Lister v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 25 October 1979
• Citation: 159 Cal.Rptr. 280,98 Cal.App.3d 64
• Parties: Jim K. LISTER, aka Jimmy Keith Lister, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Respondent. Civ. 18575.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 280

159 Cal.Rptr. 280

98 Cal.App.3d 64

Jim K. LISTER, aka Jimmy Keith Lister, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Respondent.

Civ. 18575.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Oct. 25, 1979.

L. B. Elam, County Counsel, and Thomas A. Darling, Deputy County Counsel, Sacramento, for respondent.

David P. Simmons, Sacramento, for petitioner.

PUGLIA, Presiding Justice.

In this proceeding for a writ of prohibition, petitioner, Jim K. Lister, seeks to prohibit enforcement of a Sacramento Superior Court order adjudging him in criminal contempt and imposing two days' imprisonment and a $100 fine. The court found the manner in which petitioner responded to two official questionnaires designed to elicit his eligibility and availability for jury service constituted "(a)buse of the process or proceedings of the court," "(d)isobedience of (a) lawful . . . order, or process of the court," and "unlawful interference with the process or proceedings" of the court within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 1209, subdivisions 4, 5, and 8. (Succeeding statutory references are to the Code Civ.Proc. unless otherwise indicated.) Section 1209 denominates as contempt several specific "acts or omissions in respect to a court of justice, or proceedings therein, . . ." The decisive question on review is whether the jury questionnaire as utilized here constitutes an "order," "process" or "proceedings" of the court within the meaning of section 1209. We hold that it does not and accordingly restrain the trial court from enforcing its contempt judgment.

The Sacramento County Jury Commissioner is authorized to prepare lists of qualified prospective jurors who may be summoned for jury duty ( § 204a); the commissioner is under the direct supervision of the presiding judge of the superior court. In the regular course of business, the commissioner mailed petitioner a questionnaire and cover letter requesting his "full cooperation" in answering all questions regarding jury qualification, exemption, and excuse.

Petitioner filled out the questionnaire in crayon, leaving some questions unanswered; the response to other questions was impertinent or flippant. For example, to questions inquiring of his occupation and the ages of his minor children, petitioner responded, "None of your business." To a question regarding his citizenship, he answered: ". . . white, middle class." Petitioner claimed exemption from jury service on the basis of "Incompetent judges, bleeding heart judges, irresponsible judges, and adversary system which favors the accused and neglect(s) the rights of victims."

Accompanying the questionnaire was a letter from petitioner addressed "to who(m)ever sent this trash in the mail." The letter was critical of the "justice meted out" by judges in Sacramento and suggested that the questionnaire be sent instead to some other "property holder 'who has had, or is presently, burning with some desire to sit in judgment in the same court with the creeps, the creep's defense and the creep who ultimately decides to dismiss charges against the creep-in- question (accused).' " ¹ The letter concludes: "So keep this crap out of my mail box or I'll see the post office about you violating my rights against junk mail. Hope you can read crayon. Can you write crayon? Do you understand crayon? "

Deeming petitioner's answers unresponsive, the superior court administrator, at the direction of the presiding judge, sent him a second questionnaire. In an accompanying letter, the court administrator pointed out the official nature of the communication, the mandatory jury obligation of every citizen, and the necessity of petitioner's completing and returning the questionnaire. The letter also emphasized that failure to respond appropriately to the second questionnaire would result in an order to show cause why petitioner should not be held in contempt of court. Although petitioner completely filled out the second questionnaire, his answers to certain questions were flippant, impertinent, or unresponsive. For example, petitioner inconsistently indicated his marital status as "Married," "Single," "Divorced" and "Other," without further explanation of the latter category. Petitioner did answer that his occupation was police officer; however, even though peace officers are exempt from jury service ( § 202.5), petitioner's stated reason for claiming exemption was: "Anyone who is on trial is obviously guilty of something or else. He/she would not be in court. The officers who obtained info, made a report, arrested a suspect obviously had reason to act. The accused must have committed some type of crime to initiate the process." ² At the end of an attachment elaborating on his reasons for claiming excuse from jury service, petitioner threatened: "I answered all questions and if I'm chosen for a jury I'll bring copies of this form for distribution to any defense attorney who may be handling a case in any jury I may serve in for his own enlightenment."

