Linn v. Oconto Cnty.
| Decision Date | 07 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 22-C-434 |
| Parties | DANIEL VAN LINN, Plaintiff, v. OCONTO COUNTY and NICHOLAS SCHOOL, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin |
DECISION AND ORDER
This is a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which the plaintiff claims that a deputy sheriff violated his Fourth Amendment rights by ordering a warrantless blood draw at the hospital to determine his blood alcohol concentration after he crashed his vehicle and was arrested for Fifth Time Operating While Intoxicated (OWI 5th). The case is before the court on cross motions for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the defendants' motion will be granted and the plaintiff's denied.
Shortly before 2:00 a.m. on March 26, 2017, Daniel Van Linn made a 911 call to report that he had been involved in a multi-vehicle accident and that there were injuries. Defs.' Proposed Findings of Fact (DPFOF) ¶ 6. The location Van Linn gave was in rural Oconto County on Section 4 Lane in the Town of Mountain, Wisconsin. Id. ¶ 7. Oconto County Deputy Sheriff Nicholas School was the first law enforcement officer to arrive at the location at 2:18 a.m. Id. ¶ 9. Upon his arrival, Deputy School did not observe any vehicles. Eventually, he discovered a white Suzuki SUV some distance off the roadway that had apparently crashed into someone's unoccupied cabin. Id. ¶ 14; Dkt. No. 17-2 at 3-5. Following the apparent path of the vehicle, it was determined that the SUV had crossed over the centerline of Section 4 Lane into the ditch on the south side of the road and struck a tree. It then returned to the road, crossed both lanes of traffic into the ditch on the north side of the road, traveled across a service road, into an open field, and crashed into the structure where it finally stopped. No one was occupying the vehicle when Deputy School came upon it, but blood could be seen on the inside. DPFOF ¶¶ 15-16.
At 2:38 a.m., Deputy School learned from a radio transmission that an individual had been located on the south side of Section 4 between 200 and 250 yards from the crashed SUV. Id. ¶ 17. Deputy School proceeded to that location where he observed a male, later identified as Daniel Van Linn, with cuts on his hands and face, receiving emergency medical care from Mountain Ambulance personnel. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. Van Linn's speech was slurred, and he was difficult to understand. Deputy School detected the odor of alcohol on Van Linn's breath but spoke to him very briefly because Van Linn was having a hard time breathing and appeared to be in severe pain. Id. ¶¶ 20-21. Van Linn told Deputy School that he had been out for a walk and denied that he had been driving. He also stated that he had consumed a couple of beers. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. Deputy School reasonably concluded from other statements Van Linn made and the surrounding circumstances that there was probable cause to arrest Van Linn for OWI. Id. ¶¶ 25-26.
Mountain Ambulance personnel began transporting Van Linn to St Clare's Memorial Hospital, located in Oconto Falls, at 2:58 a.m. Id. ¶ 30. During the transport, the ambulance was diverted from St. Clare's Memorial Hospital to ThedaCare Medical Center, a trauma center located in the City of Shawano in adjoining Shawano County. Id. ¶ 32. The ambulance carrying Van Linn arrived at ThedaCare Medical Center at 3:46 a.m., and Deputy School arrived less than five minutes later. Id. ¶ 38.
Deputy School saw Van Linn in the emergency room of the hospital and advised him at that time that he was under arrest for OWI 5th. Id. ¶ 39. Deputy School read to Van Linn an “Informing the Accused” form and requested his consent to submit to a chemical analysis of his blood alcohol content (BAC). See Wis.Stat. § 343.305(4). Van Linn refused to consent. Id. ¶¶ 40-41. Deputy School then telephoned Lieutenant Keven Thomson to discuss the surrounding circumstances and determine whether exigent circumstances existed so as to allow them to proceed with a warrantless blood draw. They concluded that such circumstances did exist, and Deputy School directed medical personnel at ThedaCare Medical Center to draw a sample of Van Linn's blood. The blood draw was performed at 4:15 a.m Id. ¶¶ 41-43. The results of the blood test revealed that Van Linn's BAC was 0.226, almost three times the legal limit and more than eleven times the legal limit for a person with four prior convictions for OWI. See Wis.Stat. § 340.01(46m)(a) (2019-20); State v. Van Linn, 2022 WI 16, ¶¶ 3-4, 401 Wis.2d 1, 971 N.W.2d 478. Law enforcement also determined that Van Linn's driving privileges had been previously revoked. Van Linn, 401 Wis.2d 1, at ¶ 3.
In the State criminal prosecution against him for OWI 5th, Van Linn moved to suppress the results of the blood draw on the ground that the search was illegal. The circuit court granted Van Linn's motion, rejecting the State's argument that the blood draw was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.[1]Id. at ¶ 6. The State chose not to appeal the circuit court's ruling that the warrantless blood draw violated Van Linn's Fourth Amendment rights and instead subpoenaed the hospital's records which included its diagnostic blood test. Id. at ¶¶ 7-8. After unsuccessfully seeking the suppression of the hospital records, Van Linn pleaded guilty to the charge of OWI 5th and appealed the circuit court's denial of his motion to suppress the hospital records. Both the Wisconsin Court of Appeals and the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected his challenge and affirmed his conviction. Id. at ¶ 19.
In his federal civil rights suit, Van Linn claims that Deputy School violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment by subjecting him to an unlawful search and seizure when he ordered a phlebotomist to draw his blood against his will and without a warrant. He alleges that Deputy School knew that the search was not justified by exigent circumstances and that he acted with callous indifference to Van Linn's federal protected rights. He seeks both compensatory and punitive damages, as well as his costs and attorneys' fees. And because Deputy School was acting within the scope of his employment at the time he violated his rights, Van Linn claims that Oconto County has a duty to indemnify him for any judgment entered against him under Wis.Stat. § 895.46.
Summary judgment shall be granted when the movant shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and make all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Johnson v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Parker v. Four Seasons Hotels, Ltd., 845 F.3d 807, 812 (7th Cir. 2017)). The party opposing the motion for summary judgment must “submit evidentiary materials that set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 612 F.3d 932, 937 (7th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). “The nonmoving party must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Id. Summary judgment is properly entered against a party “who fails to make a showing to establish the existence of an element essential to the party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Austin v. Walgreen Co., 885 F.3d 1085, 1087-88 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ....” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A blood draw is a search of the person. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148 (2013). By its terms, the Fourth Amendment does not require that law enforcement officers obtain a warrant before conducting a search; however, the Supreme Court has inferred that a warrant is generally required, subject to several exceptions the Court has recognized over the years. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438, 456 (2016).
One such exception occurs when there are exigent circumstances. “The exigent circumstances exception allows a warrantless search when an emergency leaves police insufficient time to seek a warrant.” Id. (citing Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)). “It permits, for instance, the warrantless entry of private property when there is a need to provide urgent aid to those inside, when police are in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect, and when police fear the imminent destruction of evidence.” Id. (citing Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S.452, 460 (2011)). When such an emergency arises, “[a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978). Ultimately, the reasonableness of the officer's determination that the circumstances justifying the warrantless search existed “‘must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight' and ‘[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.'” Ryburn v. Huff, 565 U.S. 469, 477 (2012) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-397 (1989)).
In Schmerber, the Court upheld a warrantless blood draw under circumstances remarkably similar to those in this case. In ...
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