Lines v. Ryan

• Decision Date: 24 November 1978
• Docket Number: No. 48031.,48031.
• Citation: 272 NW 2d 896
• Parties: Richard C. LINES, Appellant, v. Michael RYAN, Respondent. Sondra JONES, Respondent, v. Michael RYAN, Respondent, and Richard C. Lines, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

272 N.W.2d 896 (1978)

Richard C. LINES, Appellant, v. Michael RYAN, Respondent.

Sondra JONES, Respondent, v. Michael RYAN, Respondent, and Richard C. Lines, Appellant.

No. 48031.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

November 24, 1978.

Charles Anderson, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Sondra Jones, pro se.

Peterson, Holtze & Treat and Todd M. Henshaw, Minneapolis, for respondent Michael Ryan.

Heard before KELLY, SCOTT, and WAHL, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc.

SCOTT, Justice.

This appeal involves two cases arising out of a three-vehicle accident that were consolidated for trial in the Hennepin County District Court. In Lines v. Ryan, the jury returned a verdict denying recovery to Lines, and in Jones v. Lines and Ryan, the jury awarded Jones damages against Lines and Ryan in the amount of $8,000. Lines appeals from the order refusing his post-trial motions and claims that the trial court erred in denying him a new trial. We affirm.

On October 15, 1973, at approximately 8:30 p. m., the parties were involved in a three-car collision¹ in the middle south-bound lane of Interstate 35W near the 60th Street exit. Just south of the accident site, Highway 35W intersects with Highway 62. The two right lanes of 35W exit to 62 West, and the left lane of 35W exits to 62 East. The right-hand lane of 62 West was closed due to construction, causing the traffic to slow. Jones, the driver of the first car, testified that as a result of the construction she was forced to stop or almost stop her vehicle. Lines, driving the second car, then struck Jones' vehicle from the rear. At some point in the collision, Lines' car was hit from behind by a vehicle driven by Ryan. Ryan stated that he struck Lines' car after Lines ran into Jones' vehicle. Similarly, Jones testified that Lines' automobile hit her vehicle first and that she felt a second impact when Lines' car was struck by Ryan. Lines, however, claims that before he hit Jones his car was rear-ended by Ryan, causing the vehicle to be pushed into the back of Jones' car.

Other facts of the accident are also disputed. For example, Jones testified that Lines had been tailgating her car for a distance of ½ to 1 mile before the accident, whereas Lines stated that he was following Jones' vehicle for a distance of ¼ to ½ mile before the collision. Ryan, on the other hand, claimed that Lines' vehicle switched into the lane between his car and Jones' just prior to the accident.

After the accident, Jones consulted with an attorney to determine whether she would be able to make a recovery for her injuries incurred in the collision. After being informed that Lines was uninsured and not gainfully employed, Jones decided not to proceed against Lines, but instead to make a claim against her own insurer, State Farm Insurance Company (State Farm), under her uninsured motorist coverage. Jones negotiated on her own with State Farm and on February 18, 1974, settled for $4,000. Upon receipt of State Farm's payment, Jones executed a release and subrogation trust agreement.

On May 10, 1974, Lines brought suit against Ryan, who, like Jones, was insured by State Farm. The law firm of Peterson, Holtze, and Treat, P. A., at the request of State Farm, undertook the defense of Ryan. Also at the request of State Farm, and pursuant to the release and subrogation trust agreement executed by Jones, the Peterson law firm, on November 20, 1974, commenced an action in Jones' name against Lines. The complaint prayed for damages in the amount of $25,000. Jones had no knowledge that the action had been instituted in her name.

On April 28, 1976, Ryan moved the court to consolidate the Lines v. Ryan case with the Jones v. Lines action. The motion was granted. Lines did not make an appearance when the motion to consolidate the two cases was heard, nor did he object to the consolidation or move to vacate the judge's order until the jury verdict was returned. At the hearing on the motion to consolidate, the judge suggested that different law firms represent Jones and Ryan, due to the apparent conflict of interests. Thereafter, Paul Heim of the law firm of Hamilton, Flynn & Heim was substituted as counsel for Jones, and represented her at trial. Heim was associated with the Peterson law firm at the time it undertook the representation of Jones and Ryan.

The trial of this matter was commenced on January 3, 1977. At the beginning of the third day of trial, on January 5, 1977, Jones moved to amend her complaint to add Ryan as a defendant in the Jones v. Lines action. Jones' motion was granted, and then Ryan cross-claimed against Lines for contribution and indemnity.

