Lindsley v. Am. Honda Motor Co.
| Decision Date | 07 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-941 |
| Parties | MARGARET LINDSLEY v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Presently before the Court are Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (ECF No. 7), and Defendant Ada Technologies, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim (ECF No. 19). For the following reasons, Defendants' Motions will be granted in part and denied in part.
This action involves a product liability dispute. Plaintiff alleges that she was injured by her Honda CR-V due to a manufacturing defect caused by Defendants. Plaintiff brought suit against Defendants American Honda Motor Co., Inc. ("Honda") and Ada Technologies, Inc. ("Ada"), alleging negligence, strict product liability, breach of warranty, failure to warn, violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL"), and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
On the evening of December 31, 2013, Plaintiff Margaret Lindsley drove her car, a Honda CR-V, to her friend's house. (Compl. ¶ 20, ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff drove the car to thefront of the house, placed the vehicle's automatic transmission in the "park" position, and waited for her friend to exit the house. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23.) With the engine still running, Plaintiff attempted to exit the vehicle to secure items that were loose in the rear area of the car. (Id. ¶¶ 23-24.) As she exited the CR-V, the vehicle began rolling backwards despite the fact that she had put the vehicle in the park position. (Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff became stuck between the door and frame of the vehicle, and was forced to the ground. (Id. ¶ 27.) The CR-V's left front tire rolled over Plaintiff's left foot and hand, causing a fracture to her left ankle, serious abrasions to her left foot, and a broken finger on her left hand. (Id. ¶¶ 28-29.) As the vehicle continued to roll backwards, the left front tire passed inches away from Plaintiff's face. (Id. ¶ 30.) The CR-V continued rolling down the street, hitting her neighbor's cable utility box, and ultimately sinking into a creek in front of her neighbor's yard. (Id. ¶ 31.)
In a letter sent to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") on April 12, 2013, Honda acknowledged the existence of a manufacturing defect with its vehicles' Brake Transmission Shift interlock ("BTS interlock"). (Id. ¶ 17.) As a result of this manufacturing defect, a vehicle's BTS interlock does not always lock gears in its designated positions when exposed to low temperatures, thus allowing the gear selector to be moved from the "park" position without a driver first pushing down on the brake pedal. (Id. ¶ 19.) According to this letter, Honda had discovered the defect no later than April 5, 2013. (Id. ¶ 17.) The defective BTS interlock was installed in 204,169 Honda vehicles, including Plaintiff's CR-V. (Id.)
On December 29, 2015, Plaintiff initiated this litigation by filing a Praecipe for Writ of Summons in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶ 12.) OnFebruary 26, 2016, Defendant Honda removed the case to this Court. (ECF No. 1.) On April 19, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court. Plaintiff's Complaint asserts the following claims against both Honda and Ada: negligence (Count I); strict product liability (Count II); failure to warn (Count IV); violations under the UTPCPL, 73 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 201-1 et seq. (Count V); and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count VI).2 Plaintiff's Complaint also asserts a breach of warranty claim against Honda only (Count III).
On April 26, 2016, Honda filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), with regard to Count V and Plaintiff's request for punitive damages. (Honda MTD, ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Honda's Motion to Dismiss on May 13, 2016. (Pl.'s Resp. Honda MTD, ECF No. 8.) On September 13, 2016, Defendant Ada filed a Motion to Dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). (Ada MTD, ECF No. 19.) In that same document, Ada included a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim with regard to Counts IV and V of Plaintiff's Complaint, as well as Plaintiff's request for punitive damages. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Ada's Motion on October 25, 2016. (Pl.'s Resp. Ada MTD, ECF No. 21.) On November 1, 2016, Ada submitted a Reply brief in support of its Motion. (Ada Reply, ECF No. 22.)
A complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when a court lacks personal jurisdiction over a moving defendant. In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(2), a court "must accept all of the plaintiff's allegations as true andconstrue disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff." Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd, 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). In order to "survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the court's jurisdiction over the moving defendants." Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Pinker, 292 F.3d at 368). When the court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, "the plaintiff need only establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction" to defeat the motion to dismiss. Id. (citing Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 142 n.1 (3d Cir. 1992)).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), "[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A motion under Rule 12(b)(6), therefore, tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
A claim is plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. A complaint that merely alleges entitlement to relief, without alleging facts that show entitlement, must be dismissed. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). Courts need not accept "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements . . . ." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. at 679. This'"does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead 'simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary element." Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
In determining whether dismissal of the complaint is appropriate, courts use a two-part analysis. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. First, courts separate the factual and legal elements of the claim and accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true. Id. at 210-11. Next, courts determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a "'plausible claim for relief.'" Id. at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Given the nature of the two-part analysis, "'[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'" McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 530 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
Defendant Ada asserts that all of Plaintiff's claims against it should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(2) because this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Ada. Ada argues that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction because Ada does not have any direct contacts with Pennsylvania. Specifically, Ada asserts that its principal place of business is in Ohio, it does not have a relationship with any Pennsylvania business, it does not advertise its products in Pennsylvania, it does not directly sell its products in Pennsylvania, and it has not derived any benefit from the laws or tribunals of Pennsylvania. Plaintiff responds that Ada is subject to this Court's jurisdiction under the stream of commerce theory. Plaintiff asserts that Ada knowinglyplaced its defective products into the stream of commerce, which then entered Pennsylvania and led to Plaintiff's injuries.
A district court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to the extent allowed by the law of the state where the court sits, and subject to the constitutional limitations of due process. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). Pennsylvania's long-arm statute allows a court to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant "to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States and may be based upon the most minimum contact with this Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of the United States." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5322(b). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a nonresident to have certain "minimum contacts" with the forum state for a court in that forum to properly exercise personal jurisdiction. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
Personal jurisdiction may be exercised...
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