Litigation Relating to the Riot of Sept. 22, 1991, at the Maximum Sec. Unit of the Montana State Prison, Matter of

• Decision Date: 22 September 1991
• Citation: 283 Mont. 277,939 P.2d 1013
• Parties: In the Matter of LITIGATION RELATING TO THE RIOT OF
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 1013

939 P.2d 1013

283 Mont. 277

In the Matter of LITIGATION RELATING TO THE RIOT OF SEPTEMBER 22, 1991, AT THE MAXIMUM SECURITY UNIT OF THE MONTANA STATE PRISON.

No. 96-539.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs May 15, 1997.

Decided June 24, 1997.

John H. Maynard, Marcia Davenport; Browning, Kaleczyc, Berry & Hoven, Helena, Norman C. Peterson, Assistant Attorney General, Agency Legal Services Bureau, Helena, for appellants.

William Boggs, Attorney at Law, Missoula, Michael D. Cok, Attorney at Law, Bozeman, Wendy Holton, Attorney at Law, Helena, Kerry N. Newcomer; Geiszler & Newcomer, Missoula, Scott C. Wurster; Attorney at Law, Kalispell, for respondents.

GRAY, Justice.

The individual defendants in numerous legal actions arising out of the 1991 riot at the Montana State Prison appeal from an order of the Third Judicial District Court, Powell County, denying their motions for summary judgment which were based on qualified immunity. We dismiss the appeal, award sanctions and remand to the District Court for determination of the amount of the sanctions and for further proceedings.

The dispositive issue on appeal is whether this Court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal.

BACKGROUND

On September 22, 1991, a riot occurred at the Montana State Prison (MSP). Stated briefly, maximum security inmates breached security devices and systems and took over the Maximum Security Unit (Max). Scores of maximum security inmates were freed from their cells and access was gained to inmates housed in the Max in "protective custody" for the purpose of safeguarding them from perceived risks of harm from other inmates. Five protective custody inmates were killed and attempts were made to kill eight others, some of whom received serious injuries. Both external and internal investigations were undertaken at the behest of the Montana Department of Corrections (Department), including the "Riot at Max Report," also called the "Schwartz Report," and the "Gooch Report." The results of the investigations generally were not favorable to the manner in which prison employees operated the Max.

Substantial litigation ensued, including the negligence and civil rights cases underlying this appeal. In these cases, brought by the estates of deceased protective custody inmates and by surviving protective custody inmates, the State of Montana is the primary defendant in negligence claims against employees at the MSP, on a respondeat superior basis; individual supervisory employees and the Department are the defendants in civil rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The thrust of the § 1983 actions is the alleged breach by the individual defendants of their constitutional duty to use reasonable care to ensure the safety of incarcerated inmates. Both the plaintiffs and the defendants filed and briefed numerous motions and the District Court heard oral argument.

On July 15, 1996, the District Court entered an Opinion and Order on Pending Motions. Among other rulings, the court determined that the final conclusions in the Schwartz Report and the Gooch Report were admissible into evidence and that the authors of those reports were qualified to testify as experts in their respective fields of prison administration and personnel administration. The court also granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on liability, concluding that reasonable minds could reach only one conclusion--namely, that the defendants' breach of their duty to safely operate the Max directly contributed to the riot and the resulting damages and injuries. Finally, the District Court denied the individual defendants' motions for summary judgment on the § 1983 claims, which were based on qualified immunity. In the latter regard, it concluded that questions of fact existed as to the defendants' knowledge of the substantial risk of harm to the protective custody inmates in the Max at the time of the riot and the obviousness of the risk, and that these questions relating to the reasonableness of the defendants' conduct must be resolved by the trier of fact. The individual defendants appeal from the District Court's denial of their qualified immunity-based motions for summary judgment.

Does this Court have jurisdiction to consider this appeal?

The defendants present a number of arguments relating to asserted errors by the District Court in denying their motions for summary judgment. The plaintiffs, however, raise the threshold issue of whether we have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. We conclude that the appeal is premature and, as a result, we do not have jurisdiction to consider it.

This Court's jurisdiction is set forth in Article VII, Section 2 of the 1972 Montana Constitution. Specifically, Article VII, Section 2(1), vests us with appellate jurisdiction and Article VII, Section 2(3), authorizes us to make rules governing appellate procedure.

The Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure, duly adopted by this Court, govern appeals to this Court from Montana district courts. Rule 1(b)(1), M.R.App.P., expressly provides that an appeal may be taken from a final judgment entered in an action in a district court. A final judgment is one wherein a final determination of the rights of the parties has been made; any decree which leaves matters undetermined is interlocutory in nature and not a final judgment for purposes of appeal. Kirchner v. W. Mont. Mental Health Ctr. (1993), 261 Mont. 227, 229, 861 P.2d 927, 929 (citations omitted). Although the defendants do not address the matter, it is inarguable that the District Court's order denying the defendants' motions for summary judgment left matters unresolved. Moreover, it has long been the law in Montana that an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment. See Brown v. Midland Nat. Bank (1967), 150 Mont. 422, 429, 435 P.2d 878, 881-82. Thus, it is clear that the defendants' appeal to this Court is not an appeal from a final judgment.

Nor is the defendants' appeal authorized by subsection (2) or (3) of Rule 1(b), M.R.App.P. Those subsections expressly authorize appeals from specified interlocutory orders; however, orders denying summary judgment are not included in the delineated orders from which an appeal can be taken. See Rules 1(b)(2) and (3), M.R.App.P.

Pursuant to the Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure, therefore, the defendants' appeal is premature. A premature appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Kirchner v. Western Montana Mental Health Center (1995), 272 Mont. 110, 112-13, 899 P.2d 1102, 1104; Kirchner, 861 P.2d at 929; In re Marriage of Rex (1982), 199 Mont. 328, 330, 649 P.2d 460, 461.

The defendants do not address Montana law regarding the appealability of the District Court's order denying their motions for summary judgment based on qualified immunity in any fashion. Rather, they contend that "the record is ripe for appeal" and that federal authority establishes the appealability of at least a portion of the District Court's order. We address the contentions in turn.

We observe, initially, that the defendants cite to no authority in support of their "ripe for appeal" contention. The reason, of course, is that no such authority exists. The fact that, in the defendants' view, the current record "may easily be reviewed by this Court" is irrelevant to the issue of whether the District Court's order denying motions for summary judgment is appealable at this time, thus vesting jurisdiction in this Court to entertain the appeal. Indeed, the defendants' suggestion that a record "ripe for appeal" or "easily reviewable" somehow renders an order entered on that record appealable--carried to its logical extreme--would totally nullify Rule 1, M.R.App.P., by allowing interlocutory appeals of virtually all interlocutory orders; this is so because the records on which district courts are requested to enter such orders presumably also are "ripe." In short, the defendants' contention in this regard is totally without merit.

Nor is the defendants' assertion of federal authority regarding the appealability of an unfavorable order on a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity in a § 1983 action well taken. As background to our discussion of the defendants' position in this regard, we briefly set forth recent federal decisional history regarding the appealability of orders denying qualified immunity in § 1983 civil rights actions.

By 1985, the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals had divided on the issue, with the First, Eighth and District of Columbia Circuits holding that such orders were appealable and the Third, Fifth and Seventh Circuits holding that they lacked jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity rulings. Cf. Krohn v. United States (1st Cir.1984), 742 F.2d 24; Evans v. Dillahunty (8th Cir.1983), 711 F.2d 828; McSurely v. McClellan (D.C.Cir.1982), 697 F.2d 309; with Forsyth v. Kleindienst (3rd Cir.1984), 729 F.2d 267; Kenyatta v. Moore (5th Cir.1984), 744 F.2d 1179; Lightner v. Jones (7th Cir.1985), 752 F.2d 1251.

The United States Supreme Court resolved the division among the Circuit Courts over the appealability of interlocutory decisions denying qualified immunity to § 1983 defendants in Mitchell v. Forsyth (1985), 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411. There, the federal district court had denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, concluding that the defendant's actions violated clearly established law, and the Third Circuit held that the order was not appealable. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 517-19, 105 S.Ct. at 2811 (citations omitted).

The Supreme Court began its analysis by observing that 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the federal statute delineating the appellate jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts, vested those courts with jurisdiction only from "final decisions" of the federal district courts. Noting that a decision which was "final" within the meaning of § 1291 did...