On January 10, 1977, the jury returned a verdict finding Jones to be free of negligence in the operation of her vehicle. The jury determined that Lines was negligent, and that such negligence was a direct cause of 60 percent of his own injuries and 60 percent of the damages sustained by Jones. Ryan was found to be 40 percent responsible for the injuries incurred by Lines and 40 percent responsible for Jones' damages. Damages were set at $8,000 for Jones and $30,000 for Lines.²

The following issues are presented in this case:

(1) Did the trial court err in allowing Ryan to testify regarding an improper lane change when that claim of negligence was not included in Ryan's statement of the case?

(2) Did the trial court err in refusing to admit into evidence the statements of the case filed by Ryan and Jones?

(3) Should the negligence of a person not a party to the litigation be compared with the negligence of the parties?

(4) Is State Farm the real party-in-interest in the Jones v. Lines lawsuit?

(5) Was State Farm authorized to bring an action, in Jones' name, for an amount in excess of the $4,000 State Farm paid Jones?

(6) Was Lines prejudiced by alleged party misconduct?

(7) Did the district court err in consolidating the two actions for trial?

1. Rule 28, Special Rules for Fourth Judicial District (Rule 28), states that a case will not be assigned a ready-for-trial status until a written statement of the case and a Note of Issue — Readiness for Trial have been served and filed in the form provided for by Rule 28. The form of the statement of case is set out in Rule 28E, which requires, in pertinent part, that each party include:

"* * * * *

"d. A concise statement of the party\'s version of the facts of the case including, in accident cases, the date and hour of accident, its location, a brief description of how it occurred and, where appropriate, a simple sketch showing manner of occurrence.

* * * * * * "f. In accident cases all claims of negligence, contributory negligence or assumption of risk, giving claimed statutory violations by statute number. In other cases, a brief summary of party\'s claims.

* * * * * "

The statement of the case filed by Ryan reads, in relevant part, as follows:

"* * * * *

"4. d On Monday, October 15, 1973 at approximately 8:30 P.M. parties were involved in a rear end type accident while proceeding south on 35W at or near the point where 35W proceeds to the west and 62nd street Crosstown proceeds to the east.

* * * * * *

"6. f Plaintiff was operating his vehicle at an unreasonable rate of speed, failed to keep his vehicle under control, failed to keep a proper look-out and was following too closely."

Lines argues that Ryan should not have been allowed to testify that Lines made a sudden lane change just prior to the accident (evidence which the jury no doubt relied upon in arriving at its decision) because the claim was not included in the pertinent portions of Ryan's statement of the case. Although the statement of the case filed by Ryan does not specifically allege that Lines made an improper lane change, this is not a proper ground for Ryan's testimony to be excluded. As the trial court stated in rejecting Lines' contention:

"Obviously, the statement of the case as to the details of the action are intended for the convenience of the court and also possibly for the information of opposing counsel. However, detailed discovery of an opponent\'s position obviously should be obtained through written interrogatories or taking the deposition of the opposing party."

We agree with this interpretation of Rule 28 and accordingly reject Lines' contention.³

2. Lines argues that if Ryan could testify regarding the lane change, then Ryan's statement of the case should be admissible into evidence as an admission or prior inconsistent statement. Although it is doubtful that the statement of the case is admissible into evidence for these purposes,⁴ it is not necessary to reach this issue because the trial court allowed the pertinent portions of the statement of the case to be read to the jury. Thus, in effect, appellant is only challenging the manner in which the evidence was admitted. The document itself was not admitted into evidence because it referred to an insurance company.⁵ Consequently, to avoid any unfair prejudice the trial court limited the manner in which the evidence was received. It is well settled that a trial judge is authorized to so restrict the manner in which evidence is admitted, in order to prevent unfair prejudice. See, Rules 102 and 403, Rules of Evidence.⁶

An evidentiary ruling, such as this, is within the sound discretion of the trial court and, accordingly, this court will not reverse unless it clearly appears that there has been an abuse of discretion. See, Helm v. El Rehbein & Son, Inc., Minn., 257 N.W.2d 584 (1977); E.C.I. Corp. v. G.G.C. Co., 306 Minn. 433, 237 N.W.2d 627 (1976). Since there is no showing that the trial court abused its discretion, the evidentiary ruling is affirmed.

At trial Jones testified that she did not suffer any permanent injuries as a result of the accident. However, in her statement of the case, item 8a states that Jones suffered permanent injuries to her neck and lower back. Lines, therefore, sought to introduce Jones' statement of the case as a prior...