Little v. Hamel

• Citation: 517 S.E.2d 901,134 NC App. 485
• Decision Date: 03 August 1999
• Docket Number: No. COA98-1110.,COA98-1110.
• Court: Court of Appeal of North Carolina (US)
• Parties: James M. LITTLE, Plaintiff, v. William B. HAMEL, Individually and Helms, Cannon, Hamel, and Henderson, a Professional Association, jointly and severally, Defendants.

517 S.E.2d 901

134 NC App. 485

James M. LITTLE, Plaintiff, v. William B. HAMEL, Individually and Helms, Cannon, Hamel, and Henderson, a Professional Association, jointly and severally, Defendants.

No. COA98-1110.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

August 3, 1999.

Jerry D. Jordan, Winston-Salem, for plaintiff-appellee.

Poyner & Spruill, L.L.P., by E. Fitzgerald Parnell, III and Parmele P. Calame, Charlotte, for defendant-appellants.

HUNTER, Judge.

James M. Little ("plaintiff") is a former employee of the United States Postal Service ("Postal Service"). In February 1993, some time after retiring from his position, plaintiff retained defendant Helms, Cannon, Hamel and Henderson ("Helms Cannon") to represent him in the prosecution of a discrimination and a retaliation claim against the Postal Service. On behalf of plaintiff, Helms Cannon filed a lawsuit ("discrimination lawsuit") on 12 March 1993 in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina alleging that the Postal Service "conspir[ed] to harass, discriminate, and retaliate against [him] in order to deprive [him] of his civil rights, to frustrate [him] in his job and render [him] totally ineffective, to undermine [his] authority, and to prevent [his] advancement in the Postal Service, and destroy [his] career with the Postal Service." The discrimination lawsuit was dismissed pursuant to defendants' motion on 27 June 1994 in a memorandum of decision and order by United States District Court Judge Robert D. Potter, on the grounds that it was barred by the relevant statute of limitations and the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit ("Case I") against Helms Cannon on 25 July 1996 in which he alleged that it was negligent in its representation of him in the discrimination lawsuit. Helms Cannon was granted summary judgment on 18 September 1997, and the plaintiff did not appeal.

Plaintiff filed the present case ("Case II") on 22 September 1997 jointly and severally against William B. Hamel, an attorney with Helms Cannon, and Helms Cannon (collectively "defendants"), alleging they committed fraud by failing to inform plaintiff that he had no claim in the discrimination lawsuit under the relevant statute of limitations and the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Defendants' motion for summary judgment was denied by Judge Downs on 9 July 1998. Defendants appeal.

Defendants contend that the trial court committed error by failing to grant summary judgment based on the doctrine of res judicata.

The denial of a motion for summary judgment is not immediately appealable unless it affects a substantial right. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27 (1995). The denial of a motion for summary judgment on the basis of res judicata affects a substantial right and thus, entitles a party to an immediate appeal. Bockweg v. Anderson, 333 N.C. 486, 428 S.E.2d 157 (1993). Therefore, defendants' appeal is properly before this Court.

The doctrines of res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) are companion doctrines which have been developed by the Courts "for the dual purposes of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating previously decided matters and promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation." Bockweg, 333 N.C. at 491, 428 S.E.2d at 161. Res judicata precludes a second suit involving the same claim between the same parties or those in privity with them when there has been a final judgment on the merits in a prior action in a court of competent jurisdiction. Northwestern Financial Group v. County of Gaston, 110 N.C.App. 531, 536, 430 S.E.2d 689, 692-93 (1993). A judgment operates as an estoppel not only as to all matters actually determined or litigated in the proceeding, "but also as to all relevant and material matters within the scope of the proceeding which the parties, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could and should have brought forward for determination." Rodgers Builders v. McQueen, 76 N.C.App. 16, 22, 331 S.E.2d 726, 730 (1985).

In the present case, this Court must determine if the judgment in Case I precludes the present case. It is clear that Case I was brought before a court of competent jurisdiction and that a final judgment on the merits was obtained by the entry of summary judgment. It is also clear that identical parties are involved. Case I was brought by the plaintiff against Helms Cannon. There is a difference in the present case in that William B. Hamel is a defendant; however, Hamel is quite obviously in "privity with" Helms Cannon since he is an attorney with the firm (and was at the time Case I was filed) and the suit concerns his representation of the plaintiff. Therefore, the only issue before this Court is whether or not the plaintiff has brought the same claim herein as he brought in Case I and, if not, whether the claim being brought here could and should have been brought in Case I.

Plaintiff filed Case I alleging malpractice by defendant law firm in the discrimination lawsuit. Therefore, using reasonable diligence, the law firm should have brought forth any claim relating to defendants' representation of plaintiff in the discrimination...