Link v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co.
Decision Date | 16 September 1930 |
Docket Number | 12974. |
Parties | LINK v. SEABOARD AIR LINE RY. CO. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Abbeville County; H. F Rice, Judge.
Action by E. B. Link against the Seaboard Air Line Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Thos F. McDow, of York, and Wm. P. Greene, of Abbeville, for appellant.
Price & Poag, of Greenville, and J. Moore Mars, of Abbeville, for respondent.
This action was brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCA§ § 51-59) for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been received by the plaintiff while in the employment, as a brakeman, of the defendant railway company. At the time of the alleged injury both plaintiff and defendant were engaged in interstate commerce. The plaintiff alleges that on January 26, 1927 between 1 and 3 o'clock in the morning, while in the performance of his duties as brakeman, at Belt Junction, Ga., he was seriously and permanently injured in the following manner:
The following are some of the particulars in which it is alleged the defendant was negligent:
The defendant, answering, denied the material allegations of the complaint, and alleged that the injuries received by the plaintiff were due solely to his own negligence, and pleaded the defense of assumption of risk.
The case was tried at the April, 1929, term of the court of common pleas for Abbeville county before Judge H. F. Rice and a jury. The defendant's motions for a nonsuit and for a directed verdict were refused, and the case was submitted to the jury, who found for the plaintiff $15,000. From judgment entered on the verdict the defendant appeals.
While the exceptions are numerous, the questions raised are few, and may be thus stated: (1) Did the court commit error in refusing the defendant's motion for a directed verdict, made upon the grounds (a) that there was no evidence of actionable negligence, (b) that the negligence of the plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his injury, and (c) that the plaintiff assumed the risk of the injuries sustained by him? (2) Did the court err in his charge to the jury?
As to subdivision (a) of the first question, the respondent contends that this is a case to which the Safety Appliance Act applies, and, as a distinct violation of that act was shown by the testimony adduced, the court was bound to submit the question to the jury.
The appellant contends that, "whether the case be one for negligence at common law, or whether the case be regarded as one founded upon negligence for a violation of the Federal Appliance Act, the burden is upon the plaintiff to show by such evidence as will satisfy the Court that the case should be submitted to the jury," and that "no facts were produced by the respondent going to show that the brake furnished by the appellant in this case was either defective, inefficient, or out of repair, and that plaintiff's own testimony shows that the proximate cause of his injuries was not from any such cause, even if there had been evidence as to such fact."
An examination of the testimony discloses that the plaintiff had been employed as a brakeman by the defendant company for a number of years, and that at the time of his injury he was working on a freight train on a run between Howells, Ga., and Abbeville, S. C., and that his injury occurred while he was engaged in switching operations at Belt Junction, Ga. He testified that, when the train reached Belt Junction, it was "headed in" for the purpose of picking up some cars at that point; that he coupled up the enginge to the cars that were next to him and "cut the air in"; and that the flagman, who was back at the crossing, coupled the cars and "cut the air in there," and gave the signal to come out; that plaintiff then threw the switch and signalled the engineer to back up but it was found that he could not do so, for the reason that the brake on the end car was not released, which hindered the movement or progress of the train; that the end car was a coal car equipped with a patented brake-- a hand brake operated by a lever--known as the W. H. Miner brake; that, when he observed the brake was on, he climbed up the side of the car, carrying with him his lantern and brake stick, and stood upon a narrow platform at the end of the car, and attempted to release the brake with his hand, but that it was jambed or set so tight that he could not do so when he pulled the lever; that he then applied his brake stick behind the catch, whereupon the brake was released so suddenly and with such force that he was knocked from the platform to the ground, where he was run over by the train and seriously and permanently injured. He further testified that there was nothing in the rule book of the company prohibiting the use of brake sticks; that all of the brakemen used them, and that their superior officers knew of that practice and made no objection, and that, in attempting to release the brake, he was simply doing his duty as a brakeman. He also testified that the brake...
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Sessions v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.
... ... case of Delk v. St. L. & S. F. R. Co., 220 U.S. 580, ... 31 S.Ct. 617, 55 L.Ed. 590 ... In the ... case of Link v. Seaboard Air Line Railway Co., 159 ... S.C. 538, 156 S.E. 481, 483, Mr. Justice Stabler, for the ... court, said: "It is now settled beyond ... ...