Lindsley v. Lindsley
Decision Date | 12 April 1941 |
Docket Number | No. 12993.,12993. |
Citation | 152 S.W.2d 415 |
Parties | LINDSLEY v. LINDSLEY et al. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Dallas County; W. L. Thornton, Judge.
Action by Mrs. Marguerite B. Lindsley, widow of Henry D. Lindsley, deceased, against Porter Lindsley, independent executor and trustee under the will of the deceased and others, for construction of the will. From a judgment dismissing the action, plaintiff appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
Leake, Henry, Young & Golden, of Dallas, for appellant.
Cloyd H. Read, Sawnie R. Aldredge, Hiram F. Lively, Royall R. Watkins, Zellner Eldridge, and J. C. Muse, Jr., all of Dallas, for appellees.
Mrs. Marguerite B. Lindsley, surviving widow of Henry D. Lindsley, deceased, brought this action against Porter Lindsley, independent executor and trustee under the will of the deceased, and certain beneficiaries, for its construction; alleging that, a dispute had arisen between plaintiff and the independent executor as to the meaning of the will. The court sustained general demurrers urged by the defendants to plaintiff's petition and dismissed her suit, from which she appealed, and the case is before us for review.
Plaintiff is the surviving widow of Henry D. Lindsley, who died on or about November 18, 1938, leaving a will which has been duly probated in the County Court of Dallas County; the defendant Porter Lindsley, named independent executor and trustee of a trust estate created by the testator, qualified and is acting in such capacities. At the time of the death of Col. Lindsley and for some time prior thereto, he and his wife, plaintiff herein, resided upon and used as their rural homestead, a tract of land, approximately 500 acres, situated in a northernly direction and about three miles from the corporate limits of the City of University Park, in Dallas County. Although this land was the separate property of testator, his widow was entitled, under the Constitution and laws of the state, to use and occupy 200 acres, and the improvements thereon, during her lifetime, or so long as she may elect to use and occupy the same as her homestead, and was entitled to have same, together with exempt personal property, set apart for her use.
The widow contends that she is entitled to receive the real and personal property devised and bequeathed to her by her husband, in addition to the homestead and exempt personal property to which she is entitled as surviving widow under the Constitution and laws. The independent executor, who is in control of all property belonging to the estate, denying this claim, contends that the widow is put to an election, that is, whether she will take the bequests and devises, or the homestead and personal property to which, as surviving widow, she is entitled under the Constitution and laws, but that she is not entitled to both.
These contentions define the issue joined, and indicate the provisions of the will brought under construction, which are as follows: After providing for the payment of his debts, funeral expenses and all estate and inheritance taxes, and directing that his remains be interred in Arlington National Cemetery, the testator proceeds: (The acreage was increased by codicil to 20 acres). He bequeathed to his daughter $2,500, which, by the codicil, was increased to $12,500; to his son, Henry D. Lindsley, Jr., he bequeathed $2,500. To his secretary $1,000; to the Salvation Army of Dallas $5,000; to the Scottish Rite Crippled Children's Hospital of Dallas $10,000; to Elmer Scott, trustee, for the benefit of the Civic Federation of Dallas, $5,000; to the Endowment Fund of the American Legion, National Organization, $1,000. These bequests to be paid out of the general estate of testator. The remaining books of his library to some public, or semi-public institution, as may be selected by his executor and trustee. The testator then provides: , and then directed that:
The doctrine of election has been so often defined in cases and in textbooks, and is so well understood, as to render practically valueless as authorities, the great number of cases cited in the briefs of counsel, as, in each of the cases cited, the decision turned on the peculiar provisions of the will then under consideration. So, in determining whether the devises and bequests to the wife in the instant case were intended to be in lieu of her homestead and personal property rights under the law, resort must be had to the language of the will, and, in doing so, we are to be guided by the well-established rules of construction announced by the courts. One of the...
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...Where doubt exists as to a judge's interest that doubt should be resolved in favor of disqualification. Lindsley v. Lindsley, 152 S.W.2d 415, 432 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1941)(opinion on rehearing), rev'd on other grounds, 139 Tex. 512, 163 S.W.2d 633 (1942). The Dallas Court of Civil Appeals......
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...a judge is disqualified, the disqualification cannot be waived either expressly or impliedly. Lindsley v. Lindsley, Tex.Civ.App. 152 S.W.2d 415;State ex rel. Richardson v. Keen, 185 Okl. 539, 95 P.2d 120;State v. Ledbetter, 156 Okl. 23, 9 P.2d 728;Kline v. State, 194 Ind. 334, 142 N.E. 713;......
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In re Woodside-Florence Irr. Dist.
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