The court administrator, considering petitioner's entire series of communications an indirect contempt of court, executed and filed a declaration in support of an order to show cause why petitioner should not be held in contempt. The order issued, and a hearing thereon was held before the presiding judge of the superior court. The court adjudged plaintiff in contempt, sentenced him to jail for two days, and fined him $100; the sentence was suspended and enforcement of the order stayed pending review.

On May 3, 1979, we granted an alternative writ of prohibition to review the validity of the contempt order. A writ of prohibition is an appropriate vehicle for determining whether a lower court has exceeded its jurisdiction by imposing an invalid contempt order. (People v. Superior Court (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 600, 606, 104 Cal.Rptr. 876; Charbonneau v. Superior Court (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 505, 507, fn. 1, 116 Cal.Rptr. 153.)

We dismiss as untenable the contention that the letter from the court administrator accompanying the questionnaire constitutes an "order" of the court under section 1209. None of those documents was filed, nor was an order of court entered in the minutes. ( § 1003; Ketscher v. Superior Court (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 601, 604, 88 Cal.Rptr. 357.)

Respondent court asserts, however, that ". . . the sending of the jury question(n)aires . . . and the letter from the Court Administrator . . . were all part of the process or proceedings utilized by the respondent Court for the purpose of carrying out mandatory duties to inquire into the qualifications of prospective jurors and to select and summon persons for jury duty . . . ."

A fundamental rule of statutory interpretation requires that statutes be construed according to their plain meaning, absent persuasive evidence of a contrary legislative intent. (See People v. Koester (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 631, 641, 126 Cal.Rptr. 73.)

In its most comprehensive sense, the term "process" is synonymous with "proceeding" and embraces the entire proceedings in an action from beginning to end. (Stearns v. State (1909) 23 Okl. 462, 100 P. 909, 914; State v. District Court of Second Judicial Dist. (1941) 45 N.M. 119, 112 P.2d 506, 509; State v. Sullivan (1944) 245 Wis. 180, 13 N.W.2d 550, 555; Roddy v. Fitzgerald's Estate (1944) 113 Vt. 472, 35 A.2d 668, 670; McKenna v. Cooper (1909) 79 Kan. 847, 101 P. 662; Wolf v. McKinley (1896) 65 Minn. 156, 68 N.W. 2, 3; Gollsbitsch v. Ranibon (1892) 84 Iowa 567, 51 N.W. 48, 49.)

The word "proceeding" or "proceedings" in its general sense refers to the form and manner of conducting judicial business before a court or judicial officer. (Zangerle v. Evatt (1942) 139 Ohio St. 563, 41 N.E.2d 369, 372; Lane County v. Bristow (1946) 179 Or. 653, 173 P.2d 954, 958-959; Mellen v Knotts (1954) 125 Ind.App. 113, 119 N.E.2d 20, 23.) It may also refer to a mere procedural step that is part of the larger action or special proceeding. (Rooney v. Vermont Investment Corp. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 351, 367, 110 Cal.Rptr. 353, 515 P.2d 297.)

Apart from its technical signification as a word of art in legal parlance, the term "proceeding" or "proceedings" undoubtedly has other more common meanings depending upon the context in which it appears and the subject to which it relates (see Zangerle v. Evatt, supra, 139 Ohio St. 563, 41 N.E.2d at p. 372). However, we are satisfied that the term as it appears in section 1209 is used in its technical legal sense and refers to something done or to be done in a court of justice or before a judicial officer. Accordingly, the dispatch by administrative functionaries of the court to plaintiff of jury questionnaires and related correspondence does not constitute "proceedings" of the court within the meaning of section 1209.

Our research has disclosed only one case close on its facts and that decision supports the view which we have adopted. In Statter v. United States (9th Cir. 1933) 66 F.2d 819, the district court...