) was repealed in 1991, there is no longer a statute that authorizes a chancellor to hear divorce proceedings while in recess or in vacation from its scheduled terms of court. Section 9-5-91 was repealed; however, we do not interpret the repeal of § 9-5-91 to mean that chancellors no longer have the authority to hear divorce matters in vacation.

¶ 6. Elizabeth also contends that Miss. Code Ann. § 9-5-93 did not authorize the chancellor to hear the complaint and render a final decree of divorce. Section 9-5-93 states:

Whenever the chancery court or chancellor has lawfully set any matter in vacation for confirmation or decree, and no contest has been timely filed, if an order or decree determining the same or setting another date therefor be not entered upon such date, the chancellor shall have the power to enter an order or decree on any day prior to the adjournment of the next succeeding term, without further process. Provided, that if the matter be one in which contest might have been entered prior to the date set and such contest be filed before the entry of such order or decree, the same shall be disposed of as if such contest had been timely filed.

Miss.Code Ann. § 9-5-93 (1991).

¶ 7. Elizabeth argues that since § 93-5-17, quoted above, makes no reference to § 9-5-93 that section does not apply. Furthermore, she argues that there was no order setting the divorce hearing on September 27, 2000. The hearing was originally set for September 12, 2000. The chancery court rescheduled the hearing for a later, undetermined date.

¶ 8. Mark argues that Elizabeth's proposition that chancellors are not authorized to grant judgments of divorce while in vacation is ludicrous. He contends that to hold otherwise would void a large percentage of divorces granted in this state.

¶ 9. Because Elizabeth failed to timely answer the complaint and failed to contest the divorce decree until after the decree was entered, this Court finds that the chancellor did not err in holding the divorce hearing in vacation without her consent. We find that Elizabeth impliedly consented to the hearing in vacation by failing to contest the divorce to make a timely appearance before the chancery court.

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