Lista v. Newton

• Decision Date: 08 June 2007
• Docket Number: CA 07-00328.
• Citation: 41 A.D.3d 1280,2007 NY Slip Op 05029,838 N.Y.S.2d 299
• Parties: CHRIS LISTA, Respondent, v. MARY NEWTON et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

41 A.D.3d 1280

838 N.Y.S.2d 299

2007 NY Slip Op 05029

CHRIS LISTA, Respondent, v. MARY NEWTON et al., Appellants.

CA 07-00328.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Fourth Department.

Decided June 8, 2007.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Orleans County (James P. Punch, A.J.), entered August 9, 2006 in a Labor Law and common-law negligence action. The order denied defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the motion is granted and the complaint is dismissed.

Memorandum:

Plaintiff commenced this Labor Law and common-law negligence action seeking damages for injuries he allegedly sustained when he fell from a ladder while installing horse stalls in a barn-like building (hereafter, barn). The barn was owned by defendant Mary Newton, who used it to store her property and to shelter horses owned by her daughter, defendant Gerri Schultz. According to plaintiff, he climbed the ladder just prior to the accident and heard the sound of a horse trotting and then heard a clanging sound. He did not remember falling, nor did he know what caused him to fall. He next recalled that he was lying on the ground and that a horse was licking his face. Although plaintiff observed that sections of the moveable fence in the barn had fallen, there is no indication in the record concerning how and why they fell, and there is no other evidence concerning the cause of the accident. We agree with defendants that Supreme Court erred in denying their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

With respect to the cause of action pursuant to Labor Law § 240 (1), which is asserted only against Newton, we conclude that the exemption from liability for "owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work" applies to Newton, and thus that she is entitled to summary judgment dismissing that cause of action. "[W]hen an owner of a one- or two-family dwelling contracts for work that directly relates to the residential use of the home, even if the work also serves a commercial purpose, that owner is shielded by the homeowner exemption from the absolute liability" of Labor Law § 240 (1) (Bartoo v Buell, 87 NY2d 362, 368 [1996]). Furthermore, "[t]he fact that the work was performed on the barn and not on [a] residential home ... does not alter the analysis; the barn, located on [Newton]'s property and used in part for personal storage purposes, is akin to a garage and should be considered an extension of the dwelling within the scope of the homeowner exemption" (id. at 369; see George v Hunt [appeal No. 1], 289 AD2d 935 [2001]).

With respect to the common-law negligence cause of action, which is asserted against both defendants, we note that the only theory of negligence with respect to the cause of plaintiff's fall is that the horse knocked down sections of the fence in the barn, causing the ladder...