Lingerfelt v. Winn-Dixie Texas, Inc., WINN-DIXIE

• Decision Date: 23 March 1982
• Docket Number: WINN-DIXIE,No. 53233,53233
• Citation: 645 P.2d 485
• Parties: Margaret LINGERFELT and Wesley Lingerfelt, Appellants, v.TEXAS, INC., a corporation, Appellee.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 485

645 P.2d 485

1982 OK 44

Margaret LINGERFELT and Wesley Lingerfelt, Appellants, v. WINN-DIXIE TEXAS, INC., a corporation, Appellee.

No. 53233.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

March 23, 1982.

Rehearing Denied April 27, 1982.

A "slip-and-fall" case in which plaintiff-shopper alleges defendant-store created a foreseeable, unreasonable risk in the manner of packaging and display of produce, thereby negating traditional notice requirement of the specific hazard. Court of Appeals, Division No. 1, reversed and remanded for new trial. We granted certiorari.

CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS REVERSED AND ORDER OF TRIAL COURT REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.

Frank W. Davis, Guthrie, for appellants.

Foliart, Mills & Niemeyer, Oklahoma City, for appellee.

DOOLIN, Justice:

This is a "slip-and-fall" case with a different twist. Shall the traditional "notice" requirement to storekeeper be waived in situations of negligence in the display and packaging of goods? We answer in the affirmative.

Margaret Lingerfelt (Shopper) stopped at defendant's Guthrie store (Store) one Sunday afternoon to pick up a few items. Just inside the front door she noticed a display of strawberries, heaped high in uncovered containers. The strawberries were not covered with cellophane because Store's wrapping machine was broken. While in a different part of the store, Shopper slipped on some strawberries which had fallen on the floor from an unknown source. She suffered extensive injuries and sued Store.

The jury returned a verdict finding each party "0%" negligent and assessed Shopper's damages at $4,636.00.

Shopper appeals, on the single issue of improper instruction. ¹

Shopper requested the following instruction which was denied:

"The burden is on the plaintiff in a slip and fall case to prove by a preponderance of the evidence either that:

1. ...

2. ...

3. It was reasonably foreseeable that dangerous condition was created by or might arise from the means used by a storekeeper to exhibit commodities for sale and that such dangerous condition was the proximate cause of the injuries of plaintiff."

The instruction which the Court gave follows:

"The burden is on the plaintiff in a slip and fall case to prove by a preponderance of the evidence either that:

1. ...

2. ...

3. The fall was proximately caused by a dangerous condition created by the storekeeper or an employee and that such condition existed for a sufficient time for the storekeeper or employee to have had actual or constructive knowledge thereof and to have it removed in the exercise of ordinary case. " (Emphasis added).

The distinction is simple. The Court's instruction required a finding of "notice" of the spilled strawberries; the plaintiff's instruction did not, but in effect called for liability for negligent display or packaging.

Shopper alleges Store was negligent in allowing strawberries to be sold in unwrapped containers heaped so high they could easily fall on the floor at any point in the Store, thus creating a hazard to customers.

Store argues it should be held liable only if it had actual or constructive notice of the strawberries which had fallen on the floor, and Shopper failed to prove such notice. Shopper argues such notice should not be required due to the inherent hazard in the method of packaging and display and customers' habits.

Oklahoma has usually relied on the notice requirement in past "slip and fall" cases involving grocery stores, ² but we have never been presented with a case involving alleged dangerous display and packaging of goods in this fashion.

A recent Oklahoma "slip and fall" case summed up the traditional requirement of notice:

"The pivot of liability sought to be imposed here on the Owner is timely notice of danger. An invitor cannot be held responsible unless it be shown that he/she had notice or could be charged with gaining knowledge of the condition in time sufficient to effect its removal or to give warning of its presence." Rogers v. Hennessee, 602 P.2d 1033 (Okl.1979).

However, in Rogers we also said: "Absent evidence that invitor created the condition or that he/she failed to warn of or remove a peril known to exist, a demurrer must put an end to a 'slip and fall' litigation based on negligence." See 602 P.2d at 1035.

In Rogers a dangerous condition was caused by water spilling from wash sinks in a beauty school. We said the invitor did not create the condition of the spilled water, and had no notice of it, and therefore was not liable.

In Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Feeback, supra footnote 1, the Shopper slipped on some carrots on the floor of the store near the vegetable counter. Shopper presented no evidence of negligence of the store or its employees and we said, "Unless it is established that customer slipped on store floor through negligence of store owner's employees, or because of condition of which owner had actual or constructive notice, there can be no recovery." ³

In Fuller v. Rahill, supra footnote 1, Shopper slipped on some fruit near the produce rack in the store. We denied liability on the grounds the Shopper failed to prove the store employees either placed the offending fruit on the floor or caused it to fall there through their negligence.

Shopper points to a trend ⁴ in some jurisdictions which hold stores liable for the spills of their self-service customers, regardless of actual notice and failure to clean up. The cases call for a higher standard of care in self-service facilities, whether supermarkets or cafeterias. A leading case in this line is Ciminski v. Finn Corporation, 13 Wash.App. 815, 537 P.2d 850, 85 A.L.R.3d 991 (1975), wherein a cafeteria customer slipped on a spilled liquid while walking through the line. Ciminski turned on the fact that the cafeteria had no written policy on maintenance; employees were often reminded to look out for food on the floor and told to clean it up immediately upon discovery. No one employee was responsible for policing the area. The Ciminski court concluded:

"Requiring the owner of a self-service operation to exercise reasonable care in protecting his business invitees from the foreseeable risks of his method of doing business does not make such owner an insurer of those on his premises. If he has taken all precautions reasonably necessary to protect his invitees from injury, he is not liable merely because someone is injured on his property."

The court concluded that Mrs. Ciminski's evidence "created a genuine issue as to whether Finn had taken reasonable precautions for her safety." The court did not dispense with the notice requirement; it expanded it: "An owner of a self-service operation has actual notice of these problems (shoppers handle goods and may not be as careful as store employees.) In choosing a self-service method of providing items, he is charged with the knowledge of the foreseeable risks inherent in such a mode of operation .... An owner is required to take reasonable precautions against such deceptive conditions on his premises to prevent injury to patrons."

"This rule does not create a higher standard of care for self-service operations. It is axiomatic that a property owner or occupier is required to use reasonable care toward his business invitees. What is reasonable depends upon the nature and the circumstances surrounding the business conducted. One of the circumstances to be considered is the method of operation."

Shopper, by citing the rationale of Ciminski, supra, would have us hold Store strictly liable for injuries caused by spilled produce, regardless of how and by whom the produce was spilled and regardless of notice of the spillage and/or opportunity to clean it up, simply because Store adopted the self- service mode of display. This we cannot do. We do not view self-service display, in and of itself, so inherently dangerous to warrant imposition of a strict liability doctrine. In today's marketing climate the store owner has no other choice; he cannot revert back to method of selling of our grandparents' days. To do so would invite competitive problems.

He can, however, maintain as safe a shopping environment as possible, self-service and shopping habits taken into account. In fact, he owes such a duty to his shopper. To do otherwise, by the display of goods in an unsafe or negligent manner, invites liability on grounds he had at least constructive notice of the dangerous condition. When a shopper has shown that circumstances were such as to create the reasonable probability that a dangerous condition (e.g. uncovered, heaped strawberries), would occur, the invitee need not also prove that the business proprietor had notice of the specific hazard (spilled strawberries) in order to show the proprietor breached his duty of due care to the invitee. Bozza v. Vornado, Inc., 42 N.J. 335, 200 A.2d 777 (1964).

That the strawberries, heaped up in an uncovered basket, created a condition prior to the accident cannot be disputed, but was it such a "condition" that liability can be predicated thereon? The proper rule is set forth in Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of Tulsa v. Von Brady, 386 P.2d 993, 996 (Okl.1963), wherein this Court said:

"Liability cannot be predicated on a prior and remote cause which merely furnishes the condition or occasion for an injury resulting from an intervening unrelated and efficient cause, even though the injury would not have resulted but for such condition or occasion; but a condition from which injury might have been anticipated or which rendered the avoidance of injury impossible will be the proximate cause notwithstanding an intervening agency." (Emphasis supplied).

The above rule is not new to Oklahoma. It was cited with approval in Spicers, Inc. v. Rudd, 199 Okl. 576, 188 P.2d 692 (Okl.1947). Spicers cited a 1911 case for the following, "The rule seems to be that where the negligent act causes consequences such as in the ordinary course of things, were likely to...