Lisa W. v. Kijakazi

• Decision Date: 22 March 2022
• Docket Number: 1:20-cv-02829-MG-SEB
• Parties: Lisa W., [1] Plaintiff, v. Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

Lisa W., ^[1] Plaintiff, v. Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.

No. 1:20-cv-02829-MG-SEB

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division

March 22, 2022

ENTRY REVIEWING THE COMMISSIONER'S DECISION

Mario Garcia United States Magistrate Judge

In December 2016, Plaintiff Lisa W. filed for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") from the Social Security Administration ("SSA"), alleging a disability onset date of February 15, 2010. [Filing No 12-5 at 4.] Her application was initially denied on May 19, 2017, [Filing No. 12-4 at 7-15], and upon reconsideration on September 12, 2017, [Filing No. 12-4 at 17-25]. Lisa W. requested a hearing, and Administrative Law Judge Gladys Whitfield (the "ALJ") conducted hearings on both June 27 2019 and November 15, 2019. [Filing No. 12-2 at 40-145.] The ALJ issued a decision on December 2, 2019 concluding that Lisa W. was not entitled to receive benefits. [Filing No. 12-2 at 21-32.] The Appeals Council denied review on August 31, 2020. [Filing No. 12-2 at 2-6.]

On October 31, 2020, Lisa W. filed this civil action asking the Court to review the denial of benefits according to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). [Filing No. 1.] The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. [Filing No. 11.]

I. Standard of Review

"The [SSA] provides benefits to individuals who cannot obtain work because of a physical or mental disability." Biestek v. Berryhill, U.S., 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1151 (2019). Disability is the inability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." Stephens v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)).

When an applicant appeals an adverse benefits decision, the Court's role is limited to ensuring that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and that substantial evidence exists for the ALJ's decision. Id. For purposes of judicial review, "substantial evidence" is such relevant "evidence that 'a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Zoch v. Saul, 981 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Biestek, 139 S.Ct. at 1154). "Although this Court reviews the record as a whole, it cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the SSA by reevaluating the facts, or reweighing the evidence to decide whether a claimant is in fact disabled." Stephens, 888 F.3d at 327. Reviewing courts also "do not decide questions of credibility, deferring instead to the ALJ's conclusions unless 'patently wrong.'" Zoch, 981 F.3d at 601 (quoting Summers v. Berryhill, 864 F.3d 523, 528 (7th Cir. 2017)). The Court does "determine whether the ALJ built an 'accurate and logical bridge' between the evidence and the conclusion." Peeters v. Saul, 975 F.3d 639, 641 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 837 (7th Cir. 2014)).

The SSA applies a five-step evaluation to determine whether the claimant is disabled. Stephens, 888 F.3d at 327 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)). The ALJ must evaluate the following, in sequence:

(1) whether the claimant is currently [un]employed; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed by the [Commissioner]; (4) whether the claimant can perform her past work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy.

Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000), as amended (Dec. 13, 2000) (citations omitted). "If a claimant satisfies steps one, two, and three, she will automatically be found disabled. If a claimant satisfies steps one and two, but not three, then she must satisfy step four. Once step four is satisfied, the burden shifts to the SSA to establish that the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy." Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995).

After step three, but before step four, the ALJ must determine a claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC") by evaluating "all limitations that arise from medically determinable impairments, even those that are not severe." Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009). In doing so, the ALJ "may not dismiss a line of evidence contrary to the ruling." Id. The ALJ uses the RFC at step four to determine whether the claimant can perform her own past relevant work and if not, at step five to determine whether the claimant can perform other work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv)-(v). The burden of proof is on the claimant for steps one through four; only at step five does the burden shift to the Commissioner. See Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868.

If the ALJ committed no legal error and substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ's decision, the Court must affirm the denial of benefits. Stephens, 888 F.3d at 327. When an ALJ's decision does not apply the correct legal standard, a remand for further proceedings is usually the appropriate remedy. Karr v. Saul, 989 F.3d 508, 513 (7th Cir. 2021). Typically, a remand is also appropriate when the decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2005). "An award of benefits is appropriate only where all factual issues have been resolved and the 'record can yield but one supportable conclusion.'" Id. (quoting Campbell v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 1993)).

II. Background

Lisa W. was 33 years old on February 15, 2010, the date of her alleged onset of disability, and was 40 years old at the time of her December 2016 application. [Filing No. 12-2 at 30.] Lisa W.'s date last insured is December 31, 2018. [Filing No. 12-2 at 23.] To qualify for DIB, she must show that she was disabled as of December 31, 2018. See Martinez v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 2011).

Lisa W. completed a high school education, and she has a master's degree in social work. [Filing No. 12-2 at 109.] She has past relevant work experience as a customer service clerk, computer operator, online merchandiser, child care provider, animal caretaker, survey worker, and research assistant. [Filing No. 12-2 at 30.] For the ten years immediately preceding her alleged onset date, Lisa W. worked in Washington, D.C. as a research associate. [Filing No. 12-2 at 106.] After that, she moved to Indiana to live with her parents and worked a variety of jobs, including babysitting, dog sitting, and administering a survey for a non-profit organization. [Filing No. 12-2 at 106-108.] Starting in February 2019, she began performing customer service work for Goodwill and remained in that position through her hearing dates. [Filing No. 12-2 at 23.] Lisa W.'s original application alleges that she is unable to work because she suffers from migraines, major depressive disorder, neck pain, back pain, sleep apnea, temporomandibular joint dysfunction with headaches, flat feet (which cause back pain), high blood pressure, rosacea, pre-diabetes, obesity, and adenomyosis. [Filing No. 12-6 at 5.]^[2]

The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) and concluded that Lisa W. was not disabled and therefore did not qualify for benefits. [Filing No. 12-2 at 32.] Specifically, the ALJ found as follows:

• At Step One, Lisa W. had not engaged in substantial gainful activity^[3] during the period at issue (at least for purposes of the decision). [Filing No. 12-2 at 23 ("The undersigned finds the claimant is currently employed at Goodwill and earning above SGA. However, the undersigned finds that since the claimant can be denied at a later step, the undersigned will continue with the sequential evaluation.").]

• At Step Two, Lisa W. had the following severe impairments: "Cervical spine disorder, obesity, and major depressive disorder." [Filing No. 12-2 at 24.]

• At Step Three, Lisa W. did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments. [Filing No. 12-2 at 24.]

• After Step Three but before Step Four, Lisa W. had the RFC "to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except: The claimant can occasionally climb ramps and stairs as well as occasionally balance and stoop, but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and never kneel, crouch, or crawl. She can frequently push and pull as well as reach sideways and forward, but occasionally overhead reach. She can continuously handle, finger, or feel. She must avoid all exposure to unprotected heights, hazardous moving machinery, and avoid any rapid head or neck movements. She can have at least occasional, superficial interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and general public. She can do simple and more complex work. She must avoid all strobe lights or flashing lights in ordinary course of business. She cannot perform any job where driving is required to perform functions of the job. She cannot work in any job exceeding level three, moderate noise level. She cannot do fast-paced production requirements." [Filing No. 12-2 at 26.]

• At Step Four, the ALJ found that Lisa W. is unable to perform her past relevant work. [Filing No. 12-2 at 30.]

• At Step Five, relying on the testimony of a vocational expert ("VE") and considering Lisa W's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that she could perform, such as sorter, inspector, packing, inspector, and assembler. [Filing No. 12-2 at 31.]

III. Discussion

Lisa W....