Linse v. Linse

Decision Date08 June 1906
Docket Number14,769 - (143)
Citation108 N.W. 8,98 Minn. 243
PartiesAUGUSTA LINSE v. CARL LINSE
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Steele county, Buckham, J., denying a motion for a new trial, after a trial and findings in favor of plaintiff for a partition as prayed. Reversed and judgment ordered for defendant.

SYLLABUS

Divorce -- Wife's Interest in Husband's Property.

When divorce from the husband is granted to the wife upon the ground of adultery, her interest in the husband's estate is the same as upon his death. Holmes v. Holmes, 54 Minn. 352.

Division of Property -- Effect.

But if in such action the wife freely and advisedly consents to a certain division of the estate and agrees to accept a certain amount as permanent alimony in lieu of all other interests and such division is accepted and adopted by the trial court and judgment is entered that, except as to such amount, the wife has no share or interest in the husband's estate, such judgment is final unless set aside for cause, and, having accepted and retained the amount adjudged as permanent alimony, she is estopped from denying the validity of the judgment.

Littleton & Alexander and Harlan E. Leach, for appellant.

B. F. Hood and Sawyer & Sperry, for respondent.

OPINION

LEWIS, J.

Action in partition, commenced by respondent against her former husband, based upon the theory that she was entitled to a life estate in the homestead and to an undivided one-third interest in all of his real estate, notwithstanding the final judgment in divorce proceedings which decreed her a certain amount in lieu of all other interests in his estate.

The complaint sets forth the marriage of the parties, the ownership of appellant of certain land, a part of which constituted the homestead, and that a decree of divorce was entered March 8, 1904, in favor of respondent and against appellant upon the ground of adultery.

The answer alleged that during 1900, while the parties were living together as husband and wife respondent was seeking a separation, and making charges against appellant, and threatening to bring an action for divorce, appellant deeded to her one hundred twenty acres of land, the same being an equitable division of his property at that time, as a result of which no action was brought at that time, and respondent retained the property. The answer further states that at the time a subsequent action in divorce came on for trial in January, 1904, appellant and respondent entered into an agreement to the effect that respondent should retain the real property which had been deeded to her, and receive the further sum of $1,115 in cash, and in case a decree of divorce was entered in her favor the property so deeded and the money so received would be considered as her whole right, title, and interest in and to his estate; that thereupon the cause came on for trial, resulting in judgment for divorce upon the grounds stated, which in part reads:

That the plaintiff do have and recover of the defendant the sum of $1,150.85, as permanent alimony, and the costs and disbursements of this action, which sum is hereby made a specific lien upon the property of the said Carl Linse, defendant herein, and is to be paid within thirty days after the 8th day of March, 1904, which said property of defendant is described as follows, to wit: * * * It is further hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that, except as above herein provided, the plaintiff has no share, right, title, or interest in or to any of the property owned by or in the name of the defendant, and that the defendant has no share, right, title, or interest in or to any of the property owned by or in the name of the plaintiff.

To this answer a reply was interposed which admitted entry of the judgment in the divorce case, and alleged that the agreement as to the division of the real estate was procured by appellant from respondent by means of fraud and coercion while she was in ignorance of her legal rights in the premises, and that she signed the stipulation only under duress and in fear of appellant.

The court found that, prior to the entry of such judgment, the parties to such action entered into the stipulation referred to and that respondent was represented by an attorney of the court; appellant having made no appearance. The court also found that the stipulation for division of the property was not procured from respondent by reason of fraud or coercion on the part of appellant, but was executed by her with full knowledge of its provisions, and was her free act. The court further found that upon a former occasion appellant had deeded to his then wife the one hundred twenty acres of land worth $60 an acre, on account of which conveyance respondent dismissed the action...

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