Lindstrom v. Mutual Steamship Co
| Decision Date | 03 March 1916 |
| Docket Number | 19,530 - (135) |
| Parties | AARON LINDSTROM v. MUTUAL STEAMSHIP CO |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for St. Louis county to recover $5,000 for personal injury received while employed as a laborer by the Berwind Fuel Company in unloading a cargo from the hold of a steamship owned by defendant, and $290 for the cost of hospital care and the loss of wages. From an order, Dancer J., sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.
Sovereignty of state over vessel on navigable water.
1. Territorial sovereignty of a state extends to a vessel of the state though it is upon navigable waters.
Workmen's Compensation Act -- interstate commerce by water not excepted.
2. The Minnesota Workmen's Compensation Act is general in its terms, and it applies to all cases within the territorial jurisdiction of the state save those expressly excepted. The act excepts cases arising from interstate commerce by railroad. Those arising from interstate commerce by water are not excepted.
Act valid in absence of Federal statute.
3. The act in its application to such employment is not invalid as an interference with interstate commerce. Congress has not legislated upon that subject as to interstate commerce by water, and until it does so such legislation is within the province of the several states.
Admiralty jurisdiction.
4. The injury sustained in this case was sustained upon the navigable waters of the United States. This brings the case within the jurisdiction of the Federal courts of admiralty.
Remedies open under Judicial Act of 1789.
5. By virtue of the clause in the Judicial Act of 1789, saving to suitors the right of a common-law remedy where the common law is competent to give it, a party so aggrieved may (1) proceed in rem in admiralty; (2) bring suit in personam in admiralty (3) resort to his remedy at law in personam in a state court, or (4) in the United States Circuit Court, if there are parties proper to give such jurisdiction.
Application of that act.
6. In its application to this case the important effect of the saving clause is that it saves the right to proceed in the state courts by a suit in personam to redress wrongs committed at sea, although the person injured had the concurrent right to proceed in rem in a Federal court of admiralty.
Action in state court governed by state law.
7. When the action is brought in a state court it must be determined according to state laws and not according to the laws of admiralty.
Statutory modification of common-law rule.
8. It is competent for the state to modify by statute its common-law rules of liability in their application to such cases, so long as the modification does not amount to a regulation of commerce or an interference with some paramount Federal law.
Workmen's Compensation Act governs.
9. Since the adoption of the Minnesota compensation act, the question of liability in such cases, and the amount thereof, are to be determined by the compensation act.
Wharton & Wharton, for appellant.
Washburn, Bailey & Mitchell, for respondent.
The complaint alleges the following facts:
Defendant is a Minnesota corporation operating the steamship William Livingstone on the Great Lakes, between Duluth, its home port, and ports outside of Minnesota. The Berwind Fuel Company is an employer owning a dock at Duluth. On June 9, 1914, plaintiff was in the employ of the fuel company engaged in unloading a cargo of coal from said vessel on to the fuel company's dock. While working in the hold of the vessel he was injured through the negligence of defendant. He brings this common-law action to recover damages. Defendant demurred and the demurrer was sustained.
The demurrer raises one main question; that is, does the Minnesota Workmen's Compensation Law (G.S. 1913, § 8195, et seq.) apply to such a case. If so, it is conceded the demurrer was properly sustained. We are of the opinion that the Minnesota compensation law does apply.
1. No question of territorial jurisdiction arises, for the territorial sovereignty of the state of Minnesota extends to a vessel of the state, though it is upon navigable waters (Crapo v. Kelly, 16 Wall. 610, 21 L.Ed. 430; The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, 28 S.Ct. 133, 52 L.Ed. 264), even upon the high seas. International Nav. Co. v. Lindstrom, 123 F. 475; Thompson Towing & Wrecking Assn. v. McGregor, 207 F. 209, 124 C.C.A. 479; The Bee, 216 F. 709.
No question of conflict of state laws arises. Duluth being the home port, and also the port where the injury occurred, the laws of no state other than Minnesota could apply.
