Little Rock & Ft. S. Ry. Co. v. Oppenheimer
| Decision Date | 02 October 1897 |
| Citation | 43 S.W. 150 |
| Parties | LITTLE ROCK & FT. S. RY. CO. et al. v. OPPENHEIMER et al. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from circuit court, Conway county; Jeremiah G. Wallace, Judge.
Action by Oppenheimer & Co. against the Little Rock & Ft. Smith Railway Company and others to recover a penalty. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendants appeal. Reversed.
Dodge & Johnson, for appellants. A. S. McKennon, R. J. White, and Carmichael & Seawell, for appellees.
This action was instituted under an act entitled "An act to prevent unjust discrimination * * * and to prevent discrimination between transportation companies and individuals in furnishing cars or motive power," and approved March 24, 1887, for the purpose of collecting a penalty. The plaintiffs recovered a verdict, and a judgment thereon, against the defendants for the sum of $1,500.
The basis of the action was the failure of appellants to furnish the same facilities for transporting cotton from Altus (the shipping station for Roseville) as were furnished at Van Buren. This, it was insisted, was an undue and unjust discrimination in favor of the shippers at Van Buren against the appellees. The important facts are undisputed, and are substantially as follows: The cotton crop of 1891 was unusually large. In Arkansas it exceeded anticipation, and was 100,000 bales larger than the preceding crop. The weather favoring, it was rapidly gathered and hurried to the railroads for transportation to market. The railroad companies were not prepared to ship it at many stations as rapidly as it was offered for shipment. At these stations it soon filled their platforms, after which they refused to receive more until room for it was made by the shipment of that already received. At Roseville, where the appellants had established a receiving station for freight to be shipped at Altus over their road, the platforms were covered with it, and appellants were unable to ship it for many days, because they did not have cars sufficient to meet the demands for transportation upon their road. During the months of October, November, and December of that year (1891) appellees hauled to Roseville several hundred bales of cotton to be shipped at Altus over appellants' road, and tendered them to their agent, and he refused to receive them; giving as his reason for so doing that the station platform at Altus was filled, and he had no room to store or care for it. This cotton lay at Roseville several days awaiting transportation. At Van Buren, a town on appellants' road, however, cotton was promptly shipped. The facilities there for shipping were greater than at any other place on the road, except at Little Rock. This was owing to the fact that there are several roads running to that town, called the Kansas & Arkansas Valley Railway, the St. Louis & San Francisco, the Greenwood branch of the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway, and appellants' railway, the two roads first mentioned competing with the last, and to the fact that appellants proportionately furnished more cars at that place than at others.
The reason more cars were used at Van Buren, in proportion to freight shipped, than were furnished by appellants to other stations or depots, was, it is at one of the termini of their road; and another was, there were wholesale merchants at Van Buren, who shipped goods there by the car load, and thereby caused many cars to be unloaded at that town. Being a terminal point, many empty cars necessarily accumulated there. In such cases it was the duty and custom of the agent at the terminals to use as many of the cars as were needed there, and to report the remainder to the transportation department for distribution.
The statutes upon which this action is based are as follows:
etc.
etc.
etc.
The only parties this act declares shall have equal rights to have persons and property transported over railroads in this state are individuals, associations, and corporations. Having declared that they are entitled to these rights, it further declares that "no unjust or undue discrimination shall be made in charges for, or in facilities for, transportation of freight or passengers." Against whom is this discrimination prohibited? Manifestly, those the act declares are entitled to equal rights. If it meant that it shall not be made against any party without regard to those named, the first clause would be entirely superfluous. Having declared who are entitled to equal rights, it follows that the refusal to them of the same rights allowed to others would be a discrimination. Hence the act forbids unjust or undue discrimination against them in the transportation of persons or property, and imposes a penalty upon any railroad company who shall be guilty of the forbidden act.
Appellees sued for the penalty on account of a discrimination against them as an association, — as a partnership. Are they entitled to it?
The act makes no changes in the common law as to the rights of the parties named therein to equal facilities for shipping, or as to unjust discrimination. At common law it was the duty of the common carrier to receive and carry all goods offered for transportation upon receiving a reasonable hire, and every one had equal rights to transportation by them. Yet under this rule different facilities, furnished under circumstances essentially different, did not constitute an unjust or undue discrimination, when the difference was in accordance with the difference in circumstances, and the difference was not intended to injure another shipper, or give, or did not tend to give, the favored shipper material advantages over him in their competition in business. The observance of this rule accomplished the design and object of the law in prohibiting discrimination, which was to prevent common carriers from favoring one shipper to the injury of another in the same business, from suppressing or diminishing competition, and from creating monopolies. Hays v. Pennsylvania Co., 12 Fed. 309; Samuels v. Railroad Co., 31 Fed. 57; Messenger v. Railroad Co., 36 N. J. Law, 410; Phipps v. Railroad Co., 50 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 497; Hutch. Carr. § 302; 1 Wood, R. R. §§ 197, 198; 4 Elliott, R. R. § 1676.
Was there any unjust or undue discrimination by appellants against appellees? Superior facilities for shipping were furnished at Van Buren. If this was a discrimination, it was not against any particular individual or association, nor against the shippers at any particular station, but against the shippers collectively at every station on the railroad, except at Van Buren; that is to say, in favor of one locality against all others. They furnished the same shipping facilities to all persons, associations, and corporations at Van Buren which they refused to all parties at other stations. Hence there was no discrimination against individuals or associations, they being treated alike under the same circumstances.
There was no intention to injure appellees by discrimination. The facilities furnished at Van Buren in the months of October, November, and December of 1891 were no greater than those furnished in previous years. The evidence does not show that a sufficient number of cars were not furnished at all the stations on the road prior to the fall and winter of 1891. Previous to that time Van Buren had enjoyed the same facilities as it did then, by reason of it being one of the terminals of the railroad, and the same distribution of cars was made. The complaint of unjust discrimination grew out of the unusually large cotton crop of 1891. Sufficient transportation was not furnished then, because appellants had not anticipated it.
In the months of October, November, and December of 1891 appellees were merchandising at Paris, in Logan county, and were not injured by reason of advantages gained, through superior facilities for shipping, by those engaged in the same business. If they suffered, their competitors suffered in like manner. All were treated alike, and suffered in the same manner.
It follows there was no unjust or undue discrimination against appellees, and that they are not entitled to a penalty.
Judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and final judgment is rendered here in favor of appellants.
Necessarily, under the construction given the act by the court, there could be no discrimination between individuals at different stations. So long as all the individuals at any given station are treated alike, there can be no discrimination between these and the individuals at some other station, although at the one station all facilities desired or required are furnished, while at the other they are wholly denied. This, in our opinion, was not the intention of the legislature, and such a construction is not justified by the language of the act. There is nothing in the act limiting the discrimination to individuals of the same station, and, without some such restrictive words in the act itself, we can find no...
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