Parker v. Four Seasons Hotels, Ltd.

• Decision Date: 06 January 2017
• Docket Number: No. 16-1244,16-1244
• Citation: 845 F.3d 807
• Parties: Diane PARKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FOUR SEASONS HOTELS, LIMITED, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

845 F.3d 807

Diane PARKER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.FOUR SEASONS HOTELS, LIMITED, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-1244

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued September 27, 2016

Decided January 6, 2017

Diane Parker, Venetia, PA, Pro Se.

David A. Izzo, Attorney, David A. Izzo & Associates, Chicago, IL, for Defendant–Appellee.

Before Bauer, Rovner, and Hamilton, Circuit Judges.

Rovner, Circuit Judge.

Diane Parker was injured when a sliding glass door in the bathroom of her Four Seasons Hotel room shattered. The hotel admitted negligence and a jury awarded Parker $20,000 in compensatory damages, which was reduced to $12,000 after a motion for set-off was granted. The district court declined Parker's request to put the question of punitive damages to the jury, finding her evidence insufficient as a matter of law. We reverse and remand for further proceedings on the question of punitive damages.

I.

Four Seasons asserts that the federal courts lack jurisdiction over this diversity suit because the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000, citing the ultimate award of $12,000. But the requirements for diversity jurisdiction (including the amount in controversy) must be satisfied only at the time the suit is filed. Rosado v. Wyman , 397 U.S. 397, 405 n.6, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970) (noting the well-settled rule that a federal court does not lose jurisdiction over a diversity action which was well founded at the outset even though one of the parties may later change domicile or the amount recovered falls short of the statutory threshold); St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co. , 303 U.S. 283, 289–90, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938) ("Events occurring subsequent to the institution of suit which reduce the amount recoverable below the statutory limit do not oust jurisdiction."). Four Seasons does not deny that, when Parker filed her complaint, she brought claims in apparent good faith for compensatory and punitive damages exceeding $150,000. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 547, 553, 190 L.Ed.2d 495 (2014) ("When a plaintiff invokes federal-court jurisdiction, the plaintiff's amount-in-controversy allegation is accepted if made in good faith."); Meridian Sec. Ins. Co. v. Sadowski , 441 F.3d 536, 541 (7th Cir. 2006) (once the facts supporting the amount in controversy have been established, the proponent's estimate of the claim's value must be accepted unless there is legal certainty that the controversy's value is below the threshold). Parker's claimed damages are well in excess of the requisite amount, and federal jurisdiction is secure.

We turn to the facts, which we will simplify to focus on the issue at hand. Parker and her sister, Cindy Schiavon, checked into the Four Seasons on April 27, 2007, requesting adjoining rooms. After a short delay at the desk, Parker was assigned to room 3627 and her sister was given the room next door. In Parker's room, a sliding glass door separated the shower area from the vanity area.¹ On the day after check-in, Parker took a shower and attempted to exit the shower area by opening the glass door. As she slid the door, it exploded suddenly, raining shards of glass onto her naked body and causing her injuries. Parker's sister summoned help from the front desk. Shortly thereafter, Joseph Gartin, an engineer employed by the hotel, arrived to investigate the incident. According to Schiavon's affidavit, Gartin:

immediately looked up at the overhead track and said: "Looks like the stopper moved again!" ... He explained that the hotel had recently undergone renovations, and that a "bunch" of the newly installed sliding glass doors had exploded because the overhead track stoppers were not working properly. That allowed the door-handles to crash into the walls and cause the glass doors to explode. This was one of the rooms on the "do not sell" list. You might want to check yours.

R. 101-7, at 2. Taking Gartin's advice, Schiavon checked the sliding door in her bathroom in the adjoining room and determined that it suffered from the same defect.

