Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist.
| Decision Date | 28 March 1960 |
| Citation | 4 Cal.Rptr. 8 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Natalle M. LIPMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BRISBANE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Ellen Bhend, Margaret Galten, Edward R. Whitson, Individually and as Trustees or former Trustees of the Brisbane Elementary School District, James Tormey, Keith Sorenson, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 18576. |
Barnett & Robertson, Rodney Robertson, San Francisco, for appellant.
Keith C. Sorenson, Dist. Atty., L. M. Summey, Deputy Dist. Atty., Redwood City, for respondents.
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment in favor of all defendants which was based on an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend. The demurrer was to the original complaint. The defendants are a school district, trustees of the school district, a county superintendent of schools, and the district attorney, some being sued as officials, others as individuals, others in both capacities. There is a brief statement of the decision of the court as follows: 'The immunity from civil liability appearing on the face of the Complaint the Demurrer must be sustained without leave to amend.'
The complaint purports to state six causes of action, but three of these, the second, fourth and sixth, simply state that actions of certain defendants which are described in the other causes were done maliciously, and contain demands for punitive damages. The fifth cause, too, relates solely to damages, namely, loss of future earnings. The gravamen of plaintiff's contentions, then, appears in the remaining causes, the first and third, and the court's task is limited to deciding whether either of these states a cause of action or, if neither does, whether it was error to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend.
Plaintiff was employed by defendant Brisbane Elementary School District first as teacher, then as principal, and finally as school district superintendent, during the years from 1931 to 1958. In 1958 the district executed a new contract, employing plaintiff for the period from July 1, 1958, to June 30, 1962. Plaintiff did not sign the contract, but her re-employment became effective by operation of law, under section 1303.2 of the Education Code, 1 which provides that a superintendent is deemed re-elected if notice of termination is not given at least six months before expiration of his term.
On June 27, 1958, plaintiff filed a claim against the school district and its trustees for damages 'due to the total breach and repudiation of her contract of employment by the official action and wilful course of conduct of the majority of the Board of Trustees rendering it impossible for her to perform said contract of employment.' The claim was not acted on within 30 days, and plaintiff deemed it rejected and commenced the action.
In the paragraphs following this one, we shall give the specification of charges made against the various defendants, in the best arrangement we can make of them, for they are spread over several pages of the complaint, and many of them are repeated in the several causes. In summary, all of these charges put together state that the defendants conspired to make it impossible for plaintiff to perform her contract with the school district, that they made defamatory statements against her, that they engaged in harassing conduct, and that they succeeded, by ruining her usefulness, in preventing her from carrying on her contract. This was done, according to the complaint, with malice on the part of the individual defendants. Damages, actual and exemplary, are demanded.
Conformably with the law relating to demurrer, we accept, for present purposes, all of the following allegations as true.
Under this heading we give the charges against the trustees, with the exception of those charges in which the district attorney or the county superintendent are joined with the trustees, and which are under separate headings. It is alleged that three of the school trustees conspired to make it impossible for plaintiff to perform her duties and that they took these means of accomplishing their purpose: (a) They held secret meetings attended by school employees, including the principal of the school, at which they stated that plaintiff: (1) had suppressed facts from the board of trustees; (2) had suppressed, tampered with minutes of board meetings; (3) was receiving 'kickbacks' from school employees; (4) had used school employees and school time to engage in political campaigns; (5) had ordered school employees to pay certain attorneys' fees which had been incurred in a dispute with an extralegal committee which apparently had interested itself in school affairs; (6) was engaged in 'shady dealings' concerning the school district, for her personal profit. (b) Said trustees caused to be circulated and to be published in the public press statements that plaintiff: (1) was dictatorial; (2) had concealed facts from the board; (3) was overpaid; (4) was dishonest, and (5) had received 'kickbacks' from school employees. (c) The trustees urged the district attorney and the county superintendent of schools to conduct an investigation of plaintiff's administration, stating that they were desirous of discovering charges so that plaintiff could be discharged, and they caused an architect and certain contractors to be informed that the grand jury was investigating plaintiff's use of construction funds, although no such grand jury investigation was going on. (d) Said trustees told plaintiff she should resign and informed the public that they had so told plaintiff. (e) Said trustees bypassed plaintiff and counseled with school employees on business which was within plaintiff's duties. (f) Said trustees urged that the public come to school board meetings for the purpose of preventing plaintiff from performing her duties, which resulted in her being harassed by citizens who attended and made statements impugning her honesty and reputation, using data supplied by the trustees. (g) Said trustees caused dismissal of a private auditing firm which the trustees had directed plaintiff to hire, in order to imply that plaintiff had hired the firm in an attempt to conceal alleged irregularities. (h) Said trustees told certain 'private interviewers': (1) that plaintiff had received 'kickbacks' and exacted legal fees from employees; (2) that she had 'cleaned up' on business transactions involving the district, and (3) that they were seeking to have a previously dismissed criminal action against plaintiff reopened because 'there were many things fishy about it.' (i) Said trustees stated to members of the public that they had urged the contract with plaintiff only because the district attorney had directed them to do so but that they would 'put an end to her.' (j) Said trustees stated to the press and to the public that plaintiff had concealed the fact that the district custodian had received a check for $50 for work done at the district's recreation center so that plaintiff could collect a 'kickback' from the custodian.
Following this specification of charges, there are allegations that all of the acts were done by the three trustees as a majority of the board and in the scope of their duties, that they were done for the purpose of inducting plaintiff to break her contract or to render it impossible for her to perform her duties, and that the conduct of the trustees so maligned plaintiff's reputation, character, and integrity and so undermined her reputation with other employees of the school district as to render it impossible for plaintiff to perform her duties.
At the end of the above allegations it is alleged that 'therefore said Contract of Employment has been totally breached by said School District.'
All of the allegations set forth above appear in the first cause of action. The school district is named as a defendant in that cause.
In the third cause of action, the three trustees who were named in the first cause are named again. There is some repetition of charges against them, but for the most part, the third cause describes acts of the trustees in conjunction with the county superintendent and with the district attorney. It is alleged that: (a) The three trustees held secret meetings at which they announced that they were going to 'dig up' whatever facts they could to effect plaintiff's discharge; (b) They met with the superintendent, Tormey, and agreed to re-open criminal proceedings against plaintiff; (c) Tormey caused a member of his staff to inform an architect, contractors and a bonding firm that there was a grand jury investigation of sums spent on school construction, though there was no such grand jury investigation; (d) Tormey caused inquiry to be made of the architect about the figures on school construction, saying that the trustees thought there was something 'fishy' about the construction contract, and implying that plaintiff was participating in the architect's fee.
As in the first cause, it is alleged that these acts were done for the purpose of rendering it impossible for plaintiff to perform under the contract, and that the acts did so render it impossible, because of conflicts with the public and loss of confidence and support of school principal and teachers.
The charges against the district attorney also are in the third count. It is alleged that following a meeting with the three trustees and Tormey, the district attorney, acting through his deputies: (a) conducted an investigation, not only of the brisbane School District, but also of the Bayshore School District, where plaintiff also was employed, although the trustees of the latter district had not...
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