Little Rock & F. S. Ry. Co. v. Hanniford

• Decision Date: 25 June 1887
• Citation: 5 S.W. 294
• Parties: LITTLE ROCK & F. S. RY. Co. <I>v.</I> HANNIFORD and others.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

5 S.W. 294

LITTLE ROCK & F. S. RY. Co.

v. HANNIFORD and others.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

June 25, 1887.

Appeal from circuit court, Conway county.

J. M. Moore, for appellant. Eugene B. Henry, for appellees.

BATTLE, J.

On the fourth of January, 1886, plaintiffs, Hanniford, Beal & Wills, purchased of the Armour Packing Company, of Kansas City, Missouri, 25,000 pounds of meat, and delivered it to the Southern Kansas Railroad Company, which executed its bill of lading therefor, and thereby contracted to ship and deliver it to plaintiffs at Morrillton, in this state, at the rate of 55 cents per 100 pounds. The defendant, Little Rock & Fort Smith Railway Company, being one of the connecting line of carriers, received the meat at one end of its line, and carried it to Morrillton. The weight of the meat was not specified in the bill of lading. In the way-bill delivered to the defendant the weight specified was 33,900 pounds. Plaintiff tendered payment of the freight charges on 25,000 pounds, at the rate specified in the bill of lading, and the defendant demanded freight on 33,900 pounds, and for about four days refused to deliver unless freight on that amount was paid. After a delay and refusal to deliver for several days, plaintiffs brought an action against the defendant for the meat, when defendant agreed to accept plaintiffs' offer. Plaintiffs then brought this action for damages to an amount equal to the freight charges tendered for every day defendant refused to deliver the meat after the tender of payment was made.

This action was brought under the act of the legislature approved February 27, 1885, which reads as follows:

"Section 1. Be it enacted by the general assembly of the state of Arkansas, that it shall be unlawful for any railroad company in this state, its officers, agents, or employes, to charge and collect, or to endeavor to charge and collect, from the owner, agent, or consignee of any freight, goods, wares, or merchandise of any character or kind whatever, a greater sum for transporting said freight, goods, wares, or merchandise than is specified in the bill of lading.

"Sec. 2. That any railroad company, its officers, agents, or employes, having possession of any goods, wares, and merchandise of any kind or character whatever, shall deliver the same to the owner, his agent or consignee upon payment of the freight charges, as shown by the bill of lading.

"Sec. 3. That any railroad company, its officers, agents, or employes, that shall refuse to deliver to the owner, agent, or consignee any freight, goods, wares, and merchandise of any kind or character whatever, upon the payment, or tender of payment, of the freight charges due, as shown by the bill of lading, the said company shall be liable in damages to the owner of said freight, goods, wares, or merchandise, to an amount equal to the amount of the freight charges for every day said freight, goods, wares, or merchandise is held after payment, or tender of payment, of the charges due, as shown by the bill of lading, to be recovered in any court of competent jurisdiction."

This act being general and uniform in its operation upon all persons coming within the class to which it applies, it does not come within that special legislation prohibited by the constitution; for it applies to and embraces all persons "who are or who may come into certain situations and circumstances," and is "general and uniform, not because it operates upon every person in the state, for it does not, but because every person who is brought within the relations and circumstances provided for is affected by the law." McAunich v. Mississippi & M. R. Co., 20 Iowa, 342; Iowa R. Land Co. v. Soper, 39 Iowa, 116; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 163; Humes v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 82 Mo. 221; Davis v. State, 3 Lea, 379; Cooley, Const. Lim. (5th Ed.) 481. It is of that class of legislation specially enjoined by the constitution of the state upon the general assembly; for section 10, art. 17, Const. ordains: "The general assembly shall pass laws to correct abuses, and prevent discrimination and excessive charges, by railroad, canal, and turnpike companies for transporting freight and passengers, and shall provide for enforcing such laws by adequate penalties and forfeitures." Vested with the power to correct abuses by railroad companies, they had the right "to determine what, on the part of the railroad, constitute abuses, and to determine what laws will correct them, as well as what remedies may be necessary to secure the enforcement of such laws." In the exercise of this power and right, the act under consideration was, doubtless, passed. Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Harry, 18 Amer. & Eng. R. Cas. 502.

But it is contended that, if this act is applicable to this case, its effect is to regulate the charges to be collected on freight shipped from distant points in other states, and transported over several connecting lines of railroads to points within this state, and thereby affect interstate commerce, and is void. It is true the exclusive power to regulate commerce among the states is given by the constitution of the United States to congress; but the vesting of this power in congress was not a surrender of that which is known as the police power. That power still belongs to the state. The power to regulate commerce does not, in all cases, prevent the states, in the exercise of this power, from interfering with...