Litchfield Plantation Co., Inc. v. Georgetown County Water and Sewer Dist.
| Decision Date | 03 February 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 24069,24069 |
| Citation | 443 S.E.2d 574,314 S.C. 30 |
| Parties | LITCHFIELD PLANTATION COMPANY, INC., Appellant, v. GEORGETOWN COUNTY WATER AND SEWER DISTRICT, Respondent. . Heard |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Preston B. Haines, III, Hardig & Parsons, Pawley's Island, Howell V. Bellamy, Jr., Kathryn M. Cook, and David B. Miller, Bellamy, Rutenberg, Copeland, Epps, Gravely & Bowers, P.A., Myrtle Beach, for appellant.
William W. Doar, Jr., McNair Law Firm, and Sylan L. Rosen, Rosen & Rosen, Georgetown, for respondent.
This is an appeal from the special referee's order enjoining respondent from violating the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). We affirm.
Appellant Litchfield Plantation Company (Litchfield) entered an agreement in 1980 with respondent Georgetown County Water and Sewer District (District) which transferred water and sewer easements to District. District attempted to install a sewer line in 1989 but Litchfield objected. In October 1989 District brought a declaratory judgment action and also sought an injunction.
On November 22, Litchfield sent the first of five extensive requests to District under the FOIA, S.C.Code Ann. §§ 30-4-10 et seq. (1991). On December 18, District responded to Litchfield's first request stating Litchfield could copy and inspect the records after January 4, 1990.
After further communication and delays regarding the availability of the records, Litchfield brought an action seeking to enjoin District from violating the FOIA and requesting attorneys' fees. The special referee found District had violated the FOIA and ordered District to comply with the requests as long as the requested information was not exempt. The special referee declined to award attorneys' fees stating there was no evidence in the record to support such an award. Litchfield moved to re-open the evidence to place into the record evidence regarding attorneys' fees. The special referee denied the motion stating the evidence would be unnecessary as he would not award attorneys' fees.
1) Did the Special Referee err in finding District had not waived the exemptions under S.C.Code Ann. § 30-4-40 (1991)?
2) Did the Special Referee err in not awarding Litchfield attorneys' fees?
Section 30-4-30(a) provides: "[a]ny person has a right to inspect or copy any public record of a public body, except as otherwise provided by § 30-4-40, in accordance with reasonable rules concerning time and place of access." Section 30-4-40 lists several matters which "are exempt from disclosure under the provisions of this chapter." Subsection 30-4-30(c) provides, in pertinent part:
[e]ach public body, upon written request for records made under this chapter, shall within fifteen days (excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) of the receipt of any such request notify the person making such request of its determination and the reasons therefor.... If written notification of the determination of the public body as to the availability of the requested public record is neither mailed nor personally delivered to the person requesting the document within the fifteen days allowed herein, the request must be considered approved.
The special referee found the exemptions in § 30-4-40 absolute despite District's failure to timely respond. Litchfield argues because District failed to reply within fifteen days, the request is considered approved and the exemptions waived. We disagree. We hold under § 30-4-30(c) failure to respond within fifteen days means the disclosure of non-exempt material at the time and place of access which the party requested is deemed approved.
Under § 30-4-40 the matters listed "are exempt from disclosure under the provisions of" the FOIA. (emphasis added). We decline to hold these exemptions can be waived by the public body's failure to respond within fifteen days. The special referee correctly held these exemptions could not be waived. 1
S.C.Code Ann. § 30-4-100(b)(1991) provides:
If a person or entity seeking such relief prevails, he or it may be awarded reasonable attorney fees and other costs of litigation. If such person or entity prevails in part, the court may in its discretion award him or it reasonable attorney fees or an appropriate portion thereof.
(emphasis added). The special referee found Litchfield had not presented evidence on the issue of attorneys' fees. The special referee denied Litchfield's motion to re-open the evidence stating he did not think attorneys' fees should be awarded. Litchfield contends since the special referee found District had not complied with the FOIA, it prevailed and should have been awarded attorneys' fees. As § 30-4-100(b) provides attorneys' fees may be awarded, the special referee has the discretion to award fees. We find the special referee did not abuse his discretion.
AFFIRMED.
While I concur with the majority on the issue of attorney fees, I must respectfully dissent from the majority's narrow interpretation of the Freedom of Information Act.
I agree with Litchfield that the District's failure to respond within the mandated 15-day period waives the statutory exemptions. The majority opinion summarily deals with this novel issue by contorting the plain language of the statute to limit the automatic approval of a request to time and place of access.
Section 30-4-30(a) uses the phrase "except as otherwise provided by § 30-4-40" to describe the normal implementation of the statute. Therefore, under the plain meaning of the statute, if an agency responds within 15 days, then the § 30-4-40 exemptions apply. Section 30-4-30(c) provides that a request which is not addressed within the 15-day period is "considered approved." Nowhere in this latter section does it provide that the § 30-4-40 exemptions are still applicable. To read this into the statute flies in the face of our normal rules of statutory construction, and wreaks havoc with the underlying policy which gave rise to the Freedom of Information Act. See First Baptist Church of Mauldin...
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