Lippold v. Hart
| Decision Date | 13 June 1969 |
| Parties | Florence LIPPOLD and Roland Lippold, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Frank Gerald HART and Alta Hart, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 25606. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Watson, Tedesco, Sanguinetti, & Alphonse, by Vincent N. Tedesco, San Jose, for appellants.
Owen, Melbye & Rohlff, Redwood City, for respondents.
Appellants brought this action to recover for personal injuries and property damage suffered in an automobile collision with respondent Frank Hart. After a jury trial had resulted in a defense verdict, appellants' motion for new trial was denied. Appellants contend that the trial judge improperly denied this motion; we agree, and therefore reverse the judgment.
The accident occurred on February 7, 1966; appellant Florence Lippold, while driving appellants' automobile, was forced by traffic preceding her to come to a sharp halt on a 4-lane highway. Respondent Frank Hart was driving respondents' automobile directly behind Mrs. Lippold. When she stopped abruptly, he was unable to avoid striking the rear end of her vehicle. Appellants' automobile was damaged and Mrs. Lippold claimed personal injuries.
At the hearing on appellants' motion for a new trial, the judge indicated he felt the verdict was unfair, saying 'That lady was definitely entitled to recover something * * *.' He stated that he did not believe some of Mr. Hart's testimony and that the smoothness of that testimony and the ingenuity and persuasiveness of counsel for respondents had led the jury to disbelieve Mrs. Lippold. Although stating that 'an unjust result has occurred,' the trial judge denied the motion for a new trial because
Appellants correctly contend that these statements of the trial judge show that he misconceived his function at the hearing on the new trial motion. The comments suggest that the judge thought himself bound to uphold the jury verdict because the evidence was conflicting. But a judge is not bound by a conflict in evidence when he is ruling on a motion for a new trial; rather, he must reweigh the evidence, the inferences therefrom, and the credibility of the witnesses in determining whether the jury 'clearly should have reached a different verdict' (Code Civ.Proc. § 657; Alhambra Cons. Mines, Inc. v. Alhambra Shumway Mines, Inc. (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 590, 597, 49 Cal.Rptr. 38; Scannell v. Schmitt (1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 19, 21--22, 274 P.2d 455; 3 Witkin, California Procedure (1954) Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, § 15, and cases cited therein).
Respondents contend that this court may only review the final order of the trial judge and, as there was substantial evidence to support the verdict, that we must affirm the judgment; in support of this contention respondents cite many cases in which it has been stated that the reasons given by a trial judge for his decision on a motion for new trial may not be relied upon by an appellate court to reverse the judgment below (see Yarrow v. State of California (1960) 53 Cal.2d 427, 2 Cal.Rptr. 137, 348 P.2d 687; Figone v. Statter (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 699, 56 Cal.Rptr. 762).
However, where the comments of the trial judge indicate that he misconceived his duty at the hearing on the motion for new trial, an appellate court will not blindly affirm the judgment below because there is some evidence to support it (People v. Robarge (1953) 41 Cal.2d 628, 262 P.2d 14; cf. Ehrenreich v. Shelton (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 376, 28 Cal.Rptr. 855; Smith v. Fetterhoff (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 471, 295 P.2d 474; Gosnell v. Webb (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 1, 139 P.2d 985). Such an approach would 'let the form control the substance' (Gosnell v. Webb, Supra, at p. 5, 139 P. at p. 987). In People v. Robarge, Supra, the trial judge denied a motion for a new trial on the basis of testimony--apparently accepted by the jury--which the judge disbelived; in vacating the judgment and the order denying the motion for...
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