Little Portion Franciscan Sisters v. Boatright
| Decision Date | 27 July 2000 |
| Citation | 26 S.W.3d 443 |
| Parties | (Mo.App. S.D. 2000) Little Portion Franciscan Sisters, Inc., Lorene Louise Boatright, and John O. Howell, Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. Doug Boatright, In His Capacity as Mayor of The City of Republic, Missouri, and Tom Cunningham, Darryl Barr, Stan Heimer, Doug Shy, Rabbi Dewayne Willis, Robert Swearingin, Jim Huntsinger, and Bill Pool, In Their Capacity as Aldermen in The City of Republic, Missouri, and The City of Republic, Missouri, A Municipal Corporation, Defendants-Respondents. 23296 0 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Greene County, Hon. Henry W. Westbrooke, Jr., Judge
Counsel for Appellant: Don G. Busch
Counsel for Respondent: James M. Kelly
Opinion Summary: None
This is an appeal from a judgment entered in a suit for declaratory judgment and injunction filed by Plaintiffs against the City of Republic, Missouri, its mayor, and the members of its Board of Aldermen ("Defendants"). In that suit, Plaintiffs, property owners in Republic, sought a declaration that Republic was restricted in the manner it could use the proceeds of sewer bonds, and an injunction to prevent what they consider to be unauthorized use of those funds. The trial court entered judgment for Defendants and this appeal followed.
The ballot submitting the sewer bond issue to the voters contained the following provision:
Shall the City of Republic, Missouri issue and sell negotiable combined waterworks and sewerage system revenue bonds in the amount of Fourteen Million Three Hundred Thousand Dollars ($14,300,000) for the purpose of payment of all or a part of the costs of acquiring real estate and rights-of-way, constructing, extending and improving the combined waterworks and sewerage system of the City by constructing a new sewerage treatment plant, at the location of the existing treatment plant, and appurtenances; . . . In their sole point on appeal, Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in denying their claim for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief because the ballot approved by the voters "restricted the expenditure of the bond's proceeds to the purpose of 'constructing a new sewer treatment plant at the location of the existing treatment plant and appurtenances.' " They argue that such restriction would not permit the expenditure of those bond proceeds for the construction of new sanitary sewers, removal of existing lift stations and the construction of new lift stations not necessary to connect the new sewerage treatment plant to the existing sewer system. They explain that their challenge is not to the election or the sufficiency of the ballot, but to the proposed expenditure of proceeds of the bonds authorized in the election for constructing sewer lines, lift stations, the removal of existing lift stations, pressure mains, and other such facilities which are not necessary for the construction of a new sewage treatment plant at the location of the existing plant and the connection of it to the existing sewer system.
In reviewing this issue, we are cognizant of the fact that the voters must be informed of the purpose of the creation of a proposed debt. State ex rel. City of Breckenridge v. Thompson, 15 S.W.2d 346, 347 (Mo. banc 1929). Meyers v. Kansas City, 18 S.W.2d 900 (Mo. banc 1929), is a significant case in this area. It involved a suit to prevent Kansas City from using a portion of monies derived from bonds which were approved by the voters "for the construction, improvement and equipment of municipal docks and wharves." The proposition did not specifically include the purchase of land to construct docks and wharves. The court held that the purchase of land for the docks and wharves was not an authorized use of the bond proceeds, saying:
[The proposition submitted to the voters] contains no grant of power, other than that clearly comprehended within the words employed. There is no room, therefore, for the application of the doctrine of implied powers. This is especially true of a grant of powers to a corporation, municipal or otherwise, and if any doubt arises out of the use of the words employed, it is to be resolved in favor of the public and in limiting the expenditures of the appropriation to the express terms for which it was made. . . . Another general rule in the construction of statutes, applicable as well to municipal ordinances, is that acts of the character here under review are to be strictly construed. (Emphasis added.)Id. at 901.
Meyers was cited with approval in Armstrong v. Adair County, 990 S.W.2d 64 (Mo.App. W.D. 1999), a case in which the county commissioners passed an order imposing a sales tax "for law enforcement purposes at the rate of ½ of one percent (.005%) for providing law enforcement services . . . , ¼ of one percent to be set aside in a separate fund for future expansion of all the Dentention [sic] Center . . ." Id. at 65. The issue was whether the county could use bond proceeds to build a new jail on a different site than the current detention center. The court held that it could not, and in doing so said that "the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another," and "where . . . special methods are expressly prescribed for the exercise of power, other . . . procedures are excluded." Id. at 66. It also said:
By referring specifically to future expansion of the detention center, the commissioners' proposition could have caused a cautious reader to conclude that "law enforcement services" referred to something other than services related to the detention center. Their express mention of expanding the jail implied exclusion of building a new jail from the term "law enforcement services."
Id. It also said that the governing body's intention could be determined by presuming that it intended the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used, and that the plain and ordinary meaning of "expansion" does not connote enlarging a jail by building a new one on a different site. Id.
The above cases, together with the principles that the people's money is not to be spent in a manner other than authorized by an appropriation law, and that appropriation acts must be strictly construed, State ex rel Teasdale v. Spainhower, 580 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Mo. banc 1979), lead us to the conclusion that the bond issue approved by the voters here must be used only for the construction of a new treatment plant at the location of the existing one, and for such other purposes as are necessary to connect it to the existing sewer system.
In arguing that the ballot language was sufficient to permit expenditures for the improvement and extension of the existing sewer system, in addition to the construction of a new treatment plant at the location of the existing one, Defendants point out that section 250.0701 contains the form of a ballot for submission of the question of issuance of revenue bonds. It provides that the question of the issuance of bonds for acquiring, constructing, improving or extending any sewerage system payable from the revenues to be derived from the operation of the system shall be submitted in the following form: They argue that " [I]t necessarily follows...
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White v. Cole Cnty.
... ... assessed by the County against the Sheriff for its portion of the “shared expenses” exceeded the actual amount of ... the purpose of the creation of a proposed [tax].” Little Portion Franciscan Sisters, Inc. v. Boatright, 26 S.W.3d ... ...