Lindsey v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 22 August 2006
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 05-1761(RBW).
• Parties: Stephen J. LINDSEY and Patricia L. Lindsey, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

448 F.Supp.2d 37

Stephen J. LINDSEY and Patricia L. Lindsey, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 05-1761(RBW).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

August 22, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Stephen J. Lindsey, Garden Grive, CA, pro se.

Patricia L. Lindsey, Garden Grive, CA, pro se.

Jason Scott Zarin, Jennifer Lynn Vozne, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WALTON, District Judge.

The plaintiffs, Steven J. Lindsey and Patricia L. Lindsey, bring this action alleging that the United States Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") "recklessly, intentionally or by reason of negligence[,] disregarded and continue to disregard provisions of [the Internal Revenue Code (`IRC'),] Title 26 of the United States Code[,] and the regulations promulgated thereunder." Complaint ("Compl.") ¶ 1. In response to the complaint, the defendant initially filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to properly execute service of process ("Def.'s Mot.") and thereafter submitted a supplemental motion to dismiss based on the plaintiffs' failure to exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing this lawsuit ("Def.'s Supp. Mot."), which the Court construes as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.¹ For the following reasons, the Court denies the defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process, grants its motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for a declaratory judgment, an injunction, and a refund on the grounds that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and therefore cannot provide such relief, and grants its motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' damages claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.² Because the plaintiffs' response to the defendant's motion to dismiss appears to raise a new claim not asserted in the complaint, the Court will grant the pro se plaintiffs limited leave to amend their complaint for the sole purpose of adding this new claim.

I. Background

This case is one of at least a dozen virtually identical lawsuits brought by taxpayers, proceeding pro se, alleging a variety of forms of misconduct by the IRS.³ The complaint here, however, provides no particularized facts pertaining specifically to the plaintiffs in this case; instead, it consists predominantly of argument and restatement of putatively pertinent legal standards. See Compl. ¶¶ 8-26. Moreover even the few passages in the complaint which purport to describe facts that support the plaintiffs' positions merely offer boilerplate recitations of the factual showings required to satisfy the various statutory provisions relied upon by the plaintiffs. See Compl. ¶¶ 5, 7(a)-(r), 27-30.

In any event, the plaintiffs catalogue seventeen distinct provisions of the IRC which they claim have been violated. Compl. ¶¶ 7(a)-(r). The complaint seeks several forms of relief to redress the harm the plaintiffs have allegedly suffered, including a declaratory judgment that the defendant has violated one or more provisions of the IRC, Compl. ¶ 31, an injunction barring any further collection of taxes from. the plaintiffs, Compl. ¶ 34, a refund of all unassessed taxes and the return of property unlawfully seized, Compl. ¶ 33, and an award of damages under 26 U.S.C. § 7433 (2000), Compl. ¶ 32. The plaintiffs attempted to effect service on the defendant by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint via certified mail to the Attorney General and the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia on September 19, 2005. Pls.' Resp. at 2.

The defendant first moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint for insufficient service of process pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) on December 1, 2005. Def.'s Mot. at 1. The plaintiffs filed an "Objection" to the defendant's first motion on December 16, 2005. Pls.' Obj. at 1. Several months later, the defendant brought a second motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint alleging that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over each of the plaintiffs' claims for relief under Rule 12(b)(1). Def.'s Supp. Mot. at 1. For the reasons discussed below, the Court construes this motion, in part, as challenging the Court's subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and, in part, as seeking dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). The plaintiffs filed a "Response" to this second motion on April 18, 2006. Pls.' Resp. at 1. The Court will address in turn each of these motions and their oppositions.

II. Standards of Review

A. Motions to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5)

The Court may dismiss a complaint for ineffective service of process pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) if the plaintiff fails to establish that he or she has properly effectuated service pursuant to Rule 4. See Light v. Wolf; 816 F.2d 746, 751 (D.C.Cir.1987). "[T]he party on whose behalf service is made has the burden of establishing its validity when challenged; to do so, he must demonstrate that the procedure employed satisfied the requirements of the relevant portions of Rule 4 and any other applicable provision of law." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Hilska v. Jones, 217 F.R.D. 16, 20 (D.D.C.2003) (holding that "the plaintiff carries the burden of establishing that he has properly affected service") (citing Light, 816 F.2d at 751).

B. Motions to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1)

Once a defendant has moved to dismiss a case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), "the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the factual predicates of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence." Erby v. United States, 424 F.Supp.2d 180, 182 (D.D.C.2006) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)); see also Al-Owhali v. Ashcroft, 279 F.Supp.2d 13, 21 (D.D.C.2003) (Walton, J.) ("Throughout the Court's jurisdictional inquiry, it is plaintiffs burden to establish that the Court has jurisdiction."). "The [C]ourt, in turn, has an affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority." Abu AU v. Gonzales, 387 F.Supp.2d 16, 17 (D.D.C.2005) (internal quotations omitted).

A court ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss "may consider documents outside the pleadings to assure itself that it has jurisdiction." Al-Owhali, 279 F.Supp.2d at 21; see also Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C.Cir.1987) ("In 12(b)(1) proceedings, it has been long accepted that the judiciary may make appropriate inquiry beyond the pleadings to satisfy itself on [its] authority to entertain the case." (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). The level of scrutiny with which the Court examines the allegations in the complaint that support a finding of jurisdiction, however, depends upon whether the motion to dismiss asserts a facial or factual challenge to the court's jurisdiction. See I.T. Consultants v. Pakistan, 351 F.3d 1184, 1188 (D.C.Cir.2003).

Facial challenges, such as motions to dismiss for lack of standing at the pleading stage, "attack[] the factual allegations of the complaint that are contained on the face of the complaint." Al-Owhali, 279 F.Supp.2d at 20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "If a defendant mounts a `facial' challenge to the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations, the court must accept as true the allegations in the complaint and consider the factual allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Erby, 424 F.Supp.2d at 181; see also I.T. Consultants, 351 F.3d at 1188. The court may look beyond the allegations contained in the complaint to decide a facial challenge, "as long as it still accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true." Abu Ali, 387 F.Supp.2d at 18; see also Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249, 1253-54 (D.C.Cir.2005) ("At the pleading stage .... [w]hile the district court may consider materials outside the pleadings in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the court must still accept all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true." (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).

Factual challenges, by contrast, are "addressed to the underlying facts contained in the complaint." Al-Owhali, 279 F.Supp.2d at 20. Where a defendant disputes the factual allegations in the complaint that form the basis for a court's subject matter jurisdiction, "the court may not deny the motion to dismiss merely by assuming the truth of the facts alleged by the plaintiff and disputed by the defendant." Phoenix Consulting, Inc. v. Republic of Angola, 216 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C.Cir. 2000). Instead, a court deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion asserting a factual challenge "must go beyond the pleadings and resolve any disputed issues of fact the resolution of which is necessary to a ruling upon the motion to dismiss." Id. In such situations, "the plaintiffs jurisdictional averments are entitled to no presumptive weight; the court must address the merits of the jurisdictional claim by resolving the factual disputes between the parties." Erby, 424 F.Supp.2d at 181 (internal quotations omitted); see also Mortensen v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir.1976) (holding that a court ruling on a factual challenge to its jurisdiction is not required to accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true, but rather "is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case ... and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims").

The defendant's supplemental motion to dismiss raises both facial and factual attacks upon the Court's jurisdiction. The defendant raises a facial challenge...