Parker also uncovered evidence suggesting that the sliding door in her room had shattered before the incident that caused her injury, and that the door had been replaced. An October 2007 email between third party contractors working on door breakage issues revealed that several rooms configured in the same manner as Parker's room had similar issues:

Bob-

Here is an update from Contract Mirror & Supply on the shower doors at the Four Seasons. CMS installed 150 tub doors, 136 shower doors, and 136 sliding barn doors during the renovation. We have had one shower door break (room 4401) and five sliding glass barn doors break (rooms 3427, 3527, 3627 twice, and 4419). The cause of the shower door breakage was identified and all of the shower doors were inspected to be sure that there were no additional problems. Since the X27 rooms represent 80% of the barn door failures these rooms were examined to identify what was different in these rooms that may have caused the problems. The thicker wall construction in this room leaves less clearance for the door (+/- ½? clearance versus +/- 1? in other rooms) and the tight tolerance may contribute to the breakage because the door may deflect up to ½? if someone pulls on the door while operating it which would allow the corner of the glass to hit the stone. CMS has been working with Jim DeFily to add corner protection to the glass to protect the corners in the event of impact and CMS is also researching a continuous bottom guide that was suggested by the hotel.

R. 101-2.²

The hotel conceded negligence and so the only issue for trial was damages. But Four Seasons moved to block Parker from raising the issue of punitive damages before the jury, contending that her evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to present that claim to the jury. The district court agreed, and after trial, Parker recovered $20,000 in compensatory damages which was reduced to $12,000 after set-off. Parker appeals.

II.

Parker proceeded pro se through much of the litigation in the district court and also represented herself in this appeal. A trial court is obligated to liberally construe a pro se plaintiff's pleadings. Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) ; Kelley v. Zoeller , 800 F.3d 318, 325 (7th Cir. 2015) ; Nichols v. Michigan City Plant Planning Dept. , 755 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2014). On appeal, we too construe pro se filings liberally, and will address any cogent arguments we are able to discern in a pro se appellate brief. Anderson v. Hardman , 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001). The Honorable Harry Leinenweber oversaw the case from filing in April 2012 until July 2014, when it was transferred to the newly forming docket of the recently appointed Honorable Manish S. Shah. Shortly before his transfer off the case, Judge Leinenweber ruled on the Four Seasons' motion for summary judgment. Faced with the plaintiff's rambling pro se complaint, a document that did not set forth any particular counts, Judge Leinenweber liberally construed the document and inferred six possible causes of action under Illinois law: premises liability, common law fraud, violation of the Illinois Safety Glazing Materials Act and the Chicago Municipal Code, negligence in the installation of the sliding glass doors, spoliation of the evidence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Judge Leinenweber granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all of these claims except premises liability.

Under Illinois law, property owners owe to their invitees a duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition. Ward v. K M art Corp. , 136 Ill.2d 132, 143 Ill.Dec. 288, 554 N.E.2d 223, 227 (1990). See also Marshall v. Burger King Corp. , 222 Ill.2d 422, 305 Ill.Dec. 897, 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1058 (2006). In a premises liability action, a plaintiff has the burden of proving: (1) the existence of a condition that presents an unreasonable risk of harm to persons on the premises; (2) that the defendants knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm; (3) that the defendants should have anticipated that individuals on the premises would fail to discover or recognize the danger or otherwise fail to protect themselves against it; (4) a negligent act or omission on the part of the defendant; (5) an injury suffered by the plaintiff; and (6) that the condition of the property was a proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff. Jordan v. National Steel Corp. , 183 Ill.2d 448, 233 Ill.Dec. 818, 701 N.E.2d 1092, 1094 (1998) ; Mueller v. Phar – Mor, Inc. , 336 Ill.App.3d 659, 271 Ill.Dec. 8, 784 N.E.2d 226, 231 (2000). Judge Leinenweber concluded that Schiavon's affidavit and the contractor's email provided sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment on a premises liability claim. The court did not specifically address whether Parker's premises liability claim was limited to compensatory damages for negligence or whether she could also seek punitive damages for wilful and wanton conduct.

After the case had been transferred to the docket of Judge Shah and shortly before trial, Four Seasons submitted a motion seeking to prohibit the plaintiff from presenting a claim for punitive damages to the jury. Although the hotel characterized its filing as a motion in limine , it was really a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages, and the district court appeared to treat it as such. Judge Shah considered whether Parker had presented sufficient evidence to meet the standard for punitive damages under Illinois law, specifically whether she had evidence of wilful and wanton conduct by the defendant. Judge Shah agreed with Judge Leinenweber that Parker had sufficient evidence to present to the jury a premises liability claim founded on negligence but concluded that the same evidence was insufficient as a matter of law...