Linn v. State (In re Linn)

• Decision Date: 17 February 2012
• Docket Number: No. 2D09–5181.,2D09–5181.
• Citation: 79 So.3d 783
• Parties: In re INVOLUNTARY PLACEMENT OF Mark LINN.Mark Linn, Appellant, v. State of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

79 So.3d 783

In re INVOLUNTARY PLACEMENT OF Mark LINN.Mark Linn, Appellant,

v.State of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2D09–5181.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Dec. 14, 2011.Rehearing Denied Feb. 17, 2012.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Richard P. Albertine, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Caroline Johnson Levine, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

ALTENBERND, Judge.

Mark Linn appeals an order involuntarily placing him in a mental health treatment facility. This order is a commitment order entered by the probate court. The probate court entered this order shortly after another circuit court judge dismissed a criminal case against Mr. Linn that had been pending for five years. The judge in the criminal court case had committed Mr. Linn to the Department of Children and Family Services for involuntary hospitalization under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.213(b). The broader issue presented by this case is what, if any, additional evidentiary hearing is required in the probate court following such a dismissal and commitment. Unfortunately, our record does not contain sufficient information for this court confidently to reach a legal resolution of this broader issue. On the record before us, we conclude that the probate court's order is based on incorrect legal reasoning. We reverse and remand for the probate court to reconsider its order.¹

In early 2004, the State charged Mr. Linn with throwing a deadly missile at or into a building. See § 790.19, Fla. Stat. (2003).² In August 2004, the criminal court determined that he was incompetent to proceed and committed him to DCF until his competency could be restored to the level that would permit a trial. From our limited record, it is apparent that Mr. Linn was evaluated by at least three qualified experts at that time and that two of them opined that he was incompetent to proceed. The State placed Mr. Linn in the North Florida Evaluation and Treatment Center.

Mr. Linn's competency was not restored during the following five years. In August 2009, his attorney filed a motion to dismiss under rule 3.213(b), which states, in pertinent part:

If at any time after 5 years following a determination that a person is incompetent to stand trial ... when charged with a felony, ... the court, after hearing, determines that the defendant remains incompetent to stand trial ..., that there is no substantial probability that the defendant will become mentally competent to stand trial ... in the foreseeable future, and that the defendant does meet the criteria for commitment, the court shall dismiss the charges against the defendant and commit the defendant to the Department of Children and Family Services for involuntary hospitalization or residential services solely under the provisions of law.... In the order of commitment, the judge shall order that the administrator of the facility notify the state attorney of the committing circuit no less than 30 days prior to the anticipated date of release of the defendant. If charges are dismissed pursuant to this subdivision, the dismissal shall be without prejudice to the state to refile the charges should the defendant be declared competent to proceed in the future.

Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.213(b)(1). The court in the criminal case held a hearing on the motion on August 27, 2009. The transcript of that hearing reflects that it was perfunctory and that the State had no objection to the motion. The trial court immediately entered an order dismissing the criminal proceeding and transferring Mr. Linn to DCF for further proceedings in accordance with chapter 394, Florida Statutes (2009).

As a result of the order in the criminal proceeding, Mr. Linn was transferred to a mental health facility in Pinellas County. Mr. Linn was admitted to the facility as a voluntary patient, which appears to have been an oversight because section 394.4625(1)(d) prohibited his admission as a voluntary patient. A few days later, the administrator of that facility filed a petition for involuntary placement. The matter was immediately referred to a general magistrate for a hearing under section 394.467. This hearing is commonly referred to as a Baker Act hearing.

At the beginning of the hearing, the parties disagreed on the scope of the hearing. The State took the position that the order dismissing the criminal proceeding had specifically found that Mr. Linn met the criteria for commitment under the Baker Act and that this order was binding on the magistrate. Mr. Linn's attorney maintained that Mr. Linn was entitled to receive a completely new involuntary commitment hearing. The attorneys provided no legal authority, and the issue does not appear to have a clear answer in the law.

The magistrate prudently did not accept the State's position at the beginning of this hearing. She conducted an evidentiary hearing and considered the testimony of five witnesses, including Mr. Linn's then-current treating physician who advocated for his continued commitment. Thereafter, the magistrate prepared a typical report and recommendation. Although the magistrate relied on the treating physician's testimony to determine that Mr. Linn was not competent and that his status as a voluntary patient was incorrect, the magistrate decided that the order entered by the criminal court a month earlier was dispositive of Mr. Linn's need for civil commitment. The probate court entered an order adopting the magistrate's findings and recommendations. It expressly concluded that the criminal court order was a valid and enforceable placement order for purposes of chapter 394. Mr. Linn appealed.

On appeal, Mr. Linn argues that reversible error occurred because he was involuntarily committed under the Baker Act based on the criminal court's August 2009 order, which was entered, in essence, on a stipulated order of dismissal. The State makes two arguments in response.

First, the State argues that the order from the criminal court must be given collateral estoppel...