2. There is no serious doubt that the terms of the statute are broad enough to cover the case. The act is general in its terms and it applies to all cases within the territorial jurisdiction of the state which are not excepted. Section 8202 excepts "any employer acting as a common carrier when engaged in interstate or foreign commerce by railroad," and "any employee of such common carrier injured or killed while so engaged." No other exception of consequence here is found in the act. This section does not, either in terms or by any possible implication, except carriers by water or the employees of such carriers.
The negligence that caused the injury was not that of plaintiff's employer, but of another employer who is within the terms of the act. The compensation act applies to such a case. Mathison v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co. 126 Minn. 286, 148 N.W. 71.
3. Nor is the act invalid as an interference with interstate commerce. The right of Congress to pass laws governing the liability of employers engaged in interstate commerce for injuries sustained by their employees while engaged in such commerce, to the exclusion of state legislation upon that subject, is unquestioned, and as to railroads Congress has enacted some applicable laws. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 32 S.Ct. 169, 56 L.Ed. 327, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 44. But Congress has passed no laws regulating the liability of interstate carriers by water, at least not as to any matters here involved, and until Congress legislates upon this subject it is within the province of the several states to do so. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 32 S.Ct. 169, 56 L.Ed. 327, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 44, Stoll v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co. 205 F. 169, 177.
4. The only doubtful question in the case is whether the Minnesota compensation act is, in its application to this case, an infringement upon the Federal jurisdiction over the subject of admiralty. The Constitution of the United States extends the power of the Federal courts "to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." Article 3, § 2. Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 saves to suitors "in all cases, the right of a common-law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it." 1 U.S. St. at Large, p. 77. This case hinges on the construction of this saving clause.
The injury was sustained aboard a ship on navigable waters of the United States. This brings the case within the jurisdiction of the Federal courts of admiralty. Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52, 34 S.Ct. 733, 58 L.Ed. 1208, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1157. Just as clearly it is subject to the common-law jurisdiction of the courts of this state. The Constitution and the statute conferred upon the national judiciary the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction exactly as it existed in the jurisprudence of the common law. When the admiralty jurisdiction was exclusive, it remained so; when it was concurrent, it remained so. If the suit be in rem against the thing itself, the proceeding is essentially one in admiralty, is exclusively cognizable in admiralty courts, and the states cannot confer upon their own courts the cognizance of such cases. But the states did retain jurisdiction in cases of which the cognizance was previously concurrent in the courts of common law, that is, of suits in personam against an individual defendant. "This latter class of cases can be no more deemed cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction than cases of common-law jurisdiction." Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 583, 598, 15 L.Ed. 1028; Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638, 648, 20 S.Ct. 824, 44 L.Ed. 921. Accordingly it is said in The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 645, 19 L.Ed. 266, that proceedings in a suit at common law on a maritime contract are precisely the same as in suits on contracts not regarded as maritime, wholly irrespective of the fact that the injured party might have sought redress in the admiralty."
5. By virtue of the saving clause a party so aggrieved may (1) proceed in rem in admiralty if a maritime lien arises; (2) bring suit in personam in an admiralty jurisdiction; (3) resort to his remedy at law in a state court, or (4) in the United States court at law, if there are parties proper to give such jurisdiction. Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522, 534, 21 L.Ed. 369.
It has been said that what is reserved to a suitor "is not a remedy in the common-law courts, but a common-law remedy." The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411, 431, 18 L.Ed. 397; Moran v. Sturges, 154 U.S. 256, 276, 14 S.Ct. 1019, 38 L.Ed. 981. This is true enough, but it is not very helpful here. This language means, on the one hand, that the saving clause does not confer upon common-law courts the power to entertain an admiralty suit in rem, and, on the other hand, that some remedies are reserved that were enforceable at common law, not in a common-law court but in a court of equity, and also some remedies recognized at common law, like carriers' liens, which need not be enforced in court at all. Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638, 20 S.Ct. 824, 44 L.Ed. 921.
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